Are the States Sovereign? by Zick, Timothy
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 83 Issue 1 
January 2005 
Are the States Sovereign? 
Timothy Zick 
The College of William & Mary School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 229 (2005). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
229 
 
 
ARE THE STATES SOVEREIGN? 
TIMOTHY ZICK*
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 230 
II. CLASSICAL SOVEREIGNTY—A BRIEF INTRODUCTION ...................... 239 
III. DOMESTIC SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSES............................................ 241 
A. The Framers ............................................................................ 241 
B. The Supreme Court.................................................................. 243 
C. Scholars................................................................................... 247 
1. Classicists ........................................................................ 247 
2. Republicans ..................................................................... 249 
3. Skeptics ............................................................................ 251 
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE POST-MODERN STATE ............................... 255 
A. Post-Classical Sovereignty...................................................... 257 
B. The “New Sovereignty” .......................................................... 264 
C. Sovereignty as a Social Construct........................................... 269 
1. Some Basic Principles of Social Construction ................ 271 
2. Statehood and Sovereignty as Institutional Facts ........... 276 
V. TOWARD A RE-CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DOMESTIC STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY ................................................................................. 282 
A. A Post-Classical, Post-Modern Sovereignty ........................... 284 
B. The Construction of the Sovereign States of America ............. 288 
1. The Constitutive Rules of State Sovereignty .................... 288 
a. The Rule of Preservation ......................................... 288 
b. The Rule of Separateness......................................... 290 
c. The Rule of Participation ........................................ 291 
d. The Rule of Interpretive Independence.................... 292 
2. Sovereign Symbolism: Imposition of Function and 
Status ............................................................................... 293 
a. Functional Symbols ................................................. 294 
(1) State as Trustee........................................................ 295 
(2) State as Agent .......................................................... 301 
(3) State as Community ................................................. 306 
 * Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. I am indebted to 
Christopher Borgen and Brian Tamanaha for our many discussions and for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this article.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p229 Zick book pages.doc 9/1/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(4) State as Laboratory ................................................. 310 
b. Status Symbols ......................................................... 314 
(1) State as Corporation................................................ 314 
(2) State as Market Participant ..................................... 316 
(3) State as Nation......................................................... 319 
(4) State as Person ........................................................ 322 
C. The “Two Sovereignties” ........................................................ 325 
D. Implications............................................................................. 331 
VI. WHY STATE SOVEREIGNTY STILL MATTERS.................................... 332 
VII. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 335 
 
A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a 
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the 
circumstances and the time in which it is used.1
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Sovereignty” is something of a mythical concept.2 For all the volumes 
that have been written about it, the concept remains somewhat elusive.3 
Yet sovereignty remains a significant aspect of statehood, statecraft, and, 
domestically, of constitutional federalism. The concept performs a variety 
of functions, domestically and abroad.4 Sovereignty channels legal and 
political arguments regarding power and authority. It provides “a 
recognized legal and political hierarchy,” thereby contributing to stability 
“by creating expectations of how political entities are to behave.”5 
Sovereignty regulates the movement of goods and people. It contributes to 
order by “creating a class of political entities that are expected to be 
 1. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.). 
 2. Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law, in SOVEREIGNTY 
IN TRANSITION 115 (Neil Walker ed., 2003) (sovereignty has “acquired an almost mythical quality”). 
 3. Recent treatments of the concept of sovereignty include: JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY 
OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY? THE 
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA 
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS (1995); MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN 
STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); F.H. HINSLEY, 
SOVEREIGNTY (2d ed. 1986); ALAN JAMES, SOVEREIGN STATEHOOD: THE BASIS OF INTERNATIONAL 
SOCIETY (1986); NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH (1999); SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2; STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996); CYNTHIA 
WEBER, SIMULATING SOVEREIGNTY: INTERVENTION, THE STATE, AND SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE (1995).  
 4. See generally FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3. 
 5. Id. at 141. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3
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permanent fixtures” in domestic and international contexts.6 Sovereignty 
levels the playing field by insisting on equality. It “promote[s] the self-
determination of political communities.”7  
In its classical sixteenth century formulation, “sovereignty” connoted 
unlimited and absolute power within a jurisdiction.8 Recent events, 
however, particularly the formation of the European Union, have called 
this conception of sovereignty into doubt. Members of the EU have joined 
or “pooled” their sovereignty, an act which seemingly disqualifies them as 
“sovereign,” at least in the classical sense. International lawyers and 
theorists have questioned whether international relations, in which nations 
and nation-states are increasingly interconnected and exclusive power is a 
fiction, have moved beyond the traditional Westphalian system of 
“sovereign states.”9 At the least, some believe it may be time to re-assess 
and update the centuries-old idea of the sovereign state.10 With all of these 
changes, however, the ordering concepts of statehood and sovereignty 
refuse to disappear.11 “Sovereignty” has purportedly been transferred to 
Iraq.12 Nations, and territories seeking to become nations, continue to 
advance claims to “state sovereignty.”13 On the world stage, it appears as 
if the idea of “state sovereignty” will not be eradicated any time soon. 
Indeed, if anything, the concept appears to be prospering.  
 6. Id. at 142. 
 7. Id. at 145. 
 8. See HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that “at the beginning, at any rate, the idea of 
sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political 
community”). 
 9. See, e.g., CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 3 n.7 (discussing challenges to state 
sovereignty in light of modern conditions). The Westphalian system of states followed the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, which ended the Thirty Years’ War. See Neil Walker, Late Sovereignty in the 
European Union, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 9. For an argument that 
international relations has reached a “post-sovereign” stage, see Richard Bellamy, Sovereignty, Post-
Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights Within the EU, in 
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 167 (“the established pattern of sovereign states faces 
practical and normative challenges”). 
 10. See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 3. 
 11. Id. at 11 (“Sovereignty in both theory and practice is aimed at establishing order and clarity 
in an otherwise turbulent and incoherent world.”). 
 12. See G.A. Res. 1546, U.N. SCOR, 4987th mtg. at 1 (2004) (“Reaffirming the independence, 
sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Iraq”) (emphasis omitted); see also Steven R. Weisman, 
Congress Seeking to Clarify Iraqis’ Role Under Self-Rule, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2004, at A12; Steven 
R. Weisman, The New Government Faces Bargaining Over Its Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at 
A9 (reporting that Iraq’s caretaker government would assume “full sovereignty” after June 30, 2004). 
 13. Quebecois, Basque nationalists, Palestinians, and Scots all continue to plead for sovereignty. 
See Michael Keating, Sovereignty and Plurinational Democracy: Problems in Political Science, in 
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 203–04 (2003) (noting the “paradox, that sovereignty is 
said to be ebbing away, but new sovereignty claims are being made all the time”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Much closer to home, the concept of “state sovereignty” also 
stubbornly persists and prospers. The framers of the Constitution imported 
the concepts of “state” and “sovereignty” from Europe. They then 
proceeded to alter the concepts, first by binding states together in union, 
and then substantially limiting not only their powers, but those of the 
central government as well. The Constitution mentions “States” at several 
points, so it seems at least certain that the states are intended to be a 
permanent part of the governance structure.14 Unlike the Articles of 
Confederation, which expressly reserved the “sovereignty” of the states,15 
the Constitution does not even mention “sovereignty.” Yet state claims to 
sovereignty persist and are routinely recognized. The Supreme Court has 
recently stated that the Constitution “preserves the sovereign status of the 
States” by “reserv[ing] to them a substantial portion of the Nation’s 
primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes 
inhering in that status.”16 The idea of “dual sovereignty”17—that whatever 
they may have ceded, the states retain “a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty”—has provided the basis for recent Court rulings that “laws 
conscripting state officers violate state sovereignty.”18 Indeed, it has 
provided the basis for the recent “revival” in constitutional federalism.  
Faced with persistent claims of “state sovereignty” the world over, 
scholars have essentially been asking the same question: Are the states 
sovereign? Yet surprisingly, to date no effort has been made by American 
constitutional scholars to incorporate any part of the far more rigorous 
thinking about state sovereignty done by international relations scholars. 
This is curious for two reasons. First, as noted, the framers borrowed the 
concepts of “state” and “sovereignty” from Europe. It would seem, then, 
that we might benefit from knowing something about what has happened 
to these concepts in Europe and elsewhere since the framing. Second, as 
we shall see, the debates concerning the viability and substance of 
sovereignty in the international relations and domestic constitutional 
arenas have been remarkably similar. Scholars in both fields have 
variously defended the concept of state sovereignty, denied its existence 
 14. See John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 
27, 28–29 (1998) (“[T]he framers recognized that the states were to be a permanent feature of the 
national political landscape.”). 
 15. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II (“Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly 
delegated” to Congress.). 
 16. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 17. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 18. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3
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except in its original classical form, and derided it as a “myth” or 
polemical tool.  
This Article is the first effort to bridge the scholarly divide by means of 
a conceptual comparison of state sovereignty here and abroad. To be clear, 
this Article does not claim that the substance of state sovereignty is the 
same in all respects for states as it is for nations.19 The states and nation-
states are obviously vastly different creatures, with vastly different powers 
and rights. However, their claims to sovereignty, the manner in which 
these claims are made, and the implications of states’ success in making 
such claims, are indeed similar and thus worth comparing. This Article 
will draw upon certain insights of international scholars in addressing 
whether the American states are “sovereign,” and if so in what sense. 
Based upon an examination of the evolution of the concept of sovereignty, 
this Article concludes that the states are indeed meaningfully sovereign. 
Part II briefly introduces the concept of sovereignty. The literature and 
critical analysis regarding sovereignty are voluminous and it would be 
impossible to provide a general survey of the topic in this space. Part II 
provides only a very brief introduction to the concept, focusing 
specifically on its formal, classical iteration.  
Part III describes and critiques various domestic discourses regarding 
state sovereignty. The framers intimated that the states were “sovereign” 
but failed to explain why or in what respect this is so; they thus 
bequeathed to future generations “our oldest question of constitutional 
law.”20 The Supreme Court has waffled famously on the issue, leading us 
through eras that this Article labels “pre-sovereignty,” “quasi-classical 
sovereignty,” “shared sovereignty,” and, finally, “late sovereignty.” The 
modern era is characterized principally by bald Court pronouncements that 
the states are indeed truly “sovereign.” Scholars, in turn, have responded 
to the Court’s invocations of state sovereignty by denying that the states 
are or can be sovereign. They have generally advanced three theories for 
their argument, which this Article labels “Classicist,” “Republican,” and 
“Skeptic.” The Classicist fixates on the narrow, classical version of 
sovereignty, which requires absolute and exclusive authority.21 The 
Republican invokes the idea that under the Constitution, it is the people, 
 19. Unless otherwise indicated by the context, this Article generally refers to nations as such, or 
as “nation-states,” and to the American states as “the States.”  
 20. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
 21. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1604 (2002) 
(arguing that true sovereignty is exclusive and final within a sphere). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and only the people, who are ultimately “sovereign.”22 Finally, the Skeptic 
asserts that the notion of “sovereignty” makes no sense at all, and persists 
merely as a rhetorical plea.23  
The framers and other proponents of state sovereignty, including a 
majority of the current Supreme Court, have not presented any coherent 
concept of state sovereignty. As a result, critics exploit state sovereignty as 
a rather easy target. If exclusive dominion and control is in fact the sole 
basis for claims to sovereignty, then states surely cannot be deemed 
sovereign today. The Classicist assumes that the concepts of statehood and 
sovereignty are static, forever frozen in time.24 “Federalism,” however, 
does not mean the same thing today as it did at the framing. Neither, for 
that matter, do concepts like “privacy,” “liberty,” or “equality.” So why 
ossify sovereignty? If, as the Republicans insist, only “the people” can be 
truly sovereign under the Constitution, then indeed there is little point in 
discussing the sovereignty of states at all. Without disputing the 
fundamental, Republican truth that “the people” are ultimately sovereign, 
however, it is an inescapable fact that states exercise “sovereign” powers 
and possess certain “sovereign” rights.25 Finally, the Skeptic, who would 
banish “sovereignty,” must be convinced that sovereignty persists for 
legitimate reasons and has an identifiable core. Much of the analysis that 
follows seeks to respond to the Skeptic’s concern that sovereignty is 
essentially meaningless. 
Part IV seeks to advance beyond these ultimately unhelpful approaches 
and to expand domestic constitutional discourse regarding state 
sovereignty by drawing upon some of the broad aspects of the global 
reconsideration of the concept. The first thing to note is that state 
sovereignty has always been a concept in transition. In international 
spheres, sovereignty did not retain its classical form, which has always 
clashed with pragmatic realities, for very long. In truth, sovereignty has 
 22. See Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1113, 1150 (2001) (“It was ‘We the People’ who ordained and established the Constitution, not 
‘We the States.’”). 
 23. See Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part II, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 59 (1999) 
[hereinafter Hash II] (chiding the Court and others for making a “hash” of sovereignty, a concept “too 
vague and anachronistic . . . to allow us to reason about anything more than our propensity to keep 
using it”). There are, as well, some who doubt the utility of maintaining a system that includes 
purportedly “sovereign” states. See generally Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some 
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing that decentralization would be a 
far more efficient system than dual sovereignty).  
 24. See generally BARTELSON, supra note 3 (providing a detailed conceptual history of the 
concept of “sovereignty”).  
 25. See Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of Fundamental 
“States’ Rights,” 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213 (2004) (discussing the constitutional rights of states). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3
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never really been the all-or-nothing, zero-sum proposition early classicists 
theorized. Part IV examines some of the various post-classical meanings 
that have been attributed to sovereignty, including the idea that 
sovereignty involves de facto control over a domain, recognition of 
authority within a territory, and the effective exercise of a state’s “bundle 
of competences.”26 It touches as well upon some theoretical developments 
regarding theories of the locus and origins of sovereignty. 
To place sovereignty in a modern and doctrinal perspective, Part IV 
then focuses on recent challenges to nation-state sovereignty. In Europe, 
the cradle of the concepts of “state” and “sovereignty,” changes to 
governance structures and the state system, especially but by no means 
exclusively the ongoing experiment of the European Union, have 
necessitated serious and sustained thinking about state sovereignty. 
Although nation-states, unlike the American states, are of course not 
subordinate sovereigns by constitutional edict, neither are they the 
exclusive, free, and independent actors they once were thought to be. 
Functions once reserved exclusively to the nation-state, such as national 
defense and the coining of money, have been delegated in whole or in part 
to supra-national institutions. Interventions in the internal affairs of 
nations, in particular those stemming from concerns regarding human 
rights, are now routine—a circumstance that substantially diminishes a 
nation’s “internal” sovereignty. These and other developments have led 
some theorists to posit that a “new sovereignty” has taken shape, one that 
is necessarily partial, incomplete, and divided.27 Sovereignty today is not 
based upon the classical notion of a nation’s ability to dictate outcomes to 
others, or to act as an exclusive and final authority. Rather, according to 
some theorists, sovereignty has taken the form of a bargaining resource 
utilized by nations on behalf of their citizens.28 Sovereignty is a status 
gained as a result of state practices, including the exercise of the “bundle 
of competences” at a state’s disposal.  
In addition to undertaking to redefine and refocus sovereignty, some 
international theorists have applied principles of social construction theory 
to explain the apparent anomaly of diminishing nation-state power and 
prospering sovereignty.29 The final section of Part IV specifically 
 26. HANS BLIX, SOVEREIGNTY, AGGRESSION, AND NEUTRALITY 11–12 (1970). 
 27. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27 (1995).  
 28. See id. (“Sovereignty, in the end, is status—the vindication of the state’s existence as a 
member of the international system.”). 
 29. See, e.g., STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3; ALEXANDER WENDT, 
SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Tanja E. Aalberts, The Future of Sovereignty in 
Multilevel Governance Europe—A Constructivist Reading, 42 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 23 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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examines social construction as an approach to the concept of state 
sovereignty. One of the important insights produced by a social 
constructionist approach to statehood and sovereignty is that these 
concepts are not “brute” or inherent facts. The “state,” for example, is 
made up of territory, population, and government. But these material facts 
do not define the “state” in its relevant international or domestic contexts. 
Nor is “sovereignty” something inherent to statehood. It is, rather, what 
social construction theorists refer to as an “institutional fact,” one which is 
deemed to exist by human agreement. International social constructionists 
argue that rather than simply consider “sovereignty” either as an inherent 
status or an obsolete or mythical construct, we must focus on what states 
do and how they are represented to, and perceived by, the world and each 
other. They suggest that state practices, along with justifications for state 
sovereignty by jurists, theorists, and other officials, combine to construct 
agreements that states are “sovereign,” that they are, for example, in 
control of a domain or entitled to recognition and deference. Ultimately, 
then, it is not considered productive to ask whether states are “really” 
sovereign, for “the reality of sovereignty consists in its use and 
acceptance.”30 In the end, sovereignty will not fade away because relevant 
actors and communities have come to accept it as a necessary ordering 
principle.  
Part V draws upon these various developments in the theory and 
practice of state sovereignty to advance toward a reconceptualization of 
domestic state sovereignty. This reconceptualization takes into account 
conceptual evolution and responds to the critiques of Classicists, 
Republicans, and Skeptics. As a general response to state sovereignty’s 
detractors, Part V argues that state sovereignty can indeed, as the framers 
posited, be partial, limited, delegated, and relational. It can be lodged (on a 
representative basis of course) in the states. Thus, based upon the post-
classical and post-modern developments discussed in Part IV, this Article 
departs from the classical conception of domestic state sovereignty, which 
required exclusive and final authority within a given sphere, enclave, or 
territory. The remainder of Part V seeks principally to respond to the 
Skeptics’ arguments that state sovereignty serves no useful purpose and 
has no meaning. 
Following the work of social constructionists, Part V conceptualizes 
domestic state sovereignty as a dynamic construct. The Article utilizes 
 30. W. G. Werner & J. H. de Wilde, The Endurance of Sovereignty, 7 EUR. J. INT’L. REL. 283, 
304 (2001). 
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social construction theory to demonstrate that American statehood and 
state sovereignty are “institutional facts” that have been legally, 
politically, and socially constructed over time.31 The goal, in terms utilized 
by a leading social construction theorist, is to understand the 
circumstances (C) in which the state (X) “counts as” sovereign (Y).32 The 
Constitution sets the baseline by assigning states a prominent place in the 
governmental structure. The remainder of the constructive process is 
revealed through the lens of the variety of symbols or metaphors that have 
been invoked to represent statehood and to sharpen state claims to 
sovereignty over time. Eight symbols have been utilized to impose 
functions and statuses upon the states. States have been likened to the 
following: trustees, agents, communities, laboratories, corporations, 
market participants, nations, and persons. These symbols represent the 
principal claims or justifications for state sovereignty.  
Social construction theory counsels close attention to this sort of 
symbolism. As noted, however, a constructivist approach emphasizes that 
“the reality of sovereignty consists in its use and acceptance.”33 
Accordingly, Part V examines state justifications, political and theoretical 
discourses, and the practices of state and federal actors in order to 
understand how it is that claims to state sovereignty persist, and often 
succeed, despite the significant material and constitutional disadvantages 
under which the states operate. This is a complex process which can only 
be sketched here. It is also an ongoing process, as the states’ sovereignty is 
always, in a sense, “at stake.” Part V makes this point by examining some 
recent issues that substantially implicate state sovereignty, including gay 
marriage; educational, environmental, and welfare policies; the death 
penalty; and fundamental rights doctrine. And, of course, it also takes 
account of the recent federalism revival in the work of the Supreme Court.  
This Article concludes that there are actually “two sovereignties.” On 
one hand, the states are deemed “sovereign” insofar as they possess and 
exercise a bundle of competences. States legislate, innovate, interpose, 
negotiate, and function as independent communities. This will be referred 
to as “competence sovereignty.” This version of state sovereignty is 
similar to the “new sovereignty” of nation-states, which eschews classical 
 31. I do not argue that the process of social construction of sovereignty is the same in the global 
and domestic contexts. It obviously varies given, among other things, the fact that unlike putatively 
“equal” nations, the states and the federal government do not operate on a level playing field. This 
Article taps the principles of social construction—the basic idea—in an effort to explicate domestic 
state sovereignty. 
 32. JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 46–47 (1995). 
 33. Werner & de Wilde, supra note 30, at 304. 
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notions of brute power and focuses on the results and recognition states 
achieve in exercising their competences. On the other hand, sometimes the 
states are recognized as sovereign, or such recognition is withheld, based 
solely upon their status. The states are sovereign insofar as they resemble 
or are “like” some other sovereign, such as a nation or person. Under this 
“status sovereignty,” states are deemed to be inherently entitled to 
sovereign rights like autonomy and equality, and to possess sovereign 
characteristics like “dignity,” “respect,” and “esteem.”  
The distinction between competence and status sovereignty is an 
important one. If, as this Article suggests, state sovereignty is a dynamic 
construct, then status sovereignty is not likely to survive as a meaningful 
concept. Part IV advances several reasons why, particularly from the 
States’ perspectives, competence sovereignty is conceptually preferable to 
status sovereignty in going forward.  
Part V concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of the 
proposed reconceptualization of state sovereignty for states, scholars, and 
courts. States must realize that their sovereignty is constantly at stake. 
They must act with the knowledge that their exercise of sovereign 
functions defines their sovereignty. Scholars should be looking at state 
sovereignty not as a formal, dollars-and-personnel concept, but rather as a 
dynamic, always changing and relative concept. Finally, courts should be 
aware that status sovereignty is an inherently flawed conception. If the 
states are to be pronounced “sovereign,” it must be because they are 
serving sovereign functions or furthering the values of federalism, not 
because of some inherent status. 
Finally, Part VI anticipates the argument that state sovereignty, even as 
reconceptualized, ought to be banished from our constitutional discourse. 
Viewed as the product of a dynamic process, rather than a status imposed 
by judicial decree, domestic state sovereignty can serve many of the same 
useful purposes that have been assigned to international sovereignty. 
Perhaps above all, a shared understanding that states are “sovereign”—
that they exercise sovereign competences, are in a substantial sense in 
charge of a domain, represent distinct communities, and are equal relative 
to one another—contributes to the maintenance of order in a system of 
overlapping and competing governance structures. Putting states on notice 
that they have to earn their sovereignty will help to sustain a balance of 
power. Putting federal authorities on notice that the states retain their 
sovereignty will also contribute to the ordering of relations among 
governments that share and pool their sovereignties.  
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II. CLASSICAL SOVEREIGNTY—A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
“Sovereignty” is an immense topic with a four century-plus history.34 
In this brief introduction, the modest goal is to comment upon the origins 
of the concept and to describe its formal, classical iteration. The focus is 
purposeful. As we shall see, classical sovereignty has been the version of 
the concept which has most influenced domestic constitutional discourses 
regarding the states’ claims to sovereignty.  
Discussions of “sovereignty” generally acknowledge that the concept 
was invented in Europe in the sixteenth century.35 The French thinker Jean 
Bodin, who advanced the first comprehensive concept of “sovereignty,” 
defined it as the “absolute and perpetual power within a state.”36 Bodin’s 
conception of sovereignty emerged from a period of tumult and civil war 
in France. To deal with this turmoil, the concept of sovereignty originally 
reinforced the power of the king.37 Bodin’s thesis was that a unitary central 
authority should wield unlimited power over citizens and subjects, 
essentially unconstrained by law (except, perhaps, the laws of God and 
nature).38 The unitary sovereign’s authority was divinely, rather than 
democratically, bestowed. As Bodin declared: “We see the principal point 
of sovereign majesty and absolute power to consist in giving laws to 
subjects in general, without their consent.”39  
The principal marks of sovereignty for Bodin were “the power of 
lawmaking, the power to declare war and make peace, the power to 
establish offices of state, the ultimate right of judgment, the power to 
pardon, the right of taxation, and the power to coin money.”40 A true 
sovereign could delegate some of these powers to subordinates, but could 
not permanently transfer any of them without losing its sovereignty. The 
 34. The word “sovereignty” is taken from the French “souverain,” which means “a supreme ruler 
not accountable to anyone, except perhaps to God.” FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 4. 
 35. See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 15–16 (noting that European philosophers 
developed the theory of sovereignty in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries). 
 36. JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 1–4 (Julia Franklin ed., 1992). 
 37. See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 4–5 (“On the heels of the dynastic and imperial 
struggles of the Middle Ages, monarchs in early modern Europe advanced the notion of sovereignty to 
strengthen their grip on the reins of the state and to counter feudal claims by the nobility and religious 
claims by the papacy.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 38. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 18; see also Richard Bellamy, Sovereignty, Post-
Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights within the EU, in 
SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 171 (“The sovereign is the agent or agency where the 
buck stops and a final decision gets made.”). 
 39. NANNERL O. KEOHANE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE STATE IN FRANCE: THE RENAISSANCE TO THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT 71 (1980) (translating JEAN BODIN, LES SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE (1577)). 
 40. SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 64. 
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ultimate authority in the state, according to Bodin, had to reside in only 
one place. By definition, then, classical sovereignty could not be divided 
or shared.  
In Leviathan,41 Thomas Hobbes, who also wrote against the backdrop 
of war, constructed an “omnipotent sovereign” as the only alternative to 
the anarchy of the “state of nature.”42 By covenant, Hobbes posited that 
men conferred all of their powers and strength upon one man or one 
assembly of men. Like Bodin’s, Hobbes’s “sovereign” also wielded 
absolute, unitary authority. With Hobbes, however, sovereignty became 
“absolute” in a radical sense; “unlike Bodin he swept aside all limitations 
on sovereignty by doing away with every right of the people.”43 The result 
was a “Multitude so united in one Person,” called a “Commonwealth,” a 
“Leviathan.”44 The sovereign could not be subjected to any criticism or 
limitation. “No authority outside the state can sit in judgment on the state, 
not even religious or moral conscience, or any criterion of justice.”45  
The classical version of sovereignty that washed ashore as the Framers 
were taking up the task of drafting the Constitution posited that in all 
forms of government, there is and must be a “final and absolute political 
authority in the political community.”46 William Blackstone, for example, 
whose thinking was influential in the founding era, “defined ‘sovereign 
power’ as ‘the making of laws,’ possession of which obliges ‘all others 
[to] conform to, and be directed by it.’”47  
For these and other early thinkers, “sovereignty” was simply a fact; it 
was an inherent attribute of the monarchy and, later, the state. Sovereignty 
could not be contested. Nor could it be divided, shared, diminished, or 
limited. Classical sovereignty was legal; absolute; unitary; and, as a result 
of these characteristics, necessarily indivisible.48 As one scholar explained, 
sovereignty in its classical sense is like marital status—one either 
possesses it or one does not.49
 41. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996). 
 42. Id. at 149–52; see CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 19–20 (discussing Hobbes’s theory of 
sovereignty). 
 43. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 19. 
 44. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 227 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968). 
 45. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 20. 
 46. HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 26. 
 47. H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early Constitutional Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 
949, 986 (1993) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO 
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 49 (1803)). 
 48. JAMES, supra note 3, at 50. 
 49. See Georg Sorenson, Sovereignty: Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution, in 
SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MILLENNIUM (Robert Jackson ed., 1999). 
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III. DOMESTIC SOVEREIGNTY DISCOURSES 
In domestic constitutional circles, the debate over “state sovereignty” 
has moved but little from the concept’s classical formulation. The 
Framers, who were most likely forced by circumstances to be deliberately 
vague about state sovereignty, did little more than pose the question of the 
states’ “sovereign” status. Judicial discourse has ultimately done little to 
answer the question posed, routing through periods this Article calls “pre-
sovereignty,” “classical sovereignty,” “shared sovereignty,” and a 
“modern” era characterized by bare, and essentially opportunistic, 
reminders that states are truly “sovereign.” Finally, academic 
constitutional and historical discourse has largely dismissed the idea of 
state sovereignty, effectively splitting into “Classicist,” “Republican,” and 
“Skeptical” camps.  
A. The Framers 
As the Constitution’s structure demonstrates, the Framers of the United 
States Constitution expressly rejected the classical sovereignty of thinkers 
like Bodin, Hobbes, and Blackstone. Indeed, they purported to do 
precisely what these thinkers said could never be done, namely to divide 
and limit sovereignty.50 They did so both horizontally, among levels of the 
federal government, and vertically, reposing authority, power, and control 
in the central government with a residual authority in the several states. 
The Framers rejected the idea of a unitary sovereign, lodged significant 
rights and powers both in the state and central institutions of government, 
and then proceeded to divide authority further among these institutions.  
In debates over the plan of the proposed Constitution, the Framers were 
less than clear regarding the “sovereign” status of the states. At times the 
states were referred to as “partial” sovereigns, while at other times the 
Framers opined that sovereignty resided exclusively with “the people.”51 
Thus, Hamilton observed in Federalist No. 32 that “the State governments 
would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, 
and which were not . . . exclusively delegated to the United States.”52 
Madison said that “the States will retain under the proposed Constitution a 
 50. See Peter S. Onuf, State Sovereignty and the Making of the Constitution, in CONCEPTUAL 
CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 78–98 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988) (discussing 
conceptual change relating to “state sovereignty” at the framing). 
 51. See Powell, supra note 47, at 985–87 (discussing early thinking with regard to the locus of 
sovereignty under the Constitution). 
 52. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 220 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
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very extensive portion of active sovereignty.”53 Similarly, in Federalist 
No. 39, Madison declared that the federal government’s “jurisdiction 
extends to certain enumerated objects only,” while the states continued to 
possess “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”54 
But there were others, including Madison, who also touted strong 
republican principles. Hence Madison’s statement in Federalist No. 46: 
“[T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in 
the people alone . . . .”55  
When it came time to draft the language of the Constitution, the 
Framers avoided the term “sovereignty” altogether. This was, one may 
assume, a deliberate break from the troublesome Articles of 
Confederation, which had expressly provided that each state “retains its 
sovereignty, freedom and independence.”56 The drafters of the 
Constitution chose to express and preserve state authority and state status 
in a different fashion.  
Where, exactly, the omission of “sovereignty” left the states has been a 
matter of controversy since the framing. Indeed, it was thus that the 
“sovereign” status of the states became “our oldest question of 
constitutional law.”57 The Framers were so evasive in terms of state 
sovereignty that there has been continual disagreement even as to the 
origins of consent to the Constitution. Some view the Constitution as a 
“compact among sovereign states,”58 while others have insisted that it is 
not “an inter-sovereign compact or treaty, but a supreme statute deriving 
from the supreme sovereign legislature—the People of the nation.”59 This 
 53. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 293–94 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 54. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also THE 
FEDERALIST No. 62, at 365 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“[T]he equal vote allowed to 
each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the 
individual States and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty”); THE FEDERALIST No. 
49, at 262 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“[I]n the new government, as in the old, the 
general powers are limited; . . . the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment of their 
sovereign and independent jurisdiction.”). 
 55. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 56. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. II. 
 57. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). 
 58. SAMUEL H. BIER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 2 
(1993). 
 59. Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1452 (1987); see THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 257 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“Each State, in ratifying the 
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body independent of all others, and only to be bound by its 
own voluntary act.”). The disagreement has not been entirely quelled by the Supreme Court’s narrow 
determination, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), that the states are not at 
liberty to add to the qualifications for membership in the national legislature. The Court in making this 
determination purported to resolve the debate over the origins of constitutional authority by vesting 
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is a constitutional debate not likely ever to be settled to everyone’s 
agreement or satisfaction.  
The Framers thus bequeathed our “oldest question of constitutional 
law.” Unfortunately, they did not provide an answer to it. Indeed, they 
offered conflicting answers. As Professor Powell has noted: “The term 
[sovereignty] was both central to the founding era’s political grammar and 
essentially ambiguous.”60  
B. The Supreme Court 
It is fair to say that the Supreme Court has, over time, been all over the 
map when it comes to the concept of state sovereignty. Its various 
approaches to the “oldest question” can be helpfully, if somewhat roughly, 
distilled into four “eras” of sovereignty: Pre-sovereignty, quasi-classical 
sovereignty, shared sovereignty, and late sovereignty.  
In the pre-sovereignty period, the Court essentially refused to 
recognize the sovereignty of the states. The Marshall Court was, of course, 
too concerned with building a strong national government to recognize 
broad claims of “state sovereignty.” Thus, for example, the separate 
opinions in Chisholm v. Georgia61 all flatly rejected the state’s claim to 
sovereignty. Justice Randolph, among others, adopted the republican view 
that the people possessed ultimate sovereignty under the Constitution; the 
states, he said, were nothing more than “assemblages of these individuals 
who are liable to process.”62 In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,63 the Court 
observed that the Constitution is “crowded with provisions which restrain 
or annul the sovereignty of the states in some of the highest branches of 
their prerogatives.”64 Finally, in Gibbons v. Ogden,65 the Court pointed out 
that when the states joined the Union, “the whole character in which the 
States appear, underwent a change . . . .”66
In time, concerns over sustaining the national government subsided, 
and an era of quasi-classical sovereignty dawned. In this era, the Court not 
only recognized, but at times aggressively enforced, state sovereignty. 
original consent in “the People.”  
 60. Powell, supra note 47, at 987. 
 61. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 62. Id. at 423; see id. at 471 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (“No such ideas obtain here; at the Revolution, 
the sovereignty devolved on the people. . . .”).  
 63. 14 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 64. Id. at 325. 
 65. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 66. Id. at 187. 
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Early notions of state sovereignty were based roughly upon the formal, 
classical model described in Part II. Thus, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the Court sought to carve out separate “enclaves” for 
distinct state and central sovereigns, each the final and exclusive authority 
in their respective domains. Note that sovereignty here was exclusive, yet 
divided. It was in this era that the Court infamously purported to, as the 
Court recently put it, distinguish between “truly national” and “truly local” 
concerns.67 “Manufacture,” for example, was considered an exclusive state 
concern, while “commerce” was held to constitute an exclusively national 
matter.68 Many decisions of the 1930s stressed the “local” character of 
various activities and conditions.69 Federal regulation of manufacture or 
mining, for example, was deemed to trespass on the sovereign authority of 
the states to deal, again exclusively and finally, with local evils.70  
As events leading up to the constitutional crisis of 1933–1936 
demonstrated, the quasi-classical era’s seemingly firm concept of “dual 
sovereignty” was in fact quite vulnerable to outside forces. The Court’s 
formalism with regard to sovereignty could not be sustained in the face of 
the social and political realities of the Great Depression. “Dual 
sovereignty” of this classical character ultimately succumbed to those 
realities, and national authority expanded into areas once considered to be 
exclusively matters of state concern.71  
The demise of quasi-classical sovereignty led to an extended period of 
shared sovereignty. In the post-crisis era, which ran from the Court’s 
famous “switch” in commerce doctrine up to the “new federalism” of the 
past two decades or so, “sovereignty” was a concept rarely spoken by 
name. With the exception of a very brief experiment involving the revival 
of the early, quasi-classical form of sovereignty,72 state and federal 
 67. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000). 
 68. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 69. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (“the local character of mining, of 
manufacturing and of crop growing is a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may be done with the 
products”).  
 70. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Carter, 298 
U.S. at 293; see also id. at 295 (“[I]t is no longer open to question that the general government, unlike 
the states, possesses no inherent power in respect to the internal affairs of the states”). 
 71. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (upholding regulation of intrastate wheat 
production); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123–25 (1941) (upholding federal regulation of 
intrastate wages and hours); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (overruling 
prior precedents and accepting that Congress may regulate even intrastate activities that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 72. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976) (“[O]ne undoubted 
attribute of state sovereignty is the States’ power to determine the wages which shall be paid to those 
whom they employ in order to carry out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will 
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authorities during this extended era were deemed to be engaged in a 
mostly “cooperative” endeavor.73 In the era of shared sovereignty, there 
was less talk of authoritative exclusivity and far more of teamwork and 
cooperation, of a “cooperative federalism” in which Congress primarily 
acted and the states essentially filled gaps. Thus, states were free to 
exercise concurrent authority within the ellipses of federal regulatory 
schemes. Of course, one may speak in terms of “cooperation,” but the 
doctrinal upshot of the intermediate era was a massive expansion of 
federal authority. As one indication of this seismic shift, the Tenth 
Amendment, the supposed repository of state sovereignty, was essentially 
treated as nothing more than a “truism that all is retained which has not 
been surrendered.”74  
In the late sovereignty era, however, state sovereignty has managed a 
steady return to prominence in federalism cases. There has been some 
judicial flirtation in the late era with a revival of the quasi-classical version 
of state sovereignty and separate enclaves.75 But by far the more common 
course in the late era has been for the Court to flatly proclaim that the 
states are “sovereign,” based solely upon their status as states. This, 
indeed, has been a major pillar of the Court’s recent, and much 
commented upon, Anti-Federalist “revival.” 
In many recent federalism decisions, the Court begins with the premise 
that the Constitution recognizes the “essential sovereignty of the States.”76 
The Court has repeatedly affirmed that the states entered the Union “with 
work, and what compensation will be provided where these employees may be called upon to work 
overtime”), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 531 
(1985) (abandoning the National League of Cities approach as “not only unworkable but . . . also 
inconsistent with established principles of federalism”). 
 73. See F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982) (describing Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act as an instance of “cooperative federalism”); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981) (“[T]he most that can be said is that the Surface Mining 
Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within the limits established 
by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to 
meet their own particular needs”); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (noting that AFDC 
program was an example of “cooperative federalism”).  
 74. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. 
 75. Depending upon how one interprets them, in the two now-famous Commerce Clause 
opinions of the modern era, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court may be signaling an interest in protecting exclusive state 
sovereign enclaves like crime and marriage. Or the cases may simply suggest that there are limits to 
Congress’s commerce power. One of those limits is that Congress is empowered under the 
Constitution to regulate “commerce,” and neither gun possession near a school nor violent crime 
constitutes “commerce” in the constitutional sense. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, 
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 97–98 (2001) (opining that 
Lopez and Morrison are modest efforts to police the boundaries of Congress’s commerce power).  
 76. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750 (1999). 
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their sovereignty intact.”77 It has stressed in no uncertain terms that the 
Constitution “preserves the sovereign status of the States” by “reserv[ing] 
to them a substantial portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty, together 
with the dignity and essential attributes inhering in that status.”78  
The Court has recently described state sovereignty as a “fundamental 
postulate[] implicit in the constitutional design.”79 It has relied upon that 
“postulate” in an array of cases in which the states have been granted 
“sovereign immunity” from citizen lawsuits. “The preeminent purpose of 
state sovereign immunity,” the Court has said, “is to accord States the 
dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”80 State 
“dignity” has been a common theme in these cases; this value has been 
repeatedly invoked but never elaborated upon. In any event, immunity’s 
“primary function,” according to the Court, is “to afford the States the 
dignity and respect due sovereign entities.”81
Late state sovereignty is not limited to immunity from lawsuits. In 
addition to protecting states from private suits, the Court has also held that 
“laws conscripting state officers violate state sovereignty.”82 It has treated 
federal civil rights statutes that seek to empower citizens to sue states as 
genuine threats to state sovereignty, and subjected these measures to 
heightened judicial scrutiny.83  
In sum, the Court has varied its regard for state sovereignty over time. 
In the late or modern era, the Court has shown more than the usual regard 
for state autonomy, immunity, and other “rights” in its federalism 
doctrine.84 Indeed, the modern Court has substantially revived the 
Madisonian notion that the states retain “a residuary and inviolable 
sovereignty.”85 But the Court’s proclamations of state sovereignty raise far 
more questions than they answer. What is the nature of the states’ 
sovereignty? What is its origin or source? Its scope? How, ultimately, is it 
to be enforced and protected? 
 77. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). 
 78. Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. at 729. 
 80. Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755 (2002). 
 81. Id. at 769. 
 82. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997). 
 83. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2000) 
(invalidating the citizen suit provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. Of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) (invalidating citizen suit provisions of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act). 
 84. See Zick, supra note 25, at 219 (discussing newly discovered “fundamental” rights of states). 
 85. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
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C. Scholars 
Scholarly commentary on the judicial revival of the “sovereign state” 
in the late or modern era has been mostly disapproving. To be sure, there 
are scholars who support the ideal of state sovereignty. But the 
sovereignty they support either tracks closely the quasi-classical notion 
that the Framers set aside explicit enclaves for states,86 or focuses 
primarily on how the states are faring in the judicially administered 
distributional calculus commonly referred to as “federalism.”87 However, 
“federalism” and “sovereignty” are not the same thing; sovereignty, as this 
Article will explain, is a much more complex concept than federalism, 
which has to do mostly with the division of material power.88 This section 
focuses primarily on the detractors of state sovereignty, who appear to be 
far greater in number in any event than its supporters. For some scholars, 
the Court’s recent invocations of state sovereignty are nonsensical, 
rhetorical, even downright alarming. Three general approaches or theories 
have developed, which this Article labels “Classicist,” “Republican,” and 
“Skeptical.” Each approach is briefly considered.89  
1. Classicists  
One school of thought measures state sovereignty according to the 
classical yardstick advanced by thinkers like Bodin, Hobbes, and 
Blackstone. By this measure, “Classicists” maintain that the Supreme 
Court’s references to state “sovereignty” are an unfortunate and misguided 
misnomer. In a recent article, for example, Professor Steven Gey asserts 
that the country “is in the midst of a constitutional revolution.”90 Professor 
Gey states that the Court “has used a broad conception of state sovereignty 
to expand the power of state government . . . in virtually every area in 
which the two governments operate.”91 Professor Gey does not consider 
sovereignty to be a background or insignificant principle in these 
instances. Rather, he contends that the Court has relied substantially on 
 86. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 14, at 29–32 (discussing state sovereignty in terms of jurisdiction 
of state and national governments). 
 87. See, e.g., Baker & Young, supra note 75. 
 88. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1623 (“the real debate over the relationship between the national 
and state governments involves the issue of sovereignty, not federalism”). 
 89. The discussion here, as elsewhere in this Article, focuses on the concept of sovereignty each 
approach embraces, rather than the Court’s specific usage of the concept in any particular case, or a 
scholar’s critique of the doctrinal effects of its use.  
 90. Gey, supra note 21, at 1601. 
 91. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p229 Zick book pages.doc 9/1/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
248 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“state sovereignty” in cases broadening the states’ sovereign immunity; 
protecting states from federal “commandeering”; restricting federal court 
equitable authority; and invalidating recent Commerce Clause 
enactments.92  
For the Classicists, the Court’s late conception of state sovereignty “is 
presently an incoherent and largely mythical concept that makes it difficult 
for the federal government to operate.”93 The reason the Court’s 
conception of sovereignty is considered to be “mythical” is quite simple; it 
does not ultimately “stand in the way of federal primacy.”94 The putatively 
“sovereign” states are only granted certain partial protections from federal 
encroachments. They can still be sued, coerced, and subjected to federal 
court jurisdiction. In the end, the only claim to “sovereignty” that 
Classicists will accept as valid is one that hews to the formal definition of 
sovereignty set forth by Bodin, Hobbes, and Austin and described in Part 
II.95 “Accordingly,” Professor Gey asserts, “a government entity can only 
be deemed ‘sovereign’ . . . if that government’s power to adopt policies in 
a given area is exclusive, if those policies are final, and if the government 
has the authority to enforce the policies (in Austin’s phrase) ‘with evil or 
pain [or] through fear of that evil.’”96 Because the states cannot claim to 
have exclusive and final authority, or full enforcement autonomy, the 
Classicist maintains that no state can claim to be “truly sovereign.”97
The Classicist sees sovereignty in black and white, as a brute fact or an 
inherent quality of a specific form of government. For Classicists, 
sovereignty is ultimately about material power—power that is exclusive, 
final, and enforceable. It has nothing whatever to do with how local 
governments function; “the debate concerns the location of ultimate 
authority over policy, not the existence and usefulness of local government 
per se.”98 Whatever benefits a federal system might provide, Classicists 
maintain that the existence of sovereign states is not necessary to provide 
them.99  
 92. Id. at 1602. 
 93. Id. at 1601. 
 94. Id. at 1603. 
 95. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1629 (discussing Bodin and Austin). 
 96. Id. at 1631 (quoting JOHN AUSTIN, PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 15 (1861)). 
 97. Id. at 1631. 
 98. Id. at 1623. 
 99. See id. at 1671 (“realization of those benefits does not require a system of judicially protected 
state sovereignty”). See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23 (arguing that a system of sovereign 
states actually decreases the likelihood that benefits will be experienced). 
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In sum, the Classicist adopts the formal conception of sovereignty 
wholesale. Classical sovereignty cannot be limited, partitioned, or 
delegated. For the Classicist, “sovereignty is a mutually exclusive concept: 
if one government has it, then the other does not.”100 Sovereignty is thus a 
“zero-sum game.”101 Insofar as the Court’s recent decisions fail to afford 
the states less than absolute, exclusive power—in the regulation of 
particular items or areas of commerce, for example, or in terms of their 
immunity from lawsuits—then the Classicist maintains that the states are 
not properly deemed “sovereign.”102  
2. Republicans 
A second academic response to the Court’s recent invocations of state 
sovereignty flatly denies that the states can be considered “sovereign” 
under any theory, approach, or circumstance. As James Madison stated in 
Federalist No. 46: “[T]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may 
be found, resides in the people alone.”103 This is the “Republican” theory 
of sovereignty. For those at the founding who rejected “sovereignty talk” 
as too confusing or misleading, as well as those who wished to avoid the 
Anti-Federalist charge that the proposed plan of government would lead to 
a “consolidation” or “annihilation” of the states, this was a very popular 
argument.104 For those who today are troubled by the idea that the states 
are in any way “sovereign,” the argument retains great force.105  
In its recent federalism cases, the Court has indicated on occasion that 
the states retained the “sovereignty” they were expressly granted under the 
Articles of Confederation when they ratified the Constitution.106 
Republican theorists like Louise Weinberg dismiss this “theory of the 
 100. Gey, supra note 21, at 1632–33. 
 101. Id. at 1631. 
 102. See id. at 1632 (“Any attempt to subdivide a territory’s governance of different subjects 
between two separate sovereign entities requires a clear, easily identifiable line between the respective 
governments’ areas of sovereign authority.”); see also id. at 1641 (“In the end, a coherent theory of 
state sovereignty must mean that states possess the authority to make final policy decisions with regard 
to some function, and the federal government can do nothing about it.”). 
 103. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 104. See Powell, supra note 47, at 985–87 (discussing early statements that “the People” are truly 
sovereign). 
 105. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude For State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 81, 86 (2001) (“[T]he notion that states are organically bestowed with a dignity 
incident to all sovereigns rests in tension with the notion that states are mere creatures of and 
subservient to the truly sovereign people.”). 
 106. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (states entered the Union 
“with their sovereignty intact”). 
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preexisting state” as both “mythical” and “ahistorical.”107 Congress, the 
theory posits, “preceded the states, and the Union preceded both.”108 
Moreover, the Constitution, the Republican is quick to point out, does not 
contain the word “sovereignty,” and the Tenth Amendment reserves only 
“powers” to the states, not “sovereignty.”109
As noted in the brief remarks regarding the Framers’ own debate on 
sovereignty, this “ultimate locus of authority” debate—whether the 
Constitution is a compact among quasi-sovereign states or is based instead 
upon the consent of the whole people of the Nation—has never been 
settled definitively, and likely for some never will be.110 There is ample 
historical support for both positions.  
In any event, as Michael McConnell has observed: “The important 
question is not the locus of sovereignty prior to the Constitution, but under 
the Constitution.”111 Republicans have an answer to this question as well. 
In addition to rejecting as mythical the “pre-existing state,” Republicans 
also maintain that the states can make no valid claim to sovereignty under 
the Constitution. Professor Weinberg, for example, criticizes the Court’s 
state sovereignty opinions for being based upon yet another “mythical” 
theory, that of “state sovereignty.”112 The flaw is not, as Classicists hold, 
that the states fail to meet the classical definition of “sovereign.” Rather, 
the point is that the states cannot make any claim to “sovereignty” because 
“We the People” are the only recognized sovereign authority under the 
Constitution.113 This, the Republican claims, is “the Constitution’s own 
theory of sovereignty.”114 The central assertion of the Republican theory 
boils down to this: “It was ‘We the People’ who ordained and established 
the Constitution, not ‘We the States.’”115  
It should be noted that not all Republicans take so stark a view of state 
sovereignty. Others, like Akhil Amar, accept that state governments have 
 107. Weinberg, supra note 22, at 1151. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Compare id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The ultimate source of the Constitution’s 
authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated 
people of the nation as a whole.”) with U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) 
(concluding that ultimate constitutional authority resides in the people of the Nation as a whole) and 
Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 779 (stating that states entered the Union “with their sovereignty intact”). 
 111. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1484, 1489 (1987) (emphasis added).  
 112. Weinberg, supra note 22, at 1117. 
 113. Id. at 1149–50. 
 114. Id. at 1149. 
 115. Id. at 1150. 
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“sovereign” powers.116 But even these more moderate theorists ultimately 
fall back upon the Republican principle of popular sovereignty. Professor 
Amar, for example, has described the Court’s conception of state 
sovereignty as “oppressive,” by which he means that the concept has been 
utilized to defeat remedial claims brought on behalf of “the people.” The 
government’s “sovereignty,” he asserts, does not extend to alleged ultra 
vires acts.117 Professor Amar, like other Republican theorists, seeks in the 
context of immunity “to counter the Supreme Court’s version of 
federalism and sovereignty with the framers’ version—to replace ‘Our 
Federalism’ with their federalism, and government sovereignty with 
popular sovereignty.”118  
In sum, Republican theorists insist that “sovereignty” ultimately lies in 
the people alone, since only their say is final. For some theorists, this 
renders state sovereignty a “myth” or “legend.” For others, it colors the 
manner in which judicial federalism doctrine ought to evolve and develop. 
But uniformly, Republicans believe that the Framers themselves instituted 
popular sovereignty, not government sovereignty.  
3. Skeptics 
Finally, there are scholars who take the position that “sovereignty” is 
an altogether meaningless construct, one which has caused so much 
confusion that it would be better if we simply abandoned it altogether. 
Domestically, the historian Jack Rakove is the ablest spokesperson for this 
theory. Professor Rakove has argued that courts, commentators, and others 
have made a “hash” of sovereignty.119 Unlike other sovereignty theorists, 
however, he has offered some provocative thoughts as to why, in light of 
the obvious failure of the states to meet the formal, classical definition of 
sovereignty, state claims to sovereignty persist. 
Professor Rakove begins his attack on sovereignty where the 
Classicists end theirs—by pointing out that from the beginning, “our 
practice and theory have made a hash of the traditional concept of 
 116. See Amar, supra note 59, at 1426 (noting that the Constitution delegates “limited ‘sovereign’ 
powers to various organs of government”). 
 117. See id. at 1427 (“‘We the People of the United States,’ through the Constitution, have 
delegated limited ‘sovereign’ powers to various organs of government; but whenever a government 
entity transgresses the limits of its delegation by acting ultra vires, it ceases to act in the name of the 
sovereign, and surrenders any derivative ‘sovereign’ immunity it might otherwise possess.”).  
 118. See Amar, supra note 59, at 1426–27; see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) 
(referring to “Our Federalism”). 
 119. See Jack N. Rakove, Making a Hash of Sovereignty, Part I, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 35 (1998) 
[hereinafter Hash I]; Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23. 
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sovereignty that the colonists inherited from European theorists.”120 He 
notes that while this traditional conception of sovereignty “emphasized 
sovereignty’s unitary and absolute nature, ours parcels sovereignty out in 
bits and pieces that are scattered throughout our system of governance, yet 
somehow mystically reunited in the ineffable concept of an all-sovereign 
American people.”121  
Like the Classicists, Professor Rakove argues that the original 
conception of sovereignty which we imported from Europe did not quite 
“fit” our system from the beginning. Bodinian, Hobbesean, and 
Blackstonian sovereignty, Professor Rakove notes, all were premised on a 
unitary, absolute power that simply does not comport with our 
constitutional structure.122 Under the Constitution, by design, “sovereignty 
itself would remain diffused—which is to say, it would exist everywhere 
and nowhere.”123 Nor, however, does Professor Rakove accept that 
sovereignty can regain its coherence by resorting to the “ineffable 
concept” of “popular” sovereignty.124 This is as much a “myth” for 
Professor Rakove as the idea that states are “sovereign” in the traditional 
sense. “Popular sovereignty may express a noble idea,” he says, “but as an 
analytical principle, it is vacuous.”125  
Professor Rakove thus has “proposed that Americans should long since 
have banished the word sovereignty from their political vocabulary.”126 
Why, then, does sovereignty talk persist with regard to the states in our 
legal and political discourse? As Professor Rakove frames the question: 
“Why should sovereignty, a word which outlived its usefulness long ago, 
have instead discovered the marvelous recuperative and self-inflating 
powers that keep it alive today?”127  
Professor Rakove offers four reflections on this query. First, he 
suggests that sovereignty, particularly “popular” sovereignty, has been a 
“useful fiction” in explaining and justifying representative government.128 
It was, first and foremost, useful to Federalists who sought to escape Anti-
Federalist assertions that the Constitution would effect a complete 
 120. Rakove, Hash I, supra note 119, at 35. Professor Rakove limits his attack to domestic 
governance; he does not contend that the term is inappropriate as applied to the United States as a 
nation. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 51. 
 121. Rakove, Hash I, supra note 119, at 35.  
 122. Id. at 36–37. 
 123. Id. at 41. 
 124. Id. at 35. 
 125. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 51. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 52. 
 128. Id.  
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consolidation and annihilation of the states.129 This defensive conception 
of sovereignty would, according to Professor Rakove, ultimately “rob the 
concept of its substance while preserving only the name.”130 The 
Federalists had their absolute, unitary sovereign (“the People”), but this 
version of sovereignty was “a fiction that had little descriptive power.”131  
Second, Professor Rakove posits that perhaps sovereignty has survived 
because it has taken on a “new meaning which somehow fit the distinctive 
oddities of American federalism.”132 In contrast to the classical meaning of 
sovereignty, which positively determined where supreme authority 
resided, this new meaning appears to have arisen for the opposite 
purpose—“to deny some other locus of authority . . . that power.”133 
Professor Rakove suggests that the American concept of sovereignty “has 
always had a profoundly negative, defensive, reactive character.”134 Thus, 
he says, sovereignty survives today “not because it accurately enables us 
to map the active sources of legal and political power, but because it 
ironically expresses the dominant anti-statist currents that have swirled 
through our political culture since the eighteenth century.”135 Thus, 
Professor Rakove suggests, “[s]overeignty now lay much closer to a 
theory of resistance than of command” in which the states “would act as 
an unchecked checker, the court of last resort in determining when an 
exercise of national supremacy had gone a measure or two too far.”136 In 
sum, then, sovereignty has been effectively inverted; it is the nullification 
of someone else’s power, not the affirmative exercise of power. 
Third, Professor Rakove suggests that sovereignty has cropped up as a 
convenient shorthand for the complex and unique division of powers 
which the Constitution effects. He emphasizes that James Madison, in 
setting forth the principles of divided authority in Federalist 39, makes 
reference to “sovereignty” only once.137 According to Rakove, “Madison 
asks good-faith readers to think of the problem in other terms: as an 
exercise requiring an explicit, empirical, and pragmatic mapping of the 
actual distribution of power, not an appeal to the heavy artillery of a killer 
 129. Id. at 53. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 53. 
 132. Id. at 54. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 55. 
 137. See id. at 56 (discussing Madison’s views). 
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definition.”138 But as Professor Rakove recognizes, not every political or 
legal thinker is a Madison; thus, “reasoning from a simplistic principle like 
sovereignty was much easier than doing the heavy if prosaic lifting of 
making federalism work by avoiding the allure of extreme 
formulations.”139  
Finally, Professor Rakove ascribes the resilience of “sovereignty” to 
what he calls “linguistic creep.”140 Sovereignty, he says, “is one of those 
terms that is inherently inflationary.”141 It is a concept that “begs to be 
borrowed and assigned new and surprising uses, beckoning would-be 
consumers to take it down from the shelf and put it to work.”142 Like 
“rights talk,” which places individual claims of right above all else, 
“sovereignty talk” is absolutist and preemptive.143 Ultimately, sovereignty 
is invoked because “the term offers a measure of rhetorical or polemical 
advantage.”144 Under this profoundly “skeptical” theory, “sovereignty 
survived in American usage not because it retained any analytical or 
descriptive power, but rather because it promised rhetorical and political 
advantage to those who sought to use it.”145  
In sum, the Skeptic adheres to the classical definition of “sovereignty,” 
which holds that there must be one final authority with exclusive power. 
With the Classicist, the Skeptic notes that the states cannot be “sovereign” 
in this sense. What makes the Skeptic’s approach unique is that it is 
dismissive of the very concept of “sovereignty,” including the “popular 
sovereignty” of the Republicans. The Skeptic surmises that the persistence 
of “sovereignty talk” stems from one or more of the following: (1) the 
need for a “useful fiction”; (2) a new, negative redefinition of sovereignty 
as a limit on central power; (3) a desire to avoid the serious work of 
grappling with federalism’s complexity; and (4) “linguistic creep.” The 
point, regardless of which surmise or reflection one accepts, is that the 
concept of sovereignty is essentially devoid of real content and should be 
“banished” from our political and constitutional discourse. 
The trouble with the domestic discourses regarding state sovereignty is 
that they do not lead us anywhere. The Framers bequeathed the concept 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 57. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 57. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 58. For a critique of rights-centric argumentation, see generally MARY ANN GLENDON, 
RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). 
 144. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 58. 
 145. Id. 
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and question of state sovereignty. Defenders of state sovereignty, 
including the Supreme Court, do not elaborate on what they mean by 
“sovereignty.” They seem to conflate “sovereignty” and “federalism,” two 
related but distinct constitutional principles. Federalism, the division of 
power between state and federal levels of government, is indicative of 
state sovereignty; it does not define it. Classicists end their examination 
with the observation that states do not possess formal sovereignty. 
Republicans cannot accept that state governments are “sovereign,” since 
only “the people” can make this claim. Finally, Skeptics are both trapped 
in the Classicist fixation on formal sovereignty and stymied by their own 
skepticism. They have given up on sovereignty altogether.  
IV. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE POST-MODERN STATE 
The Framers of the United States Constitution imported the ideas of 
statehood and state sovereignty from Europe. Yet no effort has been made 
in any of the domestic constitutional discourses to ascertain what has 
happened to these concepts in the last two centuries. Indeed, as Part III 
demonstrated, most domestic sovereignty discourses still generally treat 
the sixteenth century classical conception of state sovereignty as their 
primary benchmark. This is so despite the rather obvious fact that the 
states cannot meet the Classical model’s requirements, a fact that the 
Framers no doubt well appreciated. This Part looks beyond our borders for 
assistance in understanding state sovereignty. The point of examining 
international events and thinking is not to suggest that state sovereignty in 
the domestic constitutional context necessarily means the same thing as 
state sovereignty in international law and politics. Rather, the hope is that 
an examination of serious scholarly treatments of international state 
sovereignty might breathe new life into the mostly stale debate regarding 
whether the American states are “really” or “truly” sovereign.  
Given the expanse of sovereignty’s conceptual history, the discussion 
that follows is necessarily selective. I have in mind in this Part the 
“sketchier sort of conceptual history—an outline that imposes coherence at 
sacrifice to detail while marking more closely the moments of conceptual 
change.”146 The first section of this Part examines what has happened, in 
the most general terms, to the concept of state sovereignty since the 
framing of the Constitution. Sovereignty has not been an idle or static 
concept. In particular, the classical concept of state sovereignty upon 
 146. Nicholas G. Onuf, Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History, 16 ALTERNATIVES 425, 428 
(1991). 
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which much of domestic sovereignty discourse is fixated was long ago 
abandoned by international theorists, as well as practitioners of statecraft, 
as unrealistic and contrary to fact. In its place, various indicia and 
meanings of “sovereignty” have been proposed over time. International 
relations theorists appreciate that we cannot fix the meaning of state 
sovereignty for all times and purposes. But we can, as they have, come to 
a general understanding of its core attributes. These include things like de 
facto control of a domain, legitimacy, equality, and recognition. We can 
also learn to think more deeply and flexibly about sovereignty’s locus and 
origins. 
The next section demonstrates that new challenges to state sovereignty 
continue to necessitate critical thinking about the concept. One such 
ongoing challenge is the formation and operation of the European Union 
(“EU”).147 The EU is, in essence, a refutation of the classical model of 
sovereignty. EU members have delegated or “pooled” their sovereignty in 
the interest of an unprecedented degree of unification. As a result of this 
transition, and other social and political forces around the globe, the 
inquiry at the heart of this Article—whether the states are sovereign—is 
not in any sense unique to American statehood and domestic constitutional 
debate. Developments in the EU and elsewhere have caused some theorists 
to posit that a “new sovereignty” has been forged, one that is based far less 
on the dictation of outcomes or classical exclusivity and more on 
bargaining, negotiation, cooperation, and earned recognition as a member 
of the international community.148
Serious and sustained challenges to nation-state authority 
notwithstanding, most international relations scholars would probably 
agree that the concept of state sovereignty persists, and even prospers.149 
Nation-states routinely claim the mantle of “sovereignty” whenever their 
interests or prerogatives are threatened. Sovereignty thus remains a 
powerful speech claim. This is no mere rhetoric. As recent events 
regarding Iraqi “sovereignty” demonstrate, diplomacy, social discourse, 
 147. For discussions of the recent changes in European governance, see generally NICK BERNARD, 
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2002); BEYOND WESTPHALIA? STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (Gene M. Lyons et al. eds., 1995). 
 148. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27 (“Sovereignty, in the end, is status—the 
vindication of the state’s existence as a member of the international system.”).  
 149. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, And Globalization, And Human Rights, 
Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) (“In general, I fear sovereignty as we have known it is 
alive and well.”). 
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and even the course of world events are deeply affected by the invocation 
and recognition of state sovereignty, whatever form it takes.150  
Redefining sovereignty can help to explain the seemingly anomalous 
prospering of state sovereignty in light of diminishing state power and 
authority. Another way to explain this anomaly is to focus on how it is that 
“state sovereignty” is generated, practiced, and sustained over time. 
“Social construction” is one non-skeptical, post-classical theory that seeks 
to do this. International social constructionists have treated state 
sovereignty as a variable, flexible construct rather than, as in the formal, 
classical model, an inherent aspect of statehood and a “brute” material 
fact. Social construction theorists interpret statehood and sovereignty as 
dynamic constructs, as “institutional facts” generated over time through 
such things as state functions, practices, public discourses, and statuses. 
The final section of this Part describes both the general principles of social 
construction and the specific manner in which this theory has been applied 
to the concepts of statehood and sovereignty. Looking ahead, Part V will 
draw upon the lessons of this Part in re-examining domestic state 
sovereignty.  
A. Post-Classical Sovereignty 
It ought to be beyond debate that whatever “sovereignty” the American 
states may possess, it is not the classical sovereignty of Bodin, Austin, and 
Hobbes, which looked to a unitary, exclusive, and final source of 
authority. Indeed, the Constitution does not lodge this form of sovereignty 
in any source. It is, however, error to end debate in domestic constitutional 
discourses with this truism. Far from being a fixed or static concept, state 
sovereignty has always been an institution in process. Specifically, 
international relations scholars have given substantial attention to three 
matters, highlighted in this section, which have some bearing on general 
discussions of state sovereignty: (1) sovereignty’s indicia and meanings, 
(2) its locus in various forms of governance, and (3) the origins of 
sovereignty in civil society. To begin the process of reconditioning our 
thinking about state sovereignty, some of these observations are 
highlighted in the discussion that follows.  
The indicia and meaning of sovereignty have, in fact, been constantly 
evolving since Bodin offered the first comprehensive conceptualization in 
the sixteenth century. As noted in Part II, Bodin, followed by Hobbes, 
 150. See sources cited supra note 12. 
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proffered a concept of political absolutism. But as international relations 
theorists have pointed out, even these theorists acknowledged limits, such 
as the precepts of natural law, on sovereignty authority.151 Later theorists 
like John Locke posited still other limits, including the idea of “popular” 
sovereignty.152  
Internationally, after the Middle Ages, claims to sovereignty were of 
the classical sort, “ringing assertion[s] of absolute political power at 
home.”153 After the creation of an international society, however, scholars 
have noted that “the implications of sovereignty did not remain fixed.”154 
Claims to “sovereignty,” previously thought to be unitary and indivisible, 
separated into two general spheres, with nation-states claiming not only 
domestic (“internal”) sovereignty, but also independence among other 
states (“external” sovereignty).155 Generally speaking, internal sovereignty 
has come to be regarded as “supremacy over all other potential authorities 
within that state’s boundaries.”156 External sovereignty, by contrast, is 
“actual independence of outside authority, not the supremacy of one state 
over others but the independence of one state from its peers.”157  
States in the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries were generally 
able to limit interference by other states in their internal affairs, and to 
insist upon external equality when dealing with other nations in the 
international arena.158 Sovereignty also enabled nation-states to maintain 
classic prerogatives, such as coining money and maintaining military 
force. It implied as well the ability to negotiate and ratify treaties which 
could legally bind states. The state thus remained effectively “supreme” 
over a given territory and population, and asserted unconstrained authority 
except where it had consented to limitations.159  
Both internal and external sovereignty have, however, been far more 
constrained and limited in reality than their ideal articulations would 
suggest.160 Internal sovereignty, for example, has been characterized as 
 151. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 4. 
 152. Id. 
 153. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 5. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.; see also HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 107, 122–32 (discussing distinctions between 
“internal” and “external” sovereignty). 
 156. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. at 37; see JAMES, supra note 3, at 20 (arguing that states must not only claim their 
independence from outside authorities; they must be able to assert their independence in practice). 
 158. See Robert O. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States, 
40 J. OF COMMON MKT. STUD. 743 (2002). 
 159. See id. 
 160. As Hans Morgenthau stated: “At the root of the perplexities which attend the problem of the 
loss of sovereignty there is the divorce, in contemporary legal and political theory, of the concept of 
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involving varying degrees of control over domestic affairs. It has been 
described by scholars as “the situation of being in charge of a domain”;161 
the “supreme power of deciding in a case of crisis”;162 and as belonging 
“to the authority that is both legitimate and supreme.”163 Scholars have 
noted that history is replete with examples of states being recognized by 
the international community as “sovereign” even though they lack 
absolute and final authority with respect to certain portions of their 
territories.164 As commentators have suggested, “[h]ere, as elsewhere, the 
actual behavior of states helps to shape the meaning of sovereignty.”165 
Moreover, insofar as it requires absolute domestic supremacy, classical 
sovereignty is seen by many as an indicator of dictatorships and 
totalitarian regimes, “an evil to be avoided rather than . . . an ideal to be 
pursued.”166 This too has led scholars and diplomats to relax the 
requirements of absolute and exclusive control when assessing state claims 
to sovereignty.167  
Similarly, in “external” affairs, the classical notion of arbitrary and 
absolute sovereignty was never really a feasible standard in practice. After 
all, the states had to conduct relations with one another. Thus, limitations 
on sovereignty began to appear in the form of institutions like “diplomatic 
immunity” and the creation of embassy compounds, “islands of alien 
sovereignty.”168 Again, to separate ideal theory from messy reality, the fact 
is that “[t]he only way most states can realize and express their 
sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate 
and order the international system.”169 States have even gone so far as to 
sovereignty from the political reality to which the concept of sovereignty is supposed to give legal 
expression.” HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND 
PEACE 249 (1948); see also FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 38 (“In our view such declarations 
seem overstated—evidence of scholars turning conditional thoughts into absolute standards.”).  
 161. CHARLES B. MARSHALL, THE EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGNTY: PAPERS ON FOREIGN POLICY 4 
(1965).  
 162. RAYMOND ARON, PEACE AND WAR: A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 746 
(Richard A. Howard et al. trans., 1967). 
 163. Id. at 739. 
 164. See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 41–42 (citing as examples the governments of Peru, 
Cyprus, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Somalia). 
 165. Id. at 42. 
 166. Id. at 43. 
 167. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 179 (noting that “the day of completely autonomous decision-
making does seem, for most states on many issues, to be past.”).  
 168. See Keohane, supra note 158, at 747. 
 169. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27; see FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 49 (noting 
that “the international system is routinely described as a place of cooperation and competition”). As 
discussed below, this has only become more true as global governance and other societal changes arise 
and affect international relations. See infra notes 199–218 and accompanying text. 
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do something that a classical conception of sovereignty would not permit 
under any circumstance, namely to delegate powers over the state to an 
external authority.170 This has been the dominant trend with regard to 
international organizations—the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund, for example—since World War II.171 “Should external 
independence of action ever have approached absolute qualities, it has 
now been seriously eroded.”172 In sum, “external” sovereignty, like 
“internal” sovereignty, is “a matter of degree, not of bright lines.”173
In addition to its evolving indicia, the meaning of “sovereignty” has 
also varied across time and circumstances. It would be impossible to 
acknowledge each of the specific definitions and permutations that have 
been proposed.174 But generally speaking, as the society of nations and 
nation-states crystallized, “the concept of sovereignty moved beyond 
declarations of the rights of a sovereign to encompass novel ideas of 
legitimacy, responsibility, and international recognition.”175 Over time, 
sovereignty has denoted things like superiority within a territory; the 
“capacity to make and give effect to public decisions”; and, as already 
noted, “being in charge of a domain.176 Some theorists have identified the 
“core” aspects of sovereignty, such as “supreme political authority and 
monopoly over the legitimate use of force within [a] territory,” the 
capacity to regulate movements across borders, the ability to make foreign 
 170. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999). “[T]he 
classic conception of sovereignty prohibits a government from agreeing to rules defining a process 
over which it does not have a veto, that can confer obligations not specifically provided for in the 
original agreement.” Keohane, supra note 158, at 748.  
 171. Keohane, supra note 158, at 748. 
 172. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 49. 
 173. Id.  
 174. For example, theorists have drawn distinctions between “legal” and “political” sovereignty. 
Legal sovereignty, very simply stated, is the power to enact enforceable laws. MACCORMICK, supra 
note 3, at 127. Political sovereignty, by contrast, is “the capacity of the people to overcome divisions 
and establish a political unity”; it exists where the will of the state is ultimately obeyed by the citizens 
of the state. Id. Political sovereignty depends to a large extent on the strengthening of bonds between 
the rulers and the ruled, the state and society. See Richard Bellamy, Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and 
Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of the State, Democracy and Rights Within the EU, in SOVEREIGNTY 
IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 171–72 (discussing distinction between political and legal 
sovereignty). It is “interpersonal power over the conditions of life in a human community or society 
. . . [and] the ability to take effective decisions on whatever concerns the common well-being of the 
members, and on whatever affects the distribution of the economic resources available to them.” 
MACCORMICK, supra note 3, at 127. 
 175. Id. at 6. 
 176. JAMES, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting CHARLES B. MARSHALL, THE EXERCISE OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1965)); see also K.N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 96 (1979) 
(linking sovereignty to the capacity of a state to “decide[] for itself how it will cope with its internal 
and external problems”).  
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policy choices independently, and recognition by other governments “as 
an independent entity entitled to freedom from external intervention.”177 
Some theorists have described sovereignty in de facto terms, such as 
effective control over a domain, others in de jure terms, as for example, 
constitutional independence.178 Still others have focused on sovereignty’s 
traditional components—“rulers, allegiance, common history, the taking 
of effective decisions, and the undertaking and implementing of 
obligations.”179 Some scholars, taking a functional approach, have used 
“sovereignty” to “denote the collection of functions exercised by a 
state.”180 Similarly, sovereignty has been characterized as a “bundle of 
competences,” in the same manner that possession of property bestows a 
“bundle of rights.”181
Some scholars have specifically focused upon the distinction between 
de jure and de facto state sovereignty.182 States thus might be said to 
possess both “legal” and “behavioral” sovereignty.183 All states might be 
said to be legally sovereign. They possess a “set of attributes that 
constitutes the legal personality of a state.”184 These include such things as 
legal competence to participate in the international system on an equal 
footing with other states, consent to treaty obligations, the right to exclude 
other states from interfering with internal matters, and control of their 
borders.185 Although all states possess these traits or competences, states 
can and do differ in the extent to which they are able to exercise them. 
Thus, we must look as well at the “behavioral sovereignty” of states, of 
how they conduct themselves in the world. When we do so, we can see 
that not all states have the capacity to fully exercise their sovereign powers 
and rights. State sovereignty on this view is variable; indeed, “some states 
are more sovereign than others.”186  
The flexibility of the concept of sovereignty is its signature post-
classical feature. This variability does not, however, demonstrate that 
 177. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 782, 786 (2003) (quoting Richard N. Haass, former ambassador and director of Policy 
Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State). 
 178. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 24 (“sovereignty consists of being constitutionally apart”). 
 179. FOLWER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 6.  
 180. INGRID DELUPIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE INDEPENDENT STATE 3 (1974). 
 181. BLIX, supra note 26, at 11–12. 
 182. For a recent discussion, see Richard H. Steinberg, Who Is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
329 (2004). 
 183. Id. at 329. 
 184. Id. at 330. 
 185. Id. at 329. 
 186. Id. at 331–32. 
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sovereignty means essentially whatever one wishes, and hence, nothing at 
all. Although the indicia and formulations have varied over time and 
across circumstances, “sovereignty” has commonly indicated some 
amalgam of control, competence, status, rights, and recognition by 
relevant communities.187 As noted, there are few bright lines and even 
fewer opportunities to empirically measure a state’s sovereignty. It is not 
always necessary, for example, that control over territory be de jure, nor 
that it be absolute and exclusive. Recognition, and with it deference, may 
come even if a government’s control is somewhat marginal. A state that 
exercises its “bundle of competences” will more often than not be 
recognized as “sovereign” by its peers, meaning that it will be given 
deference, respect, equality, or other rights, even if on a relative basis the 
state suffers a deficit of power, or wealth, or force. Always, in the end, we 
must attend to the actual behavior of states, which “helps to shape the 
meaning of sovereignty.”188 As we shall see, at least according to some 
theorists, being treated as if one is in control, or as if one has sovereign 
rights, is what truly matters. 
As noted, some domestic constitutional scholars insist that sovereignty 
can reside only in “the people.” The locus of sovereignty has also been the 
subject of international scholarly attention. Originally, of course, 
sovereignty resided in the monarchy. Depending upon the form of 
government, however, theorists have long acknowledged that sovereignty 
might lie as well in a legislature, or in the people themselves, or both.189 
“Monarchical sovereignty has given way to popular sovereignty, and 
popular sovereignty has come to be understood in terms of 
representation—both political and symbolic.”190 As one commentator 
observed: “[A]s states moved from absolutist to representative rule, 
democratically elected governments co-opted a term that had originally 
been linked with the supreme powers of a state’s ruler and used it to assert 
their own sovereign powers delegated to them by their citizens.”191 
Republican objections notwithstanding, in terms of conceptual evolution, 
it has not been at all unusual to speak in terms of “sovereign” governments 
or states, recognizing of course the ultimate representative character of the 
states’ sovereignty. 
 187. See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 45 (“Perhaps for many observers today domestic 
political supremacy amounts to little more than occupying the recognized seat of government.”). 
 188. Id. at 42. 
 189. See WEBER, supra note 3, at 8 (discussing locus of sovereignty authority). 
 190. Id. 
 191. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 6. 
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Finally, international relations scholars have given the origins of 
sovereignty far more considered attention than domestic constitutional 
scholars, who are trapped between the positions that either “the states” or 
“the people” consented to the Constitution and are thus “truly” sovereign. 
Some international scholars have noted, in particular, that sovereignty 
does not automatically arise whenever a state possesses a monopoly on 
coercive power. Although the state and sovereignty reinforce one another, 
there can be states (people, territory, and government) that are not in fact 
“sovereign.”192 According to some scholars who have studied the origins 
of modern sovereignty, a community must “recognize” the state before it 
can rule effectively.193 As one scholar stated:  
It is when a sufficient element in the community in which the state 
operates has sufficiently come to accept it and when, in the process 
of becoming accepted to this sufficient extent, the state has adjusted 
its forms and its outlook to the demands and conditions of the 
community—it is then and only then . . . that the concept of 
sovereignty has been newly coined.194
Thus, sovereignty does not simply arise with the erection of a capitol, 
the election of a legislature or an executive, or even the ratification of a 
constitution. Rather, “[i]t is only when the community responds to the 
state and the state responds to the community in which it rules that the 
discussion of political power can take place in terms of sovereignty.”195
“Sovereignty,” as should be obvious from even this brief discussion, is 
a great deal more complex than domestic constitutional discourses 
acknowledge.196 One cannot, for example, define “sovereignty” in some 
formalistic sense, or capture it by measuring guns, dollars, or personnel. It 
is more than the product of some distributional calculus, for example, but 
less than supreme and absolute authority within a territory. As one scholar 
has observed, sovereignty is “a perpetually tentative undertaking; one can 
only cite the latest edition and anticipate the next revision.”197 That does 
not mean, as Skeptics contend, that sovereignty is therefore meaningless 
or solely a rhetorical parry. It means, rather, that one must stay current 
with the evolutionary progress of the concept. Meanings, even of basic 
 192. See HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 20–21. 
 193. Id. at 21. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 21–22. 
 196. SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 307 (describing sovereignty as “a prism 
through which many different legal or political problems might be examined”). 
 197. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at xi. 
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constitutional concepts, change. “Our Federalism” is not the same today as 
it was in, say, 1930. Neither, for that matter, is our “privacy.” We can, as a 
result of the evolution highlighted here, hopefully at least throw off the 
classical straightjacket and see what else there might be.  
B. The “New Sovereignty” 
Historically, sovereignty “has been the source of greatest 
preoccupation and contention when conditions have been producing rapid 
changes in the scope of government or in the nature of society or in 
both.”198 This is certainly the case across the globe in this modern era. 
Domestically, the balance of power that resulted from the “cooperative 
federalism” of the shared sovereignty era left the states in a substantially 
subordinated position, leaving their “sovereign” status in some doubt. 
Internationally, unique forms of governance have cropped up which have 
further threatened the traditional prerogatives of states and, thus, the 
concept of state sovereignty.  
The sovereignty of today’s nation-state is beginning to bear far greater 
resemblance to the framers’ concept of a limited, partial, and divided 
authority than to the absolute, exclusive, and final authority of the classical 
model. As one international scholar noted: “One element of postmodern 
statehood is that sovereignty is considered to be increasingly ‘held in 
common’, ‘pooled among governments, negotiated by thousands of 
officials through hundreds of multilateral committees, compromised 
through acceptance of regulations and court judgements.’”199 In light of 
the resulting limitations on state authority, the question now commonly 
being asked, domestically as well as internationally, is whether the states 
can still be considered “sovereign” at all. 
To better appreciate the character and status of state claims to 
sovereignty in the “post-modern” era, let us briefly consider the best-
known example of the trend toward limited and partial sovereignty—the 
European Union. By way of a summary or overview, the EU is constituted 
by the various treaties and laws that are uniformly applicable throughout 
the European Union, which bind all the member states and their citizens.200 
These laws are interpreted by the European Court of Justice, which, 
 198. HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 2. 
 199. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 34 (quoting W. Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The 
European Paradox, 47 POL. STUD. 503, 519 (1999)) (emphasis added). 
 200. See JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CONCISE 
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2002). 
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among other things, gives opinions to national courts in cases where there 
are questions about the meaning of EU law.201  
Pursuant to various treaties, EU member states have effectively agreed 
to transfer authority to the EU in a range of policy areas—for example, 
intra-European trade, the environment, agriculture, and social policy.202 In 
these areas, EU law supersedes national law. In other areas, national law 
remains supreme.203 Thus, member states have voluntarily surrendered 
important aspects of their “internal” and “external” sovereignty to the EU. 
According to one interpretation: “Sovereignty is pooled, in the sense that, 
in many areas, states’ legal authority over internal and external affairs is 
transferred to the Community as a whole, authorizing action through 
procedures not involving state vetoes.”204  
In contravention of the classical model of sovereignty, this delegation 
of authority has led to the development of a new level of supra-state legal 
authority to which the member states are often subject.205 The impact of 
this new arrangement on European governance has been substantial. EU 
legislative institutions, for example, have been quite active. Until the early 
1990s, the EU was adopting 6,000–7,000 laws every year; the number has 
fallen significantly, by one count to about 1,500–1,800.206 The complex 
structure of the EU consists of, among other things, the European 
Parliament, a directly elected representative body. As the powers of this 
body grow, the powers of the national legislatures may continue to 
decline.207 In certain areas, the European Commission, another institution 
within the complex EU structure, is authorized to oversee negotiations 
with third parties on behalf of all the member states.208 In addition, the 
Euro has replaced the national currencies of most of the member states.209 
Thus, the power to set fiscal policy, one of the traditional indicia of 
 201. See id. at 109–13 (describing the role of the European Court of Justice). 
 202. See Neil MacCormick, The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now, 1 EUR. L.J. 255 (1995) 
(describing transfer of competences in various policy areas); see also McCormick, supra note 200, at 
11.  
 203. See MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at 11. 
 204. Keohane, supra note 158, at 8. 
 205. See SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 186–87 (noting surrender of authority by 
member states over certain competences).  
 206. MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at 89. By comparison, the United States House of 
Representatives and the United States Senate each passed less than 1,000 pieces of legislation in the 
latest year for which figures are available. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THOMAS E. MANN, & MICHAEL 
J. MALBIN, VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 2001–2002 (2002). 
 207. The EU budget ($86 billion in 2002) gives EU institutions an element of financial 
independence as well. MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at 11.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
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national sovereignty, has been transferred to the European Central Bank in 
Frankfurt.210
The challenges to sovereign authority encompass more than changes in 
regional governance structure. Indeed, derogations from the classical 
model of sovereignty are everywhere. For instance, many nation-states 
have voluntarily consented to a variety of obligations, including even 
binding enforcement mechanisms, with regard to human rights.211 As 
Louis Henkin has reported: “In major regions of the world (Europe, the 
Americas), states have submitted to comprehensive systems of 
enforcement by commission, court, and political bodies, unthinkable to 
‘sovereignty’ just a few years ago.”212 Another scholar has suggested that 
“Europe, the cradle of external and unitary sovereignty, now serves as the 
model of co-operative mutual interference.”213
In sum, EU member states have surrendered powers to decision-
making systems that function beyond the level of the state.214 Nation-states 
have formally moved beyond the intergovernmental level to the creation of 
supranational organizations and bodies of common law.215 As one scholar 
 210. EU member states can still do almost everything that American states cannot do; they can 
make treaties, for example, and they maintain an independent military. See MCCORMICK, supra note 
200, at 9–12 (discussing distinction between confederation and federation). In addition, again by way 
of rough comparison, the EU institutions presently have few of the powers of the federal government 
in the United States; they cannot levy taxes or operate a common military. Id. at 11. The EU is thus not 
a true federation like the United States. The EU cannot technically force members to remain so; 
theoretically, but by no means practically, the member states can withdraw from the EU.  
 211. See Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 41–
42 (1995/1996) (describing compliance and enforcement trend with regard to international human 
rights). 
 212. Id. at 42. As Professor Henkin also noted, however, some concessions on human rights have 
been over the strong objections of states who continue to invoke their sovereignty. See id. at 44 (“At 
the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993) some states led the attack on the idea of 
human rights, and particularly on its enforcement, under the banner of ‘sovereignty’. . .”). 
 213. Keohane, supra note 158, at 749. 
 214. Regional integration has occurred elsewhere around the globe, in the Americas, Asia, and 
Africa for example. To date, however, the EU is the most highly evolved example of regional 
integration in the world. 
 215. Some international scholars have described the EU and similar arrangements as a form of 
“multi-level governance.” See LIESBET HOOGHE & GARY MARKS, MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2001). This descriptive theory depicts contemporary structures in EU 
Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies. Under multi-level 
governance, “decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels.” Aalberts, supra 
note 29, at 28. Thus, although the EU is not a federation, “supranational institutions have become 
actors in their own right, playing an independent part in policy-making” and having substantial effects 
formerly considered to be the exclusive domain of “internal” state sovereignty. Id. Subnational and 
local governments have also gained in importance, resulting overall in a diminished role for nation-
states. In many respects, “the traditional separation of domestic and international politics has been 
undermined because of transnational associations.” Id. Multi-level governance theory is based on the 
idea of governance beyond the state—in other words, governance including the state, but as only one 
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summarized the situation: “Overall, one can speak of a tripartite shift of 
authority away from national governments: upwards, as a most direct 
result of European integration; downwards, because of subnational 
empowerment; and sideways to, for instance, public-private 
partnerships.”216 As a result, “states are only one among a variety of actors 
influencing decision-making at a variety of levels, and do not by definition 
have a final say.”217 Nations have pooled, and thereby in some measure 
limited and devalued, their “sovereignty.” They have consented to 
substantial interventions with respect to their “internal” sovereignty. All of 
this has further widened the gap between political reality and the ideal of 
classical sovereignty. “The capacity and right of existing states to exercise 
supreme authority within their territory, control access to it, and speak for 
their citizens outside it, have all become harder to sustain and justify.”218  
These and other post-modern developments have spurred some 
theorists to reconsider the traditional, formal concepts of state sovereignty. 
In particular, national interdependence, changes in governance structure 
like the EU, and other forces have forged what some scholars have called 
the “new sovereignty.”219  
In thumbnail form, the “new sovereignty” has two basic characteristics 
that distinguish it from classical sovereignty. First, in contrast to classical 
sovereignty, the new sovereignty “is not virginity, which you either have 
or you don’t.”220 Sovereignty is not a “chunk” or absolute, but a “basket of 
attributes and corresponding rights and duties.”221 This is not a new idea so 
much as a return to a conception of sovereignty which had been eclipsed 
for many years by the formal, classical model. As one scholar noted some 
time ago: “[S]overeignty has traditionally been used as a term to denote 
the collection of functions exercised by a state.”222 Or as Hans Blix, the 
official at the center of the pre-war weapons search in Iraq once said: “As 
ownership is described as a bundle of rights, sovereignty may be described 
among many actors, if still a key actor. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 28.  
 216. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 28. 
 217. Id. Intergovernmental theorists view these new governance arrangements as necessitating 
bargaining, while states retain sovereignty. See, e.g., ALAN S. MILWARD, THE EUROPEAN RESCUE OF 
THE NATION STATE (1992) (describing intergovernmentalism theory). Supranationalists, by contrast, 
view these new structures as obviating state sovereignty. See, e.g., R.A.W. Rhodes, The New 
Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUDIES 652 (1996). 
 218. Bellamy, supra note 174, at 167.  
 219. See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3. 
 220. Geoffrey Howe, Sovereignty and Interdependence: Britain’s Place in the World, 66 INT’L 
AFF. 675–95 (1990). 
 221. FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 70. 
 222. DELUPIS, supra note 180, at 3. 
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as a bundle of competences.”223 Although sovereignty has been devalued 
by new arrangements and political realities, it persists and prospers insofar 
as these competences continue to be performed and used to sustain state 
claims to internal sovereignty.  
Second, the “new sovereignty” is not based upon a state’s ability to 
demand or coerce other states, or its exclusive control over policies or 
other matters. Rather, the new concept of state sovereignty has been 
characterized primarily in terms of a state’s ability to act effectively within 
international regimes. With few exceptions, nation-states cannot control, 
coerce, or dictate like they used to.224 In a word, sovereignty, once 
exclusive and isolationist, has become “relational.”225 As Abram and 
Antonia Chayes, leading proponents of a particular version of the “new 
sovereignty,” have explained: “[T]he only way most states can realize and 
express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes 
that regulate and order the international system.”226 Thus, states have to 
maintain their sovereignty by actively practicing it, by propping it up and 
maintaining it.227  
The “new sovereignty” is a substantial change from the classical 
model. For one thing, sovereignty’s traditionally negative, proscriptive 
character has become more positive, proactive, and affirming. Sovereignty 
is “a resource to be used, rather than a constraint that inhibits or limits our 
capacity for action.”228 It is, to be sure, less of a sledgehammer or “slam 
dunk” argument than is classical sovereignty. Sovereignty retains 
considerable force and prospers insofar as nations support it by playing 
functional roles and advancing winning justifications for being left alone 
or being deferred to with regard to decisions and policies that affect them. 
“Under conditions of extensive and intensive interdependence, formal 
sovereignty becomes less a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining 
resource.”229  
 223. BLIX, supra note 26, at 11–12. 
 224. Interestingly, the United States may be one of the exceptions to this general rule. Indeed, 
some have noted the irony that the United States, which has always had a distributed sovereignty, has 
conducted itself as a classical sovereign in foreign relations, while the states of Europe, which 
originated the classical form of sovereignty, have pooled and limited their sovereignty. See generally 
Keohane, supra note 158, at 744 (noting the irony of the United States clinging to a classical concept 
of sovereignty in foreign affairs, while European states have adopted “pooled” sovereignty).  
 225. Anne-Marie Slaughter, In Memoriam: Abram Chayes, 114 HARV. L. REV. 682, 685 (2001). 
 226. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27. 
 227. See STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 11 (noting “the variety of 
ways in which states are constantly negotiating their sovereignty”); id. at 12 (“sovereignty provides 
textual and/or contextual prescriptions for what a state must do to be recognized as sovereign”). 
 228. Howe, supra note 220, at 680 (emphasis added). 
 229. Keohane, supra note 158, at 748. 
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Bargaining, of course, entails sacrifice. As the complexity of the EU 
demonstrates, in order to preserve effective “behavioral”sovereignty 
nation-states must give up some aspects of their formal, legal sovereignty. 
Even powerful countries must support international cooperation if they 
hope to preserve their policymaking autonomy. As Chayes and Chayes 
have stated: “Sovereignty, in the end, is status—the vindication of the 
state’s existence as a member of the international system.”230  
C. Sovereignty as a Social Construct 
Developments in Europe and elsewhere have given rise to various 
theories regarding state sovereignty. There are those who, without offering 
a coherent theory of state sovereignty, nevertheless maintain that nations 
retain their “sovereignty” despite the general erosion of their authority.231 
There are international Classicists who argue that sovereignty cannot be 
shared, pooled, or negotiated. Since no state currently exercises exclusive, 
final, and enforceable authority, these scholars suggest, no state is 
“sovereign.”232 There are international Republicans, who argue that the 
concept of the sovereign state is, and in fact always has been, inconsistent 
with republican and democratic principles, and an impediment to the 
realization of human rights and general welfare.233 And there are 
international Skeptics, who argue that claims to “sovereignty” persist 
primarily because they provide a rhetorical advantage.234 This synthesis 
should sound arrestingly familiar. Each of the domestic theories regarding 
 230. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27 (“[F]or all but a few self-isolated nations, 
sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-
interest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of 
international life.”). 
 231. Intergovernmental theorists regard consolidation and interdependence as a form of 
bargaining, while supranationalists see it as loss of sovereignty. See MILWARD, supra note 217 
(intergovernmentalism); Rhodes, supra note 217 (supranationalism). Some scholars note that EU 
members do in fact retain the final say as to whether they will remain members. It has been commonly 
noted, however, that practical realities make withdrawal from the EU next to impossible. See, e.g., 
Bellamy, supra note 174, at 176 (stating that member states can formally, but not practically, withdraw 
from the EU); MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at 119 (noting that while withdrawal from the EU is 
permissible, “it is practically unlikely, because the economic ties among the member states would 
probably make it more costly to leave than to stay in”). 
 232. See generally CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3 (questioning the continued usefulness of the 
concept of sovereignty in light of interdependence and other developments).  
 233. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 211, at 33 (“But the benefits of a system in which states were 
let alone were seen in state terms, with the individual an incidental, indirect beneficiary, and often not 
a beneficiary at all.”). 
 234. See, e.g., KRASNER, supra note 170 (arguing that sovereignty is an incoherent concept). 
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sovereignty discussed in Part III is indeed represented in international 
scholarly discourse concerning state sovereignty.  
As noted in Part III, however, none of these theories is capable of 
advancing our consideration of state sovereignty very far, if at all. Part of 
what the evolution of sovereignty in general, and the “new sovereignty” in 
particular, demonstrates is that state sovereignty cannot, as Classicists 
apparently believe, be fixed for all times and purposes. “Like all social 
norms, the principle of sovereignty has a history, a history that has 
involved the same sort of communicative processes that surround the 
production of other social norms.”235 Thus, “as the prescriptions for 
sovereign recognition change, so does the meaning of sovereignty.”236  
We might, as “new sovereignty” theorists have, go about untangling 
the seeming anomaly of persistent state claims to sovereignty and 
diminishing state powers by redefining sovereignty for a new era. It might 
be helpful, in addition, to examine how state sovereignty is generated in 
the first place, and ultimately sustained. This section looks to social 
construction theory, which is well suited to this task. Some international 
relations scholars have recognized that it is not particularly helpful to treat 
sovereignty as something that can be measured or rigidly defined. They 
have applied principles of social construction theory to examine statehood 
and sovereignty as constructs, facts that are ultimately generated by human 
agreement. This can help explain how it is that states continue to be 
recognized and treated as “sovereign” despite their seeming loss of 
classical authority. It can also help us to understand how something like 
the “new sovereignty” might arise. The theory’s sensitivity to the extent to 
which state sovereignty is constructed enables us to track “important 
qualitative changes in the meaning of both state and sovereignty.”237  
The section begins with a brief distillation of the basic principles of 
social construction theory. It will then specifically examine how social 
construction theory has been applied to the concepts of statehood and 
sovereignty in the international context. Part IV will then return to 
domestic constitutional concerns, incorporating the lessons learned in this 
Part.  
 235. Id. 
 236. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 13. 
 237. Id. at 12. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3
p229 Zick book pages.doc 9/1/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] ARE THE STATES SOVEREIGN? 271 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Some Basic Principles of Social Construction 
Social construction theory essentially posits that “there are portions of 
the real world, objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human 
agreement,”238 that “[i]n a sense there are things that exist only because we 
believe them to exist.”239 Objects like money, property, governments, and 
marriages have physical properties; but none of them can truly exist unless 
we arrive at some agreement as to what it means to say that something is 
“money,” or “government,” or what have you. These concepts are human 
inventions. 
John Searle, a leading proponent of social construction theory, 
distinguishes two types of facts that order the world. “Institutional facts” 
are those that “require human institutions for their existence.”240 For a 
piece of paper to be a five dollar bill, for example, there must be the 
“human institution of money.”241 “Brute facts,” by contrast, are those 
which are not dependent on any human opinion.242 The fact that “hydrogen 
atoms have one electron” is a “brute fact.”243 The fact that “the sun is 93 
million miles from earth” is a “brute fact.”244 The fact that George Bush is 
“president,” by contrast, is an “institutional fact” because there must be 
some shared understanding of what it means to be “president” for this 
status term to have meaning.245 To preview the discussion that follows, 
social constructionists posit that “state” and “sovereignty,” like 
“president,” are institutional, rather than brute, facts.  
The distinction drawn is essentially one between matters of “brute 
physics and biology” versus “features of the world that are matters of 
culture and society.”246 Searle and other constructionists are primarily 
interested in how institutional facts are created. It is not necessary to grasp 
all of the technical nuances and formal logic of social construction theory 
to understand the basic process by which this occurs. According to Searle, 
 238. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 1; see also P.L. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1991). 
 239. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 1. 
 240. Id. at 2. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. 
 244. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 27. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 27. Social construction theory posits a need to “distinguish those true statements we 
make that attribute features to the world that exist quite independently of any attitude or stance we 
take, and those statements that attribute features that exist only relative to our interests, attitudes, 
stances, purposes, etc.” Id. at 12. 
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the fundamental “apparatus”247 necessary to account for and order social 
reality includes three basic elements: (1) constitutive rules; (2) imposition 
of function; and (3) collective intentionality. 
Constitutive rules are critical to the construction of institutional facts. 
These rules must be distinguished from mere “regulative rules.”248 A 
regulative rule regulates antecedently existing activities. Hence, “drive on 
the right side of the road” is a regulative rule; activity which precedes the 
rule is being regulated.249 Constitutive rules do not merely regulate. 
Rather, they “create the very possibility” of certain activities.250 Searle 
gives as an example the rules of chess.251 “Chess” cannot exist without a 
set of constitutive rules to tell players and observers how it is to be played. 
The rules constitute, in a sense, the game; they define it for us. 
Institutional facts exist only within systems of constitutive rules; “the 
systems of rules create the possibility of facts of this type .”252  
The imposition of functions is the second critical element of the 
constructive apparatus. The structure of social reality is by and large taken 
for granted—“weightless and invisible”; as Searle notes, we don’t reflect 
on the ontology of “car” or “house” or “money” as institutional facts.253 
We see these and other objects in terms of their functions, not their 
physical properties.254 Some objects are constructed to serve specific 
functions. In most cases, however, we impose some function or functions 
on an object to understand it. As Searle notes, as we attribute functions to 
an object (a river is used to swim in, for example), “we are situating these 
facts relative to a system of values that we hold.”255 Imposed functions are 
not always oriented toward some action. As Searle observes: “Sometimes 
the agentive function assigned to an object is that of standing for or 
representing something else.”256 This type of imposition of function is 
called “symbolism.”257  
 247. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 13. 
 248. Id. at 27. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 28. 
 251. Id. at 27–28. 
 252. Id. at 28. 
 253. Id. at 4. 
 254. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 4. These are what Searle calls “observer-relevant” features of the 
social world—they are “ontologically subjective.” Id. at 9–10. 
 255. Id. at 14, 15. A specific feature (X) may malfunction; yet we will still consider a function of 
the object itself to be X. Id.  
 256. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 21. 
 257. Id. at 21. Searle refers to symbols as a special class of “agentive function,” with “agentive” 
meaning matters of the use to which agents put specific entities. Id. 
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Finally, the development of what Searle calls collective intentionality 
completes social construction. Collective intentionality refers to the 
“shared intentional states”—beliefs, desires, purposes258—of relevant 
participant and observer communities. A “social” fact is, thus, any fact 
involving collective intentionality or, to use another phrase, human 
agreement.259 With regard to institutional facts, collective intentionality 
involves “the imposition of a collectively recognized status to which a 
function is attached.”260 It is important to recognize that this does not mean 
that the community of relevant actors or observers must be conscious that 
they are collectively imposing a function or status; as Searle notes, in the 
course of acting “they may simply evolve institutional facts.”261 “As long 
as people continue to recognize [the object] as having the . . . status 
function, the institutional fact is created and maintained.”262 “They do not 
in addition have to recognize that they are so recognizing, and they may 
hold all sorts of other false beliefs about what they are doing and why they 
are doing it.”263
With this basic apparatus, we can grasp the rudimentary process by 
which institutional facts are generated. We first must conceptualize a 
hierarchy of facts where brute facts precede institutional facts; in other 
words, institutional facts essentially sit atop brute facts.264 Currency, for 
example, must exist in some physical form or another before we can 
generate the institutional fact of “money.”265 So too with “state,” which 
has a set of physical properties (territory and population, for example). 
Once this physical realization is in place, the object (currency or territory) 
is assigned a function and becomes, within a set of constitutive rules, the 
construct we call “money” or “state.”  
Collective intentionality is a critical part of the movement from object 
to institutional fact.266 As Searle posits: “The key element in the move 
 258. Id. at 24. 
 259. Id. at 26. 
 260. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 41. 
 261. Id. at 47 (emphasis added). 
 262. Id. Searle uses the example of a boundary wall which has collapsed but is still treated as a 
boundary by the community. It is intended to function the same way but the means by which it does so 
is the collective recognition that the stones have a special status to which this function is attached. Id. 
at 28.  
 263. Id. at 47–48. 
 264. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 34–35. 
 265. Id.  
 266. “The central span on the bridge from physics to society is collective intentionality, and the 
decisive movement on that bridge in the creation of social reality is the collective intentional 
imposition of function on entities that cannot perform those functions without that imposition.” 
SEARLE, supra note 32, at 41. 
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from the collective imposition of a function to the creation of institutional 
facts is the imposition of a collectively recognized status to which a 
function is attached.”267 In essence, the principle of “self-referentiality” 
posits that for X to be money, it “must be believed to be” money, or “used 
as” money, or “regarded as” money.268 As Searle states, “for social facts, 
the attitude that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of 
the phenomenon.”269 Stated somewhat differently: “[P]rocess is prior to 
product”; “social objects are always . . . constituted by social acts; and, in 
a sense, the object is just the continuous possibility of the activity.”270  
Searle reduced the basic process of institutional fact-generation to a 
formula: “X counts as Y in C,”271 where X is the object, Y is the status 
function, and C represents the circumstances or conditions under which X 
takes on the status Y. For example, paper (X) counts as money (Y) under 
certain conditions of commerce and exchange (C). Or, once again to 
anticipate later discussion, state (X) counts as sovereign (Y) under certain 
conditions (C).272 This process applies to institutions as well as objects. 
Importantly, Searle notes that institutions, unlike certain other objects, do 
not wear out as this formula is repeatedly invoked over time. Instead, 
“each use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that institution”; thus, 
“constant use renews and strengthens institutions such as marriage, 
property, and universities.”273 One can thus anticipate that repeated use 
can do the same thing for institutional facts like “state” and “sovereignty.” 
There are two additional points which should be noted as a supplement 
to this basic distillation of social construction; these will take on special 
significance when we consider domestic state sovereignty as an 
institutional fact. First, there is a significant linguistic component to the 
generation of institutional facts. Indeed, Searle notes that “language is 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 32. 
 269. Id. at 33. “Part of being a cocktail party is being thought to be a cocktail party; part of being a 
war is being thought to be a war. This is a remarkable feature of social facts; it has no analogue among 
physical facts.” Id. at 34. Searle also notes the possibility that a social fact can be created by means of 
“performative utterances” or declarations. For example, the utterance “War is hereby declared” creates 
the very state of affairs it represents. Id. 
 270. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 36. As Searle says, seeming to be F (the observer-relative feature) 
“logically precedes” being F. Thus, “seeming to be F is a necessary condition of being F.” Id. at 13 
(emphasis added). 
 271. Id. at 46. 
 272. Of course, “state” is itself an institutional fact. It is composed of physical properties like 
territory and people. We can give the status function of state (Y) to a territory and population (X) 
under certain circumstances, such as where the territory and population has come together under a 
constitution or other consensual agreement. 
 273. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 57. 
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essentially constitutive of institutional reality.”274 This stems from the fact 
that for institutional facts, unlike brute ones, we need a system of 
representation like language to convey and constitute the facts.275 As a 
result, “the linguistic element appears to be partly constitutive of the 
fact.”276 Symbolism is especially important to the process of generating 
social constructs. “The feature of language essential for the constitution of 
institutional facts is the existence of symbolic devices, such as words, that 
by convention mean or represent or symbolize something beyond 
themselves.”277 By “symbolism” Searle means that “there are words, 
symbols, or other conventional devices that mean something or express 
something or represent or symbolize something beyond themselves, in a 
way that is publicly understandable.”278  
The importance of symbolism makes perfect sense when we consider 
that the process of institutional fact-generation requires shared 
understandings. “Because the new status exists only by convention, there 
must be some conventional way to represent the status or the system will 
not work.”279 Thus, symbols are especially useful, indeed at times critical, 
means for conveying social status constructions.280 In terms of the formula 
for generation of institutional facts: “Physically X and Y are exactly the 
same thing. The only difference is that we have imposed a status on the X 
element, and this new status needs markers, because, empirically speaking, 
there isn’t anything else there.”281 Social construction theory sensitizes us 
to the host of markers we otherwise take for granted. A passport, for 
example, is not simply a document that permits us to leave and re-enter the 
country. It is a status indicator, a “speech act” that combines with a host of 
other markers to constitute institutional facts like nation and citizenship.282  
The second supplemental point is that, generally speaking, when in the 
process of generating institutional facts we assign functions to an object or 
institution, we generate power on its behalf. According to Searle: 
“Because the creation of institutional facts is a matter of imposing a status 
and with it a function on some entity that does not already have that status-
 274. Id. at 59. 
 275. Id. at 37. 
 276. Id.  
 277. Id. at 60. 
 278. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 60–61; see also id. at 66 (Linguistic symbols “symbolize 
something beyond themselves, they do so by convention, and they are public”). 
 279. Id. at 69. 
 280. Id. at 3. 
 281. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted). 
 282. Id. at 119. 
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function, in general the creation of a status-function is a matter of 
conferring some new power.”283 The creation of an institutional fact, such 
as government or, indeed, sovereignty, is the conferral of power on the 
institutions of government or the state. There is, Searle notes, one class of 
exceptions to this typical conferral of power: “Some institutional facts 
involve pure status with no further function.”284 These facts, and their 
symbols, can be either honorific or critical, positive or negative. 
To summarize: “The secret of understanding the continued existence of 
institutional facts is simply that the individuals directly involved and a 
sufficient number of members of the relevant community must continue to 
recognize and accept the existence of such facts.”285 In other words, 
“institutions survive on acceptance.”286 As Searle notes, when de Gaulle 
insisted during World War II on the “dignity” and “honor” of France, he 
thereby “helped to re-create and maintain the French nation-state.”287 In a 
similar fashion, the Declaration of Independence helped to create the 
institutional fact of independence in circumstances in which that 
institution did not yet exist.288 Let us now see how this theory might apply 
to the institutional facts of statehood and state sovereignty.  
2. Statehood and Sovereignty as Institutional Facts 
The many and increasing limitations on nation-state sovereignty call 
into substantial doubt the classical conception of state sovereignty, which 
is based upon the principles of absolute, unitary, and supreme power. 
Indeed, many theorists see this conception as something of an easy target, 
since “the day of completely autonomous decision-making does seem, for 
most states on many issues, to be past.”289 As we have already seen, 
classical sovereignty has not aged well. 
In an effort to resolve the apparent tension between states’ diminishing 
power and the persistence, indeed prospering, of global “sovereignty talk,” 
social construction theorists have offered an alternative to the classical 
model. Social constructionists who focus specifically on statehood and 
sovereignty expressly reject the reification of the state.290 Their beginning 
 283. Id. at 95 (emphasis omitted). 
 284. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 96. 
 285. Id. at 117. 
 286. Id. at 118. 
 287. Id.  
 288. Id. at 118. 
 289. JAMES, supra note 3, at 179.  
 290. Reification is:  
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premise is that state sovereignty is “an inherently social concept.”291 Social 
constructionists look beyond material objects like wealth, power, and 
territory in examining state sovereignty. Theirs is a dynamic theory of 
social interaction. This means that state sovereignty cannot be defined for 
all time; indeed, “the very attempt to treat sovereignty as a matter of 
definition and legal principle encourages a certain amnesia about its 
historical and culturally specific character.”292 As two leading international 
social constructionists have stated: “The modern state system is not based 
on some timeless principle of sovereignty, but on the production of a 
normative conception that links authority, territory, population (society, 
nation), and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place (the 
state).”293  
Social construction theorists posit that “neither state nor sovereignty 
should be assumed or taken as given, fixed, or immutable.”294 The theory 
“directs us to a consideration of the constitutive relationship between state 
and sovereignty.”295 It encourages us to “consider state, as an identity or 
agent, and sovereignty, as an institution or discourse, as mutually 
constitutive and constantly undergoing change and transformation.”296 
Adopting an approach that views all of international politics as socially 
constructed,297 these scholars have read statehood and sovereignty as 
“institutional facts” rather than objects existing in the world as “brute 
facts.”298 They have sought to explain the conditions (C) under which 
brute facts like territory and population (X) “count as” a state (Y). More 
importantly for present purposes, they have examined the conditions (C) 
under which a state (X) “counts as” sovereign (Y). The extent to which 
statehood and sovereignty are social constructs obviously differs in the 
the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something other than 
human products—such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine 
will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human 
world and, further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to 
consciousness. 
BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 238, at 106.  
 291. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 1. 
 292. R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 166 
(1993); see also HINSLEY, supra note 3, at 126–57 (discussing the origins of modern sovereignty). 
 293. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 3.  
 294. Id. at 11. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id.  
 297. See generally WENDT, supra note 29 (arguing that all of international politics is socially 
constructed). 
 298. See generally STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3 (presenting various 
social constructionist treatments of statehood and sovereignty). 
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global and domestic contexts, as do the specific conditions that support the 
generation of these institutional facts.299 The general point, however, is 
that statehood and sovereignty can be conceptualized as constructs.  
In making this point, it helps to present the theory, as applied, in a 
somewhat simplified, even mechanical manner. Thus, in terms of the basic 
constructive “apparatus” described in the previous section, the constitutive 
rules which make it possible to speak in terms of nation-state sovereignty 
might be thought of as all of the sources of international law—treaties, 
customary law, the state system itself—which together “create the very 
possibility” of state interaction and claims to sovereignty.300 Like the rules 
of chess, this system of rules “create[s] the possibility of facts of this 
type.”301 One of the important insights of constructionist thought in this 
area is that sovereignty is relational; there must be a system of accepted 
rules within which sovereigns relate to one another in order to speak of the 
institutional fact of (internally and externally) “sovereign” states.  
The imposition of functions upon states is critical to the construction of 
“sovereignty.” Social constructionists “regard the state as an agent or 
identity that may have specific roles designated to it by sovereignty.”302 
Nation-states earn their identities by performing certain basic functions 
and having these functions associated with them over time. An example is 
the inclusion or exclusion of citizens: “[E]stablishing the criteria for 
national citizenship—whether in everyday discourse or by legal 
proclamation—constructs the foundation of a state’s identity, the 
nation.”303 Similarly, “promises to provide protection from some foreign 
‘other’ reinforce that identity.”304 Although nations in the EU have lost 
 299. For example, international social constructionists maintain that the state itself is a social 
construct. See STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 3. They posit that “even 
our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings, . . . they are reified structures 
that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness . . .[which] were subsequently 
diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted.” Emanuel Adler, Seizing the Middle 
Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, 3 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 319, 322 (1997); see also Aalberts, 
supra note 29, at 34 (“[T]he sovereign state should not be mistaken for a ‘natural’, consequently 
unchangeable, being.”); J. Anderson, The Shifting State of Politics: New Medieval and Postmodern 
Territorialities?, 14 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOCIETY AND SPACE 133–53 (1996) (examining territory as a 
social construct). There is a substantial sense in which our understanding of the states is based upon 
shared understandings. Nevertheless, the extent to which certain aspects of statehood like territory and 
population can be considered constructs is not the same in the international and domestic realms. State 
territories, for example, are far less flexible under the Constitution than they are in certain international 
contexts. We may need to adapt social construction theory to make use of its general principles.  
 300. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 28. 
 301. Id. 
 302. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 13. 
 303. Id. at 13–14. 
 304. Id. 
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certain sovereign functions—coining money, for instance—they have 
undertaken a number of other functions, including representing national 
interests in bodies like the European Parliament. As they perform these 
functions, citizens, theorists, diplomats, and other states will eventually 
come to associate their claims to sovereign status with the functions 
performed. State identity is thus an ongoing process, a production that 
evolves over time. 
International social constructionists posit that state sovereignty is 
constructed primarily “out of interaction with other states and with the 
international society they form.”305 According to these theorists, “[s]tates 
can be defined in terms of their claims to sovereignty, while sovereignty 
can be defined in terms of the interactions and practices of states.”306 The 
premise is that “there is a close connection between what actors do [and 
say] and what they are.”307 Social construction theorists primarily urge an 
examination of “the variety of ways in which practices construct, 
reproduce, reconstruct, and deconstruct both state and sovereignty.”308  
Consider once again the emerging multi-level governance structures of 
the EU. A positivist approach to sovereignty would focus on the empirical 
realities of policy-making in the EU as central to the sovereignty issue. A 
social constructionist, by contrast, posits that “a comprehension of 
sovereignty as a social and political construct, existing merely by virtue of 
(state) practice to accept this institutional fact for real, might be more 
helpful when untangling the puzzle relating to emerging multilevel 
governance structures in the states system in EU Europe.”309  
In addition to state practices, social construction theorists emphasize 
the language or symbols which are used to generate the institutional facts 
of state and sovereignty. As one scholar has noted, the justification of 
sovereignty has typically  
taken the form of an appeal to higher-order values that define the 
identity or raison d’ etre of the state, whether they entail the pursuit 
of justice, the achievement of civic glory, the protection of a 
divinely ordained social order, or the advancement of individuals’ 
rights and the celebration of the nation.310
 305. Id. at 13. 
 306. Id. at 11. 
 307. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 36.  
 308. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 11 (emphasis added). 
 309. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 33. 
 310. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 11. 
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The character of justifications for state sovereignty are thus an important 
part of the constructive process. For example, international social 
constructionists have asserted that “an analysis of the justifications given 
by states for the wars and interventions on which they embark is another 
way to observe some of the practices that construct and reconstruct 
sovereignty, as well as how these practices have changed over time.”311  
Sometimes, for example, state justifications are based upon a symbolic 
analogy to personhood; thus states, like persons, are said to have various 
interests and “rights” to autonomy, equality, and independence.312 In 
urging self-determination as a part of state sovereignty, one scholar has 
observed: “Within domestic society, the best way to further a moral claim 
is to ‘graft’ it to prevailing views about what constitutes a fully realized 
human being, or to beliefs about the ideal community of such beings.”313 
Or, as another put it: “New ideas are more likely to be influential if they 
‘fit’ well with existing ideas and ideologies in a particular historical 
setting.”314 Thus, part of the social construction of nation-states has 
involved treating the states as self-determining and autonomous because 
persons have these basic characteristics.315 We shall see that this sort of 
“grafting” is prevalent in the construction of domestic state sovereignty as 
well. 
Finally, the ultimate formation of a collective intentionality, or shared 
understanding, of state sovereignty comes through the combination of 
state functions, practices, and justifications. What sovereignty is and 
entails depends upon states reaching a shared understanding of its 
character. Social construction theory directs our attention in particular to 
“the ways the meaning of sovereignty is negotiated out of interactions with 
intersubjectively identifiable communities.”316  
The basic idea here is that “interaction forms the foundation[s] of 
social reality.”317 As nation-states negotiate and participate in new forms 
of governance structure, for example, they reinforce their sovereign status 
 311. Id. at 13. 
 312. See Christian Reus-Smit, Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty, 27 REV. 
OF INT’L STUD. 526 (2001) (“As theorists of communicative action observe, actors [seeking to justify 
moral claims] usually try to associate their prescriptions with values that are already accepted as 
normative within the relevant speech community.”).  
 313. See id. at 527; see also id. (“Historically, the identity values defining ideal individuals and 
states have been closely linked . . .”). 
 314. KATHRYN SIKKINK, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS: DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BRAZIL AND 
ARGENTINA 26 (1991). 
 315. Id. 
 316. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 11. 
 317. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 36. 
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by exercising control over the process and touting their autonomy and 
independence at critical junctures.318 Even if nations cannot dictate terms, 
for example within the EU, they can still substantially impact final 
decisions as they form intergovernmental, and other, power structures. As 
states interact with other states and institutions, they prop up and sustain 
their sovereign identities; they communicate something about who they 
are as they insist upon recognition.319 The key to understanding 
sovereignty as a social construct is that other nations come to recognize 
and accept claims to sovereignty—whether one views this status as 
indicating autonomy, or control, or equality—even though the empirical 
realities do not dictate such recognition.320 In other words, “[a]s long as 
states accept and act upon each other as being sovereign, they are.”321  
This does not mean, to respond to the Skeptic’s concern, that state 
sovereignty is a wholly subjective construct, or that it has no appreciable 
effect on policy and power. Citizens, sub-state actors, and supra-state 
actors all rely upon and respect state sovereignty even without the threat of 
coercion or the use of force. Sovereignty may not be represented 
materially, but it exists just the same. As one leading social constructionist 
has noted: “Cultural phenomena are just as objective, just as constraining, 
just as real as power and interest . . . The point is that the real world 
consists of a lot more than material forces as such.”322  
In sum, through the lens of social construction theory sovereignty 
“emerges as a product of knowledgeable practices by human agents, 
including citizens, non-citizens, theorists, and diplomats. It is neither 
natural nor ever fully ‘completed.’ It has to be actively propped up and 
preserved, and its meanings and their referents vary across both time and 
space.”323 Sovereignty is social, invariably in process, and as such always 
“at stake.”324 It is through interaction, practice, and justifications that 
 318. The theory is expressly critical of neo-realism, which combines the elements of 
sovereignty—territory, population, authority, recognition—“into a single, unproblematic actor: the 
sovereign state.” STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 5. “What neorealists 
fail to recognize, however, is how extensively the socially constructed practices of sovereignty—of 
recognition, of intervention, of the language of justification—contribute to the structures of 
international society that exist beyond neorealist analysis.” Id. 
 319. “When entities interact in their quality as states, their identity as sovereign states is 
(re)confirmed.” Aalberts, supra note 29, at 36. 
 320. “It is recognition . . . that makes sovereignty, besides being a supposed feature of individual 
states, an institution shared by many.” Id. at 37. 
 321. Id. at 40. 
 322. WENDT, supra note 29, at 136. 
 323. STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 18. 
 324. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 39. 
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shared meanings with regard to statehood and state sovereignty arise.325 
Under social construction theory, sovereignty emerges not as the essence 
of states, a “brute fact,” but as a dynamic construct.  
Social construction theory offers an alternative perspective—one that 
helps move us beyond the major camps of state sovereignty detractors. 
Parting company with Classicists, social constructionists do not see state 
sovereignty as a brute, static fact of statehood. Rather, statehood and state 
sovereignty are viewed as variable, constantly in process, negotiated, and 
ultimately in need of active preservation. Note that this description echoes 
the basic foundation of the “new sovereignty” described above. 
Disagreeing with Republicans, international social constructionists view 
state and sovereignty as relational concepts, with states as the ultimate 
locus of a representative sovereignty. Finally, eschewing the cynicism of 
the Skeptic, constructionists assert that sovereignty matters because in the 
“real world” sovereignty continues to be treated as if it matters.  
V. TOWARD A RE-CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DOMESTIC STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY  
This Part returns to the principal domestic constitutional concerns of 
the Article. As noted, statehood and state sovereignty are imported 
constitutional conceptions. If we are to continue debating “state 
sovereignty” in constitutional discourse (and it certainly appears that we 
are going to do so), we should consider whether the insights of those for 
whom state sovereignty is a central concern might add something to our 
understanding of the concept. This consideration does not mean that 
sovereignty must mean precisely the same thing for nations as for the 
American states, or that statehood and state sovereignty are constructed in 
precisely the same way domestically as internationally.326 The idea, rather, 
is that a different way of looking at the concept of sovereignty will benefit 
our domestic constitutional discourse.  
 325. Id. at 35; see also id. (arguing that “structure has no meaning outside of a (state) practice to 
accept certain concepts and institutions as a basic rule in international politics.”). 
 326. For example, international social constructionists argue that the entire international political 
system can be treated as a social construct. See WENDT, supra note 29. This Article does not assert that 
the entire constitutional system of vertically distributed authority is a social construct. The 
Constitution instructs and limits in a relatively specific manner as to many aspects of this distribution. 
We know, for example, that the Constitution does not permit the states to conduct foreign policy on 
behalf of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties). 
Nor does it permit them to coin money. Id. Still, the Constitution does not tell us much of anything 
about state “sovereignty,” a concept even more readily characterized as an institutional fact than, for 
example, “President.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3
p229 Zick book pages.doc 9/1/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] ARE THE STATES SOVEREIGN? 283 
 
 
 
 
Based upon the discussion in Part IV, this Part puts to one side the 
classical model of sovereignty. As noted, sovereignty has never in fact 
been the bright line Classicists embrace. It is, rather, a still-evolving 
concept that admits of no easy definition. We have to address state 
sovereignty on its own terms, where it resides and where and how it is 
manifested and practiced. As sovereignty has evolved, including into the 
“new sovereignty” discussed in connection with international relations, it 
has become less a static and formal concept than a dynamic institution. 
That, in a broad sense, is the vision of state sovereignty this Part will 
pursue. 
Social construction theory and the concept of the “new sovereignty” 
are ideally situated to examine the dynamic concept of state sovereignty. 
Accordingly, accepting the demise of classical sovereignty and using the 
work of international social constructionists as a model, this Part 
conceptualizes domestic state sovereignty as a social, political, and legal 
construct rather than a brute, inherent fact. It utilizes an adaptation of 
social construction theory to sketch the construction of statehood and state 
sovereignty. Social construction theory in particular enables us to move 
beyond classical and skeptical arguments about whether the states are 
“really” sovereign by demonstrating the construction and evolution of 
state sovereignty. Using the essential elements of the constructive 
apparatus, as described in Part IV—constitutive rules, imposition of 
functions, and shared understandings—this Part examines the basic 
process whereby the domestic state (X) counts as “sovereign” (Y) in 
certain circumstances (C). It reads state sovereignty as an “institutional 
fact” generated by imposed functions and statuses; a variety of legal, 
political, and social discourses; and the dynamics of state practices and 
interactions with citizens and other institutions.  
Ultimately, the jettisoning of the classical model and the application of 
social construction theory will accomplish three things insofar as domestic 
state sovereignty is concerned. First, as it has in the international context, 
they will reconcile the persistence of sovereignty talk in constitutional 
discourse concerning the states with the limited and constrained powers 
states actually possess. Second, they will provide an alternative to 
Classicist, Republican, and Skeptical conceptions of state sovereignty. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, they will help to clarify the concept 
of state sovereignty by explaining how it is generated and sustained. As 
we shall see, all of these advances will significantly impact how state 
sovereignty should be studied, practiced, and enforced.  
In the end, application of social construction theory will expose two 
different concepts of state sovereignty; one based upon state competence 
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and substantially resembling the “new sovereignty” discussed above, and 
the other a principally juridical construct based upon inherent status. After 
comparing and contrasting these “two sovereignties,” the Part concludes 
with some thoughts regarding the implications of a new, socially 
constructed state sovereignty for courts, states, and scholars. 
A. A Post-Classical, Post-Modern Sovereignty  
Internationalists have long understood that state sovereignty is a 
variable construct that evolves over time and is, in some sense, always in 
process and always “at stake.” The sooner domestic constitutionalists 
accept this, the sooner we can proceed with a meaningful discussion of 
state sovereignty. This section speaks in broad terms of how we might 
begin to reconceptualize domestic state sovereignty. The next section more 
specifically applies social construction theory to the situation of the 
American states.  
The discussion thus far confirms what ought, in any event, to be 
apparent from our own constitutional and jurisprudential history, namely 
that sovereignty does not mean the same thing regardless of social, 
political, or legal context. Broadly speaking, domestic state sovereignty 
has indicated such disparate ideas as classical enclave exclusivity, the 
exercise of sovereign competences or functions, equality among states, 
and recognition of sovereign status. It has both internal (intrastate) and 
external (interstate) aspects. Indeed, state sovereignty shares many of the 
characteristics that have been ascribed to postmodern statehood more 
generally: It “is considered to be increasingly ‘held in common,’ ‘pooled 
among governments, negotiated by thousands of officials . . . , 
compromised through acceptance of regulations and court judgements.’”327 
Although diminished and shared sovereignty is a relatively recent 
phenomenon for nation-states, it is part of the basic fabric of the 
sovereignty of the American states.  
Whatever sovereignty is or has become, a matter to which we shall 
shortly turn, one version of sovereignty we can and should drop from 
domestic constitutional debate is the formal or classical model. For one 
thing, classical sovereignty was dead on arrival insofar as the plan of the 
Constitution was concerned. It is not in any sense a fair barometer of the 
concept’s meaning or importance. Moreover, the conceptual evolution 
described in Part IV demonstrates that states can be “sovereign” even if 
 327. Aalberts, supra note 29, at 34 (quoting William Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: The 
European Paradox, 47 POL. STUD. 503, 506 (1999)) (emphasis added).  
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they are not formally granted exclusive and final authority over a territory 
or with respect to discrete enclaves of activity. States can be sovereign 
even if they do not have the power to coin money, or raise an army. As 
international relations scholars have recognized, when it comes to state 
sovereignty, the reality has never been one of bright line rules, but rather 
one of degrees. In this country, as in the rest of the world, sovereignty has 
always been less about formalism, juridical or otherwise, than about state 
practices and intergovernmental dynamics.  
The Supreme Court’s several failed attempts to enforce a classical 
model of sovereignty, prominently in the early era and more fleetingly in 
the “late” era, demonstrate the implausibility of the classical concept. 
These failures indicate that the classical model of sovereignty cannot 
properly account for social, political, and legal realities. The post-New 
Deal revolution is strong evidence that the Court cannot construct classical 
state sovereignty by simple judicial fiat. Concepts like the “new 
sovereignty,” as well as theories of social construction, teach that such 
formalism cannot account for the institutional fact of state sovereignty, 
which must be based upon broader understandings and must account for 
political, historical, and social realities. 
Social construction theory suggests that it is not productive to continue 
thinking and speaking of state sovereignty in terms of material facts like 
wealth and power, dollars and personnel, or the relative distribution of 
these sorts of things. To a substantial extent, sovereignty is about respect 
for and recognition of governments and communities that are at a 
profound disadvantage on these terms. As discussed below, this respect 
and recognition are products of what states do, how they are perceived in 
the world, and how their claims to sovereignty are justified. This is why 
nations with less than complete control over territory, or little wealth or 
power, often nevertheless succeed in advancing claims to sovereign rights 
and recognition. In order to appreciate what sovereignty is or means, we 
have to account for social, political, and legal discourses and, most 
especially, state and federal practices. We have to appreciate how 
sovereignty is generated; how it becomes an expectation, an ingrained 
norm of governmental and intergovernmental relations.  
Indeed, one of the benefits that flows from reconceptualizing state 
sovereignty in terms of concepts like the “new sovereignty” and social 
construction theory is that we can better identify and study the concept. 
Sovereignty becomes more accessible and meaningful when it is viewed 
as a construct rather than a brute fact, as a dynamic process rather than a 
static formality. The focus necessarily shifts to what states do, whether 
that is litigating, bargaining, making claims to local control, acting as a 
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community, acting as the people’s agent in supra-national institutions, or 
acting as a trustee of local welfare. The continued performance of these 
sorts of things props up the states’ sovereignty, reinforcing that they are in 
some meaningful sense in charge of a domain, in possession of a “bundle 
of competences,” or entitled to recognition by their peers or federal 
authorities. In terms of social construction theory, we can better appreciate 
that “each use of the institution is in a sense a renewal of that 
institution.”328
The Supreme Court, of course, plays a role in all this, chiefly in 
validating state claims to sovereign status and recognition. To be sure, the 
Court must stand ready to occasionally remind Congress that there are 
limits to its sovereignty. By and large, however, meaningful and sustained 
boundaries arise from things like state practices; political, academic, and 
social discourses; and state justifications, not the handing down of judicial 
decrees. The focus for scholars thus cannot be Court-myopic. The 
discussion in Part IV suggests, rather, that we can locate state sovereignty 
in a complex dynamic process involving, among other things, symbolism, 
state practices, various discourses, and the normative basis for state 
justifications. This dynamic is manifested in everything from judicial 
opinions, to ordinary state legislation, to state negotiations with federal 
regulatory authorities, to judicial deference and doctrine, to state 
innovations and practices. Indeed, it is even manifested in such seemingly 
trivial things as state speech acts like flags, license plates, and other 
symbols. If we are looking for post-modern state sovereignty, we cannot 
find it in the United States Reports alone. 
Substantively, international relations theorists have discovered that 
post-classical, post-modern state sovereignty can in fact be limited, partial, 
and divided yet still support claims to state control and deference. The 
heretofore curious nature of American-state sovereignty has thus become 
something less of an anomaly the world over. Compromised or pooled 
authority is still, as the experiment of the EU demonstrates, nonetheless a 
form of sovereignty. Indeed, some have suggested that by pooling their 
sovereignty, EU members have actually enhanced their authority by 
enabling members to accomplish things together that they could not 
achieve separately.329 Whether or not that is the case, it is at least clear that 
by voluntarily devaluing their sovereignty, nations have not thereby ceded 
it altogether. Sovereignty has, true to its dynamic character, changed 
 328. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 57. 
 329. See, e.g., JAMES, supra note 3, at 187 (noting that it may be the case that cooperation among 
states enables them to do things in unison they could not otherwise do). 
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shape. On one view, it has become a bargaining resource, a sort of earned 
recognition. Whatever its form, it is clear that for nations, as social actors, 
sovereignty retains significant meaning. The same is true within our 
borders as well. That is why, despite skeptical disavowals, the concept of 
state sovereignty will not simply fade away.  
There is more here than a simple affirmation of the Framers’ 
prescience that states can be “sovereign” even if they are only partially so. 
Viewing state sovereignty as a resource has important implications for 
how state sovereignty can and will be exercised in the future. The 
governors of California, Texas, New York, and Florida recently decided to 
pool their political influence and form a group they call the “Big Four” to 
lobby Congress on behalf of their states’ interests.330 They did this 
apparently to counteract what they felt was the disproportionate influence 
of the smaller states in securing federal funds and advancing their agendas. 
This is an unusually flexible, if understandably pragmatic, sharing of state 
sovereignty. It demonstrates, as does the EU, that states can sometimes 
enhance their individual sovereignties by pooling or sharing their power. 
States are doing this sort of thing in other, more ordinary, contexts as well, 
such as “pooling” their resources in lawsuits designed to protect local 
environments or to force federal policy changes.331  
In sum, thus far this Article has suggested that a re-conceptualization of 
domestic state sovereignty must move beyond classical constraints and 
recognize that sovereignty is a great deal more relative than, say, virginity. 
The meaning of sovereignty has changed from one era to the next, in 
response to historical, social, legal, and political circumstances the 
Classicist largely ignores. As the EU and other global events have shown, 
there is indeed a meaningful sense in which we can speak of “divided,” 
“partial,” and “pooled” state sovereignty. There is a sense, as well, in 
which we can meaningfully speak of states as the locus of sovereignty, if 
only in a representative sense. More important than fixing the meaning or 
locus of state sovereignty, however, is understanding the process whereby 
state sovereignty, in all these various forms, is actually generated and 
sustained. In order to concretize these admittedly general observations, the 
Article next turns to social construction theory.  
 330. See Raymond Hernandez & Al Baker, Governors Join As “Big Four” To Pool Clout, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 20, 2004, at B1. 
 331. See Andrew C. Revkin, New York City and 8 States Plan to Sue Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 21, 2004, at A15 (reporting that California, Connecticut, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin had joined a lawsuit against companies emitting carbon dioxide). 
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B. The Construction of the Sovereign States of America  
This section, following the lead of a group of international relations 
scholars discussed in Part IV, utilizes the principles of social construction 
to demonstrate that domestic state sovereignty is an institutional, rather 
than a brute, fact. It applies the basic apparatus of social construction to 
the concept of American state sovereignty.  
1. The Constitutive Rules of State Sovereignty 
The Constitution, as mentioned, does not contain the term 
“sovereignty.” Sovereign statehood is a human invention, a legal, social, 
and political object that has been constructed over time, based upon shared 
understandings. Although the Constitution does not invoke “state 
sovereignty,” it does contain certain basic “constitutive rules” that allow 
for its construction. Recall that “constitutive” rules, unlike “regulative” 
rules, do not merely regulate activity. “Federalism,” for example, provides 
various regulative rules which have at various times curtailed and 
expanded federal exercise of enumerated powers. These rules or standards 
regulate institutional activity (commerce, for example) that would 
otherwise occur regardless of the Constitution. Constitutive rules, by 
contrast, do more than merely regulate existing activity. They “create the 
very possibility” of certain activities.332 As analogized by Searle, think of 
the rules of chess as an example of constitutive rules. Without the rules of 
the game, there would be no such thing as “chess.” As for “chess,” so too 
for “sovereignty.” 
The constitutive rules with regard to state sovereignty are set forth in 
the Constitution itself, in what constitutional scholars generally refer to as 
its “structure.” These rules make it possible to speak of the states as 
“sovereign.” Without these rules, the very notion of “dual sovereignty” 
would not be plausible.  
a. The Rule of Preservation  
The rule of sovereign self-preservation is the most critical. Anti-
Federalists feared that the Constitution would utterly annihilate the states. 
Yet with all of the changes that have occurred with regard to the regulative 
rules of federalism, the constitutive rule of state preservation has remained 
fixed in constitutional structure. It is at least clear, as the Supreme Court 
 332. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 28. 
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has said, that “neither government may destroy the other.”333 The 
Constitution, the Court declared in Texas v. White, “looks to an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.”334  
The Constitution reinforces the constitutive rule of state preservation in 
various structural provisions. As the Court noted in Lane County v. 
Oregon,335 “in many articles of the Constitution the necessary existence of 
the States . . . is distinctly recognized.”336 The Constitution protects, for 
example, the territorial integrity of the states.337 State citizenship, as well, 
is expressly recognized and carries with it certain privileges.338 The 
Constitution cannot be amended without the participation of the states.339 
Finally, the Guarantee Clause340 “presupposes the continued existence of 
the states and . . . those means and instrumentalities which are the creation 
of their sovereign and reserved rights.”341  
In order to protect their right to exist, states are entitled to defend 
themselves against internal threats to integrity, peace, and tranquility. 
Thus, states, like any other authority with “internal” sovereignty, may 
prosecute criminals in order to preserve their existence, as well as their 
internal “peace and dignity.”342 “Each [state] has the power, inherent in 
any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense against 
its authority and to punish such offenses . . .”343 Although one hopes it 
does not come to pass, states may also resist efforts by internal or external 
forces to extinguish or annihilate them altogether. The Second 
Amendment, whose meaning with regard to who retains the “right” to bear 
arms has yet to be definitively resolved, contemplates the existence in all 
free states of a “well regulated Militia.”344 Moreover, states may also 
 333. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926). 
 334. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868). 
 335. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868). 
 336. Id. at 76; see Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbral, 77 
B.U. L. REV. 1089 (1997) (noting the Court’s embrace in federalism areas of the sort of penumbral 
reasoning common to substantive due process precedents). 
 337. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (“[N]o new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction 
of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, 
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”). 
 338. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
 339. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 340. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 341. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414–15 (1938). 
 342. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 
90 (1985) (under “dual sovereignty” principle, state can prosecute person for crime even if another 
state has also prosecuted for same offense). 
 343. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978). 
 344. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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expect that central governmental power will be used to protect their 
existence should it be threatened.345  
The first constitutive rule with regard to statehood, and the one that 
more than any other indicates that states are intended to be a permanent 
part of the plan of government, is the rule of preservation. Whatever else 
the central government may be empowered to do, it may not destroy the 
states.  
b. The Rule of Separateness 
It would make little sense to preserve the states if the central sovereign 
could simply dictate to them such basic principles as the formation of their 
governments. The Constitution thus sets forth, in various structural 
provisions, a constitutive rule of separateness. This rule, like the rule of 
preservation, provides support for state claims to “internal” sovereignty. 
The Constitution contemplates that state governments will be 
composed of legislative, judicial, and executive branches.346 It gives no 
authority, however, to the central government to dictate who may serve in 
state governments, where they may serve, the manner in which they shall 
be chosen, what their basic qualifications must be, or how these 
institutions of government are to be funded.347 Thus, as to all of these 
things, the states must have the final say.  
As the Supreme Court has said, these are “functions essential to 
separate and independent existence.”348 The Constitution by negative 
implication provides that these functions must remain within the exclusive 
control of the states. In this sense, the rule of separateness makes it 
possible to speak in terms of “state sovereignty.”  
 345. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union 
a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against 
domestic Violence.”). 
 346. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[t]he Members of the several State Legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by 
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution”). 
 347. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (the “power to locate its own seat of 
government, and to determine when and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to 
appropriate its own public funds for that purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers”); see 
also Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 570–71 (1900); Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892). 
Only the states, for example, may establish the qualifications for voters for state and local elections.  
 348. Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1868). 
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c. The Rule of Participation 
The Constitution also plainly provides that states possess the right to 
participate in the governance of the Nation. In matters both small and 
large, the Constitution sets forth a rule of political participation which 
allows us to speak in terms of “sovereign” states. 
Article V absolutely and unequivocally guarantees to each state equal 
suffrage in the Senate.349 This guarantees that each state will have an equal 
vote in all matters of national governance. It requires that all states be 
granted an equal opportunity to be heard on legislative proposals. Unlike 
states’ representation in the House of Representatives, which, because it is 
based upon population, varies, the right to equal suffrage in the Senate is a 
constant and an absolute.350 Unless a state consents to its waiver, this right 
cannot be diluted or abridged. In this sense we can begin to speak in terms 
of the “external” sovereignty of the states; each state has the right to have 
its vote counted equally among its “peers.” 
Article V also grants states the right to participate in the constitutional 
amendment process.351 It guarantees that the states shall have a substantial 
voice in all fundamental proposals to alter the basic charter of government. 
This right, too, is subject to neither abridgement nor denial. In addition, 
Article II of the Constitution preserves an important role for the states in 
the selection of the president.352 State electors are appointed, and must 
meet in their respective states to cast their votes for president. States thus 
play a critical role in the selection of the nation’s chief executive. 
The rule of political participation preserves a substantial role for the 
states in national governance. The constitutional structures that comprise 
this rule place the states at the center of the Nation’s political activity. The 
states have the final say in important decision-making not only at the local, 
but also at the national level.  
 349. See U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]o State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
suffrage in the Senate”). 
 350. See THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987), at 365 (“[T]he 
equal vote allowed to each State [in the Senate] is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of 
sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary 
sovereignty.”). 
 351. See id. (providing that proposed amendments may be ratified by the legislatures of three 
fourths of the states, or by conventions in three fourths of the states). 
 352. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (requiring the choice of state Electors).  
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d. The Rule of Interpretive Independence 
Article III of the Constitution sets forth the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.353 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, the “judicial power of 
the United States” does not generally extend to matters relating solely to 
the constitutions or laws of the states.354 By clear negative implication, and 
as an incident of federalism, the Constitution provides that the states 
should generally be free to interpret their own laws and constitutions.355 So 
long as no federal constitutional right or power is implicated, the states 
possess interpretive independence.  
This is a significant, although often underappreciated, aspect of state 
sovereignty. It means that so long as no federal constitutional right or 
power is implicated, the states are the final interpreters of their own laws 
and constitutions. For example, the New York courts recently invalidated 
that state’s death penalty scheme, a decision that, since it was based solely 
on state law, could not be appealed to the Supreme Court.356 The 
Constitution’s constitutive rule of interpretive independence empowers the 
states to decide such pivotal issues for themselves, free from federal 
interference.  
These are the constitutive rules—preservation, separateness, 
participation, and interpretive independence—which make it possible to 
speak in terms of a “dual sovereignty” under our constitutional system. 
These rules do not define state sovereignty. They do, however, establish a 
legal and communicative baseline for our thinking about statehood and, 
thus, ultimately about state sovereignty. Some of the rules, like those 
involving participation and interpretive independence, position the states 
as final decision-makers. Some, like separateness, invoke “internal” 
 353. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under their Authority . . .”). 
 354. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (noting that the Court generally defers to 
state courts on the interpretation of state law); Minnesota v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940) 
(“It is fundamental that state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state 
constitutions.”). There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. The most famous such exception in 
recent years is, of course, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In that case, the Court refused to defer to 
the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of Florida election law. See id. at 115 (“To attach definitive 
weight to the pronouncement of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the court has 
actually departed from the statutory meaning, would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the 
explicit requirements of Article II.”). 
 355. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (recognizing that the Court acts as an 
“‘outsider[]’ lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction” 
and that deference to state courts “helps build a cooperative judicial federalism”).  
 356. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004) (invalidating state deadlock instruction). 
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sovereignty, while others, like equal participation, sound in “external” 
sovereignty. There is enough in these constitutive rules, this constitutional 
structure, to at least permit talk of the “sovereign” states in a de jure sense. 
To get at the heart of the “institutional facts” of statehood and state 
sovereignty, however, we must examine the remainder of the constructive 
process. To do this, we must consider the imposition of functions upon the 
“state,” the language and form of state justifications for sovereignty, the 
variety of discourses on state sovereignty, and the dynamic process of 
state interaction with citizens and institutions.  
2. Sovereign Symbolism: Imposition of Function and Status 
With the basic constitutive rules in place, this section will further 
elaborate the circumstances (C) in which the state (X) is considered to 
possess the status of sovereign (Y).357 By way of review, recall four 
general principles from the discussion, in Part IV, of social construction 
theory generally, and of the construction of nation-state sovereignty in 
particular. First, statehood and sovereignty are variable constructs; their 
meaning changes depending upon, among other things, the functions or 
statuses imposed upon them. Second, the specific manner in which state 
sovereignty is justified or represented, including the symbols or metaphors 
used to depict it, are of critical importance in understanding the 
construction of statehood and sovereignty. Third, as Searle notes, these 
symbols and justifications usually result in the transfer of some power to 
an object.358 The exception is a class of status symbols, which can be 
either positive or negative in character and substantive effect and which 
relate more to sheer status than to power or function. Fourth, and finally, 
the meaning of an institutional fact like sovereignty ultimately depends 
upon the formation, over time, of shared understandings or agreements by 
relevant communities that states are entitled to be recognized and treated 
as sovereign.  
The state consists of certain brute, empirical facts. Each state has 
territory, people, and a government. In terms of moving beyond these 
 357. Recall that X is the object, Y is the status function, and C is the circumstances or conditions 
under which X takes on the status Y. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 46. The “state” is also, of course, a 
construct. Its empirical elements (X)—territory, population, and government—constitute a “state” (Y) 
under certain conditions (C). In the interest of economy, that process is not elaborated here. For a 
discussion in the international context of the social construction of the state itself, see Alexander B. 
Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary 
Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT, supra note 3, at 81.  
 358. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 95. 
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brute facts, and demonstrating the general process by which statehood and 
state sovereignty are constructed, we are fortunate to have a rich 
symbolism in constitutional discourse. States have been depicted or 
represented using no less than eight symbols or metaphors. We can map 
the general construction of statehood and sovereignty by tracking these 
symbols, noting the functions and statuses they impose on states and the 
way they have been used to justify, or at times to refute, claims of state 
sovereignty. These symbols represent functions, values, and statuses that 
are attached to states and which delineate state sovereignty. In order to see 
clearly how it is that state sovereignty is ultimately accepted or agreed 
upon, however, we must in addition examine the practices of states, the 
various discourses in which their sovereignty is debated, and the effect 
these and other forces have on the ultimate recognition of state claims to 
sovereignty.  
As it happens, the eight symbols of sovereign statehood that have been 
most prominent in constitutional discourse can be readily divided into 
those which impose specific functions on the states, and those which are 
based exclusively upon status. As we shall see, this makes it possible, in 
the end, to characterize modern state sovereignty both in terms of state 
competences and in terms of pure state status.  
a. Functional Symbols  
Recall that the Classicist would separate state function or competence 
from the concept of state sovereignty, arguing in essence that the states 
would perform many of their various functions whether or not they were 
considered “sovereign.”359 Social construction theory, by contrast, holds 
that it is primarily through the imposition of functions that institutional 
facts like sovereignty are ultimately generated. State function and state 
sovereignty are thus conceived as relational; the identity roles assigned to 
states are therefore intimately tied to their most effective claims to 
“sovereignty.”360  
 359. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1670–75 (arguing, in response to normative justifications for state 
innovation and attention to local problems that “the realization of those benefits does not require a 
system of judicially protected state sovereignty”). Note here the narrow emphasis on judicial 
enforcement of state sovereignty. Classicists like Professor Gey are not concerned with whether or not 
the states enforce, or construct, their own sovereignty through the functions they perform.  
 360. Recall that in forming a shared understanding of an institutional fact like state sovereignty, 
the community of relevant actors or observers need not be conscious that they are collectively 
imposing such a function; in the course of acting they may simply evolve institutional facts. SEARLE, 
supra note 32, at 47. “As long as people continue to recognize the [object] as having the . . . status 
function, the institutional fact is created and maintained.” Id. Searle uses the example of a boundary 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3
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 (1) State as Trustee 
Early defenders of the constitutional design, eager to rebut arguments 
that the states would be wholly annihilated in the new government, 
conceived of the federal and state governments as “but different agents 
and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers, and designated 
for different purposes.”361 Defenses of the plan of the constitutional 
convention routinely emphasized that states would be considered 
“sovereign” insofar as they served the people’s local and, hence, most 
basic needs. As trustees, states were supposed to administer the day-to-day 
needs of the political community.362 The Constitution, Madison stated, 
“leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all 
other objects” of legislation not among the enumerated powers of the 
central government.363
Recall that the origins of sovereignty in civil society depend to some 
extent on the community’s recognition of the sovereign authority of the 
government.364 In administering local welfare, the Framers believed that 
the States would be the most recognizable forces in people’s lives. The 
state-as-trustee metaphor represents the early belief that the States would 
have a “superiority of influence” with the people; this, it was believed, 
“would result partly from the diffusive construction of the national 
government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects to which the 
attention of the State administrations would be directed.”365 So long as the 
wall which has collapsed but is still treated as a boundary by the community. Id. at 39. It is intended to 
function the same way but the means by which it does so is the collective recognition that the stones 
have a special status to which this function is attached. See id. at 39. Moreover, these communities “do 
not in addition have to recognize that they are so recognizing, and they may hold all sorts of other false 
beliefs about what they are doing and why they are doing it.” Id. at 47–48. Again, to utilize one of 
Searle’s examples, we may actually, although quite mistakenly, believe the King to be divinely 
appointed to rule. See id. at 96. So long as we believe it, however, and act upon that belief in 
submitting to the King’s authority, then it matters not that we are mistaken in our belief. See id. 
 361. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 362. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 296 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting 
that state power would “extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the 
lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the 
State.”); see also John C. Yoo, Federalism and Judicial Review, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND 
STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 164 (Mark R. 
Killenbeck ed., 2002) (“Broadly stated, the Framers understood the Constitution to grant the national 
government primarily those powers involving foreign relations. The states would retain primary 
jurisdiction over almost all other domestic matters, such as taxation, judicial administration and law 
enforcement, and social and moral legislation.”).  
 363. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 258 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 364. See discussion supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text. 
 365. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 157 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis 
added). 
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states actively attended to local matters like taxation, crime, and morality, 
they would be recognized, both by the people and by the central 
government, as “sovereign.” They would enjoy the benefit of a special 
attachment to the people.366  
In the early days of the republic, it was hoped or believed that citizen 
“affection, esteem, and reverence” for their state governments “would 
insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render 
them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, 
dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.”367 But the Framers 
recognized that the states’ sovereignty might be diminished, or transferred 
to the central government, should the states fail to effectively use what 
would become known as their “police powers.”368 Indeed, critics of the 
concept of sovereign statehood have noted that “local” needs are, more 
often than not, today met by central authorities.369 The power that has 
accrued over time to the national government has significantly blurred the 
distinction between what is “local” and what is truly “national.” There is at 
present scarcely an area of our lives which is not affected by federal rule 
or regulation.  
Social construction theory can help us to understand why, in light of 
this seeming diminution of state power, the states continue nevertheless to 
be regarded as “sovereign.” The theory posits that sovereignty cannot be 
measured as a “brute” fact; it is not a matter of dollars and cents, or 
relative manpower, or a demarcation of supposed “enclaves,” or even 
numbers of laws or regulations. We cannot say, for example, that the states 
are only “forty percent responsible” for local welfare and thus not truly 
“sovereign.”370 Rather, we must examine, with regard not only to the 
 366. Based upon this rough division of functions, Hamilton reasoned as follows:  
Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, 
to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to 
feel a stronger bias toward their local governments than towards the government of the 
Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration 
of the latter.  
THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 157 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 367. Id. (emphasis added). 
 368. The same point applies to other structures of shared sovereignty. Although EU institutions 
are not today capable of overshadowing their national members, this may not always be the case. 
 369. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 929–30 (discussing rise in national administrative 
power). 
 370. Rubin & Feeley suggest that sovereignty is a function of the “control over appointed 
officials, public resources, and regulatory rules.” Id. at 931. No doubt, as a simple matter of resources 
and brute strength, states are at a sizeable disadvantage. A social constructionist would submit, 
however, that the matter is not one of quantitative comparison—of physical, political, and 
administrative power. See id. at 929–31 (suggesting a typology of powers in which states are inferior). 
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trustee function but also the remaining functions that have been imposed 
upon the states, the discourses, dynamics, and practices which generate 
and ultimately sustain state claims to sovereignty.  
The imposition of the function of trustee is, of course, deeply ingrained 
in our constitutional, political, and social discussions. We are indebted to 
the Framers for this. Their understanding has been brought forward by 
academic discourse, which has a tendency to pay homage to the Framers’ 
statements and opinions. This discourse has typically touted trusteeship, or 
some version of it, as one of the virtues of vigorous statehood.371 Various 
theories, including most recently economics and public choice theories, 
have been utilized to explain why some decisions are better left to local 
decision-makers.372 Indeed, although there is no quantitative measure for 
this, it seems that most theorists support at least the rudimentary 
proposition that there is a role for the states as “trustees” of local welfare. 
So do most members of the current Supreme Court, although they actually 
say so on a relatively infrequent basis. Every now and then, however, the 
Court reminds us that there may be some areas of local control, like crime 
and marriage for instance, that Congress may not encroach upon.373
At various critical points in our history, political discourse has 
similarly emphasized the importance of local control. “States’ rights” has 
been a rallying cry, for example, for supporting state control of matters 
like morality and education.374 Of course, most rightly rejected the racist 
agenda some sought to further under the banner of “states’ rights” and 
state sovereignty.375 Still, the sentiment at the heart of the justification for 
local control was one with seemingly broad appeal in other contexts. One 
could certainly disagree with Governor Wallace’s persistent refusal to 
permit desegregation of the schools yet still accept the idea that there 
ought to be some limit to central intervention in the “internal sovereignty” 
of the states.  
It is a matter of the way in which states use the power and authority they do have, how they assert their 
sovereignty, and how others accept state claims to sovereignty.  
 371. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 525–30 
(1995) (discussing traditionally stated values of federalism).  
 372. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic 
Theory of Regulation: Toward A Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 274–
90 (1990) (elaborating on the conditions under which local law dominates national law).  
 373. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000) (gender-motivated crime); 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563–64 (1995) (gun possession and local safety; marriage).  
 374. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, STATES’ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN 
IMPERIO, 1776–1876 (2000). 
 375. See WILLIAM RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGINS, OPERATION, AND SIGNIFICANCE (1964) 
(examining connection between “states’ rights” and racism). 
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More benignly, and no doubt to greater effect in terms of constructing 
state sovereignty, presidents and other public officials have regularly 
touted the “devolution” of power from the federal government to the 
states. This is now a ritual of presidential and other politics. President 
Nixon declared: “It is time for a New Federalism in which power, funds, 
and responsibility will flow from Washington to the states and to the 
people.”376 President Reagan in the 1980s and the Republican-controlled 
Congress in the 1990s also aggressively pushed agendas of 
“devolution.”377 This was partially reflected in the discretion granted to 
states to, for example, set eligibility requirements for federal welfare 
programs.378 Even within this federal regulatory scheme, states managed to 
exercise substantial control over welfare policy. Midwestern and Southern 
states, for example, “took a harder line [than federal regulations required], 
reflecting a tougher work ethic.”379 With these and other transfers of 
power, “state governments have become increasingly competent in 
economic regulation and public administration.”380 The “devolution” 
agenda remains popular today with the Bush Administration.381  
More generally and closer still to the ground, again as part of what we 
might consider their “internal” sovereignty, states (and, by delegation of 
authority, localities) actively exercise their so-called “police powers.” 
These powers affect such critical life decisions as who may marry or 
adopt, whether one may seek assistance in ending a life, and whether the 
state itself may take life as punishment for criminal behavior.382 
 376. Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism—An American Tradition: 
Modern Devolution Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 227, 288 (1996) (quoting President 
Richard Nixon). 
 377. See generally id. See also JOHN J. DIIULIO & DONALD F. KETTL, FINE PRINT: THE 
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, DEVOLUTION, AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM (1995). 
 378. See TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 257–92 (1998) (describing the “evolutionary devolution” of the mid-
1990s). 
 379. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, THE NEW POLITICS OF POVERTY: THE NONWORKING POOR IN 
AMERICA 191 (1992). 
 380. Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. 
L. REV. 663, 672 (2001). 
 381. See Felicity Barringer, Bush Seeks Shift in Logging Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at A1 
(reporting that the administration has proposed a rule leaving it to state governors to determine what, if 
any, limits there should be on logging in national forests). 
 382. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (finding a state legislative “consensus” that 
execution of the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual punishment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (canvassing state laws on assisted suicide); Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of 
Children and Family Servs. 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding Florida’s ban on adoption by 
practicing homosexuals). 
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Notwithstanding the undeniably enhanced federal role in virtually all 
matters of governance, the ubiquitous exercise of these and other state 
“police” powers reinforces the states’ trustee relationship with citizens. 
The object of regulation does not necessarily have to be something as 
critical as birth, death, or marriage to contribute to sovereignty’s 
construction. We do not usually focus upon such seemingly trivial things, 
but even when states issue driver’s licenses, or liquor licenses, or 
prosecute crimes, or prohibit smoking in bars, or the use of hand-held cell 
phones while driving, they are in effect making effective claims to 
sovereign control. Each such exercise or practice of this imposed function 
reinforces the institutional fact of the “sovereign” trustee acting in 
pursuance of the general welfare. This occurs, as social construction 
theory posits, whether or not we are conscious of the process.  
We must, as some of these examples demonstrate, be generally aware 
of the influence of the media in the constructive process. In particular, 
controversies which stem from the states’ police powers and which play 
out on a grand public stage, nationally or regionally, for example, 
reinforce on a broad scale the perception that the states retain substantial 
control over matters of local welfare. This perception is a crucial element 
of the construction of state sovereignty, since “for social facts, the attitude 
that we take toward the phenomenon is partly constitutive of the 
phenomenon.”383 The current debate regarding whether homosexuals 
should have the right to marry is only the latest example. The focus in this 
debate has primarily been on the acts of state (and in some cases sub-state) 
officials in Massachusetts, New York, and California. There has been 
national debate, to be sure, but it has been mostly a reaction to events and 
circumstances in the states. The states effectively set the agenda in this 
debate over morality; indeed, even if there is to be a constitutional 
amendment, the states will be intimately involved in shaping policy. This 
is, of course, nothing particularly new. The states have a long history of 
regulating local morality in such areas as assisted suicide, narcotics 
legislation, and public nudity. Over time, we have all come to expect that 
the states will largely control this agenda, and to a substantial extent have 
the “final say” with regard to morality.384  
Far more than citizen perception is being affected and generated in 
these contexts. Over time, the imposition of the trustee function, and more 
 383. SEARLE, supra note 32, at 33. 
 384. Even silly proposals, such as the recent measure proposed in the Louisiana legislature to ban 
the public wearing of “low rider” pants and other revealing clothing, help to reinforce the notion that 
local values and morals are the domain of the states.  
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importantly its repeated exercise by states, has a real and substantial effect 
on the attitudes and perceptions of supra-state regulators, who often reach 
an understanding that deference to state “trustees” on such matters is 
generally appropriate.385 Federal courts, for example, are both loathe to 
interfere with the exercise of state police powers and increasingly likely to 
look to state examples when fashioning new constitutional rules. Thus, for 
example, when the Supreme Court examined a claim to a “right” to 
assisted suicide, it canvassed state laws to determine what state practices 
had been on the matter.386 This has now become a regular practice of the 
courts in deciding whether certain unenumerated rights exist under the 
Constitution. Similarly, when the Court was asked to decide whether the 
Constitution prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded, it based its 
decision on the number of state laws that prohibited the practice.387  
It is not only the federal courts which respect and recognize the states’ 
claim to trusteeship with regard to “local” matters. While federal 
regulators are often less reticent than the courts to interfere with the state’s 
role as trustee, the pragmatic truth is that it is often just plain bad politics 
to do so. As a result, the vast array of state general welfare laws are not 
subject to any federal influence or intervention whatsoever. In other areas 
once thought to be truly local, such as education, states may no longer 
exercise exclusive control. But this does not mean that they make no valid 
claim to “sovereignty” in such areas. States, like modern nations 
participating in supranational institutions, can be powerful and effective 
negotiators on behalf of their citizens. The course of the No Child Left 
Behind Act, a recent major federal overhaul of public education, is one 
case in point.388 The path of this law demonstrates that the federal 
government is not at liberty to simply enact such measures and then 
wholly disregard the objections of the states. Since its passage, the No 
Child Left Behind Act has been subject to sustained and vocal state 
criticisms.389 Federal authorities thus have had little choice but to negotiate 
with the affected states. As a result, numerous exemptions to federal rules 
 385. See, e.g., Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Press Ahead on Anti-Gay Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2004, at A15 (noting opposition to federal solution to gay marriage by, among 
others, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, who noted that “[t]he regulation of marriage has long 
been under the purview of the states . . . and I believe that is where it should remain”). 
 386. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (canvassing state laws on assisted suicide). 
 387. See Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (invalidating legislation which provided for the execution of the 
mentally retarded, based primarily upon the Court’s finding of a state legislative “consensus” that such 
punishment was deemed cruel and unusual). 
 388. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2001). 
 389. See Sam Dillon, President’s Initiative to Shake Up Education Is Facing Protests in Many 
State Capitols, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at A12. 
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and regulations have been granted.390 This is not an aberrant pattern. The 
same process has affected other areas of traditionally “local” concern. 
Federal welfare, environmental, and labor regulations, among others, have 
all been significantly altered in response to state concerns.  
States thus may not exercise exclusive control in these and other areas, 
but federal authorities feel compelled, politically and otherwise, to 
negotiate with them and often to accommodate their concerns. State 
sovereignty in this sense is like the “new sovereignty” of nations, who can 
no longer dictate outcomes but who nevertheless exercise sovereign 
prerogatives through such things as cooperation and bargaining. The 
perception that the states are “sovereign” trustees is thus inter-subjective; 
it is shared by states, federal courts, federal regulators, and citizens. This 
understanding is not some academic construct; it has tangible, objective 
effects in terms of the shape of policies that affect local concerns. In sum, 
it is the “shared understanding” that states are in some sense “sovereign” 
that keeps the federal government from simply dictating terms to them.  
The examples could well be multiplied many times over, and in a 
variety of policy areas. In these and other generally non-transparent ways, 
the idea that the states are “sovereign trustees” has become, over time, a 
shared understanding. One aspect of state sovereignty, namely control 
over local welfare and conditions, or “internal” sovereignty, has been 
constructed as a result of historical, academic, judicial, and political 
discourses, and more importantly as a result of continuous state practices 
like the exercise of their police powers and the securing of exemptions 
from federal regulations. States are thus regarded as, and ultimately treated 
as, “sovereign” not because they have a monopoly with regard to local 
concerns or the ability to stave off all federal regulation, but because there 
is an agreement that they are the most legitimate locus of authority with 
regard to issues of local welfare. 
 (2) State as Agent 
As mentioned, the Framers considered the states to be “but different 
agents and trustees of the people . . . .”391 As trustees, states function as the 
primary administrators of local health, safety, welfare, and morals. 
 390. Diane Jean Schemo, Rules Eased On Upgrading U.S. Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2004, at 
A20; Diana Jean Schemo, 14 States Ask U.S. to Revise Some Education Law Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 2004, at A16; Diana Jean Schemo, New Exceptions in Testing Law For Some Ill or Injured 
Students, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A14; Diana Jean Schemo, States’ End Run Dilutes Burden 
For Special Ed, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2004, at A1. 
 391. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 297 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p229 Zick book pages.doc 9/1/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
302 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sovereignty in this sense is effective control over internal concerns like 
health, safety, and morality. The imposition of the agency function 
contributes further to the construction of state sovereignty. In terms of 
agency, the states serve, or again are at least perceived to serve, as buffers 
and representatives in interactions with other states and with the central 
government.  
The agency function, like the trustee function, originated with the 
Framers. Elaborating on what the states were intended to become, 
Alexander Hamilton asserted that the states would be the “voice” and 
“arm” of the people’s discontent should the central government overreach 
its proper boundaries.392 As always, Anti-Federalist opponents of the 
constitutional plan put the matter in stronger terms. Fisher Ames of 
Massachusetts, for example, considered the states to be the “safeguard and 
ornament of the Constitution;” “they will afford a shelter against the abuse 
of power, and will be the natural avengers of our violated rights.”393
The form this “avenging” would assume was not made entirely clear, 
although it was ominously noted at the time of the framing that the state 
militias would substantially outnumber federal armies.394 More 
optimistically, however, the states were intended to function as agents 
primarily by interposing themselves between local citizens and over-
zealous federal regulators. Like the imposition of the states’ trustee 
function with regard to local concerns, the imposition of this function has 
been critical to sovereign statehood from the beginning.  
Today, state-as-agent is every bit as deeply ingrained in our legal and 
political culture as state-as-trustee. The Framers provided the broad picture 
in terms of expectations. But state-as-agent, like state-as-trustee, has been 
sustained over time as a result of legal, social, and political discourses, as 
 392. THE FEDERALIST No. 26, at 199 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also 
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“The different 
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987), at 206 (“Power being almost 
always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the 
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general 
government.”). 
 393. 2 JOHNATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION 
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 46 (1836). 
 394. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 301 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (projecting 
a federal army of twenty-five or thirty thousand, opposed by “a militia amounting to near half a 
million of citizens with arms in their hands”); THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 206–07 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting difficulty in raising and maintaining large federal army, 
and ability of states to defend themselves against any such force); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 
157 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting that states might be “dangerous rivals to 
the power of the Union”).  
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well as state and federal practices. “States’ rights” controversies, from 
nullification to secession to desegregation, were grounded upon the idea 
that meaningful “state sovereignty” was necessary to constrain the federal 
government, and ultimately to preserve individual liberties.395 
Constitutional theorists have long contributed to the imposition of the 
agency function in their work as well. Scholars routinely emphasize that 
“checking tyranny” is a critical role for the states.396 On occasion, the 
Supreme Court also reminds us that we need truly sovereign states in order 
to check central authority and preserve individual freedom.397  
As was true with respect to the state-as-trustee function, the imposition 
of the state-as-agent function is not solely a matter of historical, political, 
judicial, and academic discourses. Especially in the past few decades, it 
has become critical for states to put theory into practice, to become active 
and effective advocates for state interests. The Supreme Court pushed the 
agency function to the fore in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,398 where the Court abandoned a short run at instituting a form of 
“quasi-classical” sovereignty in which it identified exclusive state enclaves 
that Congress could not encroach upon in exercising its commerce 
power.399 The Court held instead that the states would henceforth be 
responsible for negotiating and protecting their own sovereignty, 
principally by utilizing the tools provided in the constitutional structure 
and through their effective advocacy in the political process.400  
Some feared that in light of the relatively few actual “safeguards” the 
Constitution and political process provided the states, the balance would 
tip even more substantially in favor of federal regulators. There can be 
little doubt that the balance of material power rests comfortably in favor 
of Congress. But again, as a social construct and institutional fact, 
sovereignty is not solely or even primarily about material facts like wealth 
 395. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) 
(noting that with states “a double security arises to the rights of the people”). 
 396. See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism As Empowerment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 541, 546–47 
(1995) (arguing that autonomous states “temper the direction of federal law by supplementing federal 
legislation and regulating areas that Congress has not preempted” and that “state and local 
governments are vigorous lobbyists and litigants”). 
 397. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (“This separation of the two spheres is 
one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty.”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
181 (1992) (“[T]he Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for the 
protection of individuals.”); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–60 (1991) (cataloguing benefits 
of federalism, including preservation of individual liberty). 
 398. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 399. See id. at 531 (abandoning the “traditional governmental functions” test as “unworkable” and 
“inconsistent with established principles of federalism”). 
 400. See id. at 552–53 (describing structural and political safeguards). 
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and personnel. It is, rather, about the dynamics of what the states do, and 
how citizens and institutions perceive them as a result. There is more than 
ample anecdotal evidence to support the perception that states act as 
effective buffers and emissaries on behalf of their citizens.401  
The states’ agency function is manifested in two primary contexts. The 
first we might call “interposition.”402 When a state interposes its 
“sovereignty” against a claim of federal authority or jurisdiction, it 
contributes to the perception that it is a vigilant and effective agent for the 
people. Sometimes these interpositions are of a rather striking character. 
For example, the governor of Nevada has refused to permit federal 
authorities to store nuclear waste in his state, arguing that the waste had 
not been demonstrated by adequate scientific evidence to be safe.403 This 
standoff with the President and several federal agencies received 
significant national attention. It exhibited a single state official standing 
firmly and, to the home constituents, bravely against an encroachment by a 
powerful federal government. High-profile episodes pitting state officials 
against federal “encroachers” contribute to the perception that “sovereign” 
states are a necessary bulwark against central overreaching.  
States “interpose” in other ways as well. For instance, vertical 
jurisdictional battles among state and federal prosecutors are routine 
aspects of federalism. Here the states do not seek to prevent federal 
authorities from exercising their own sovereign powers, but to stake their 
claim to an equivalency in terms of executive authority. For example, not 
willing to be overshadowed by federal prosecutors, state prosecutors have 
asserted their state’s jurisdiction and interest, as a “separate sovereign,” in 
prosecuting notorious criminals like Timothy McVeigh and Terry 
 401. One may accurately observe that the examples here and elsewhere are anecdotal episodes. 
One might argue that these examples do not convey the “real” balance of power between the states and 
the federal government. But one of the principal tenets of social construction theory is that this sort of 
“reality” cannot be known as a “brute fact.” What matters is the perception, or shared understanding, 
that states serve these functions. And that perception, in turn, does have real, objective consequences 
in terms of effects on policy outcomes and citizen loyalties. The perception that states are effective 
agents may, in the end, be mistaken. As social construction theory posits, however, relevant observers 
may mistakenly believe that an object (state) serves a particular function (agency). What is important 
is that the observers treat the object as if it serves this function, and as deserving of the status the 
function imposes. In terms of construction, “the reality of sovereignty consists in its use and 
acceptance.” Werner & de Wilde, supra note 30, at 304.  
 402. This is not the same “interposition” that was once advocated by extreme states’ righters, 
essentially the claimed right of the states to declare federal laws null and void. The concept is, rather, 
interposition as buffer.  
 403. See Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 373 F.3d 1251 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004) (invalidating plan for storage of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain site in Nevada).  
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Nichols.404 These sorts of literal and figurative “turf wars” lead, over time, 
to the imposition of the agency function. Citizens grow to expect their 
state officials to defend the moral interests of the locality and its interest in 
justice, separate and apart from any national interests. These and other 
interpositions reinforce the states’ separateness, their independent right to 
a form of “external sovereignty” and equality.  
The second manner in which the agency function has been imposed on 
states is far more common than interposition. This we will call the states’ 
“emissary” role. The basic idea is that state officials serve as emissaries or 
representatives of their citizens in the political process. They privately, and 
often publicly, negotiate and bargain with federal authorities regarding the 
implementation of federal policies. Each time they bargain and negotiate, 
the states reinforce their “sovereign” status as representatives of separate 
legal and political communities, as protectors of their citizens’ interests. 
States, of course, lose many of these battles. The political reality, however, 
is that the states’ most significant victories are likely to be publicized. So, 
for example, returning again to the No Child Left Behind legislation, 
publicity regarding successful state negotiations leading to exemptions, or 
alterations, or additional funding communicates that the states can indeed 
serve as effective emissaries.405 States routinely bargain with and cajole 
federal authorities to alter and amend not only educational, but also 
welfare, environmental, and other federal requirements and regulations. 
Although they do not exclusively control the agenda, or the outcome, with 
regard to these policies, states do have a real, substantial, and public effect 
on the shape and direction of policies. States contribute to the structure of 
the negotiation process as well; by actively exercising the agency role, 
they maintain their status as members in good standing in the federal 
system. 
This is a different conception of state sovereignty, one that sheds the 
classical focus on exclusivity and brute power and examines instead the 
dynamics of state behavior and its effect on policy outcomes and 
governance processes. Insofar as states are perceived as legitimate and 
effective agents on behalf of their citizens, they are granted recognition as 
sovereigns and treated as if they are in control of a domain. This concept 
of state sovereignty begins to resemble in a significant manner the “new 
sovereignty” of nation-states. “Sovereignty, in the end, is status—the 
 404. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (“When a defendant in a single act violates the 
‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct 
‘offences.’”) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)). 
 405. See sources cited supra at notes 388–90. 
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vindication of the state’s existence as a member of the [federal] 
system.”406  
 (3) State as Community 
A simple conception of “community” is a unified group of individuals 
sharing common interests, living in a common location.407 In the most 
rudimentary sense, the states readily meet this definition; they are separate 
communities. States are physical places marked off by boundaries. They 
have their own charter documents, or constitutions. They set their own 
rules of membership, which they call “citizenship.” And, perhaps most 
importantly, states have recognizable members—their citizens.408 The 
addition of a formal governmental structure transforms the state into a 
particular type of community. As the Supreme Court has observed: “A 
state, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of 
free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized 
under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and 
established by the consent of the governed.”409  
There are two principal implications, in terms of “sovereignty,” of 
states taking on their roles as separate communities. First, each state 
community constitutes a separate, distinct, and equal locus of authority 
with respect to other states. The states, “as political communities, [are] 
distinct and sovereign, and consequently foreign to each other.”410 Thus, as 
separate sovereign communities, the states enjoy a measure of “external” 
sovereignty with regard to one another. Except insofar as the Constitution 
requires unity or recognition, the states are legally and politically 
independent of one another.411 They can and do “protect” their citizens by 
 406. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 3, at 27 (“[F]or all but a few self-isolated nations, 
sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-
interest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of 
international life.”). 
 407. See, e.g., WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 226 (1976) (defining “community” as, 
inter alia, “a unified body of individuals”; “the people with common interests living in a particular 
area). 
 408. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720 (1868) (“The people, in whatever territory 
dwelling, either temporarily or permanently, and whether organized under a regular government, or 
united by looser and less definite relations, constitute the state.”). 
 409. Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
 410. Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 54 (1838); see also Coyle v. 
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911). 
 411. Some of these limits on interstate “external” sovereignty are expressly set forth in the 
Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 
1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the 
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refusing to give effect to policies of other states with which they disagree. 
Iowa, for example, is not compelled to follow Massachusetts or Hawaii in 
honoring the marriages of two men, or two women.412  
The second general implication, in terms of sovereignty, of state-as-
community is that the states are generally perceived as serving many of the 
same functions as other typical communities. Judicial and scholarly 
discourses regularly emphasize that as communities, states do such things 
as encourage political participation, foster respect for local concerns, offer 
choices to citizens, and foster competition.413 There have been many 
variations on these themes, too many to describe here in full detail. 
Constitutional scholars have suggested, for example, that the states, like 
other communities, permit the accumulation of “social capital,” which 
enables citizens to overcome the usual obstacles to collective action.414 
Others have posited that states, like other communities, may play a 
formative role in individual development, or “may help foster civic 
identities that overlap with more deeply felt identities in ways that create 
cross-cutting allegiances.”415 There is no way to empirically test these 
various assertions and theories. Nor is there any point in doing so, insofar 
as state sovereignty is conceived as a social construct. The point is that 
over time these and other “community” functions have been effectively 
imposed on the states; they constitute, in part, circumstances (C) in which 
the states (X) are deemed to count as sovereign (Y).  
Active states continually prop up their sovereignty by demonstrating 
their community bona fides. The nation recently witnessed California’s 
citizenry expressing its social, economic, and political discontent in the 
gubernatorial election that resulted in the recall of the incumbent governor 
several States”.). Others, like the so-called “dormant” commerce clause, have been imposed as a 
matter of judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding 
that protectionist state legislation is per se invalid).  
 412. In this particular case, note that the community function also reinforces the states’ role as 
trustee of local morality. As the discussion has demonstrated, states can, of course, serve more than 
one function at once. 
 413. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“It assures a decentralized government 
that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for 
citizen involvement in democratic processes; . . . and it makes government more responsive by putting 
the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”); see also Deborah J. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause 
and State Autonomy: Federalism For A Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988) (discussing 
the “values” of federalism); Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–1511 (1987) (same). 
 414. See Jason Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument For Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 27 (2001) (arguing that “federalism also promotes the kinds of social relationships that allow 
citizens to overcome collective action barriers and get things done”).  
 415. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 938; Sorenson, supra note 49, at 98. 
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and the election of Arnold Schwarzenegger. To be sure, not all elections 
receive this sort of attention; most do not involve such colorful characters. 
But the California election was one example of what states are understood 
to provide in terms of opportunity for political participation. The 
opportunity need not relate to an election of national concern or curiosity. 
State and local elections receive plentiful local media coverage, and 
anyone who is paying the slightest attention will be aware that an election 
is taking place. Even if citizens are not inclined to participate, the state at 
least offers them the opportunity, and they know that this is so. Ballot 
initiatives and statewide referenda regarding issues of state and local 
concern such as taxes, affirmative action in public education, assisted 
suicide, and “medical marijuana” also focus substantial attention on states 
as political communities. So long as states continue to offer and encourage 
these sorts of opportunities, they will continue to be perceived as 
sovereign political communities.  
The same can be said for the imposition of other community functions, 
including fostering respect for local concerns, offering meaningful choices 
to citizens, fostering competition, and fostering civic identities. There are 
those who assert that the states do not actually provide such benefits, that 
they are, for example, too overshadowed by federal authority and too 
homogenous to serve as real choices or effective communities.416 We 
cannot empirically demonstrate that states do or do not perform these 
functions. There are, however, sufficient indicia of state engagement and 
heterogeneity to argue that a shared understanding has in fact arisen with 
respect to these elements of state sovereignty as well.  
As the discussion of the trustee and agency functions demonstrated,417 
states do pay attention to and pursue local community interests and 
concerns, often with substantial vigor. Moreover, it would appear that 
states offer enough choices and foster sufficient competition to at least be 
perceived as unique communities. Some states have income and sales 
taxes, some do not; some permit the use of medical marijuana, some do 
not; some allow assisted suicide, others proscribe it; some states permit 
homosexuals to marry, most do not; some states have what we might 
considered a recognizable religious identity, most are secular and 
indistinguishable on this basis; some states rely upon agriculture, others 
industry; some states have what might be considered “liberal” cultures, 
 416. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23, at 920 (arguing that “we have a national political culture, 
and no state is likely to take advantage of the normative independence that serves as federalism’s 
raison d’ etre to suppress local variation”) (emphasis added). 
 417. See supra notes 184–90, 203–10. 
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while others are considered to be generally more “conservative.” The 
distinctions could be multiplied many times over.  
Is some critical mass of people going to move from one state to another 
because of these or other differences? Probably not, but this again misses 
the point of conceiving of sovereignty as an institutional fact.418 These and 
other distinctions would seem to be at least sufficient to lead to the 
perception, among citizens, political leaders, many if not most academics, 
and most judges, that states comprise unique, separate communities that 
offer different choices in terms of living experiences. This is something 
one would surely not have to belabor with two citizens, one from 
Massachusetts and the other from Mississippi. This is certainly not to deny 
that there is a substantial degree of homogeneity among the states, 
particularly in terms of economic considerations and policies. But there is 
sufficient demarcation to give rise to the perception that it makes a 
difference which state’s membership one chooses to join. Because there 
are separate communities out there, one is at liberty, if sufficiently 
motivated, to pack up and move.419 As the Supreme Court stated in 
McCulloch v. Maryland:420 “No political dreamer was ever wild enough to 
think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of 
compounding the American people into one common mass.”421 That 
statement remains as true today as when it was made, very early in the 
conceptual evolution of statehood.  
Finally, in terms of the imposition of community functions, the states 
are said to do such things as foster civic identities and even contribute to 
individual development. It is not at all difficult to see how this perception 
might arise. The states themselves contribute to the imposition of such 
functions in carrying out activities most of us do not consciously think of 
as claims to sovereignty. For example, flagship state schools are 
recognizable arms of the state that contribute substantially to education, 
one of the most important aspects of personal development. In addition to 
offering a discounted but quality higher education, these state institutions 
often foster strong loyalties among their alumni. Even such seemingly 
trivial objects as state flags, license plates, and slogans all contribute to 
civic identity and personality. These state symbols are intended to 
 418. Corporate citizens, of course, are quite likely to be swayed by distinctions among states with 
regard to tax, employment, and property laws, for example. In this sense, states function as 
communities that offer what are sometimes make-or-break choices.  
 419. See McConnell, supra note 111, at 1503 (noting that “[t]he main reason oppression at the 
federal level is more dangerous is that it is more difficult to escape”). 
 420. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 421. Id. at 403. 
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engender citizen loyalty and identification; they are in that respect very 
subtle claims to sovereignty, but claims nonetheless. Objects and symbols 
like the vilified confederate flag, the license plate motto “Live Free or 
Die,” and the slogan “Don’t Mess With Texas” are mostly 
underappreciated currents of an ongoing state sovereignty discourse. 
These things are far from trivial. They contribute substantially, if not 
always consciously, to the shared perception that states are sovereign 
communities and that membership in those communities has special 
meaning.422
In sum, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove with any 
empirical precision that the states actually serve the various community 
functions often attributed to them. But it is not at all hard to believe that 
through social, political, judicial, and academic discourses, as well as 
continuous state practices, the states are perceived as existing to serve a 
variety of functions typically associated with other communities. Insofar 
as they do so, states stake out claims to recognition as sovereigns. And 
insofar as their sovereignty is recognized and acted upon, the states are in 
fact “sovereign.” 
 (4) State as Laboratory 
A final function that has been imposed upon states is perhaps the best 
known, but least understood. States have been said to function as 
“laboratories” from the earliest recorded moments in constitutional 
discourse. Alexander Hamilton argued that states would supply model 
legislation “which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the 
federal legislature than to review the different laws and reduce them into 
one general act.”423 On one view, then, a diversity of sovereign state 
lawmaking laboratories would contribute to the content of federal law.  
But others have argued that there is value in experimentation itself. 
One of the principal arguments in favor of “sovereign” states was that 
“federalism enables a people to try experiments which could not safely be 
tried in a large centralized country.”424 Justices Holmes and Brandeis 
popularized this version of state-as-laboratory in their Lochner era 
 422. This is not to suggest that everyone agrees with the claims such symbols make, or that the 
state by making such claims exercises precisely the sort of influence that, say, a family or religious 
community does in terms of identity formation and individual development. These sorts of things do, 
however, contribute to the imposition of community functions with regard to the states. 
 423. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 340 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 424. 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 353 (1888). 
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dissents,425 which would ultimately become celebrated for repudiating 
Lochner’s economic substantive due process. Holmes specifically objected 
to the Court’s invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause “to prevent the making of social experiments . . . in the insulated 
chambers afforded by the several states.”426 Justice Brandeis considered it 
“one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”427
The persistence of the laboratory metaphor is a testament to the social 
construction thesis. The symbol has an uneven history. The framers 
supported it, as did Supreme Court luminaries like Brandeis and Holmes. 
But the modern Court has been stingy with its references to the laboratory 
function. It is mostly mentioned in passing in concurrences and dissents.428 
Some academics have questioned the utility of this particular 
representation of state function since what is happening in the “real world” 
of state legislation is nothing like the controlled environment of the 
scientific laboratory.429  
Still, state-as-laboratory continues to exert influence on how the states 
are perceived, and how their “sovereignty” is represented. Social, 
academic, and political discourses, and the dynamics of state practices 
have combined to support the perception that the states are critical 
innovators. Various discourses continue to emphasize that the states ought 
to be provided the breathing room to decide certain matters in the first 
instance.430 Again, the debate over gay marriage demonstrates the 
entrenched nature of the laboratory function. Politicians who favor 
permitting the states to deal with this issue without federal interference 
generally tout some version of the “laboratory” function to channel their 
 425. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 426. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 427. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 428. See James A. Gardner, The “States-As-Laboratories” Metaphor In State Constitutional Law, 
30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 483 (1996) (noting that the laboratory function does not provide the 
foundation for Supreme Court holdings). The Court does sometimes mention the laboratory metaphor 
in passing, as one of the many benefits of federalism. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 
(1991) (federalism “allows for more innovation and experimentation in government”). 
 429. See Gardner, supra note 428, at 480–82 (1996) (arguing that states are not engaged in 
scientific experimentation in any sense, but a loose form of policy experimentation); see also Rubin & 
Feeley, supra note 23, at 923–24 (noting lack of controls and central direction in state 
“experimentation”).  
 430. See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750–76 (2004) (describing and elaborating on the state-as-laboratory 
metaphor, and examining the Supreme Court’s invocation of this functional symbol). 
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argument against federal action.431 The idea that states sometimes act as 
laboratories of experiment has seeped into our social discourse.432 Many 
academics, who may well be aware that the laboratory metaphor is 
technically flawed, nevertheless support the idea that the states should be 
permitted to “experiment” before a national solution is implemented.433
Recall as well that social construction theorists who have studied state 
sovereignty in the international context stress that in a significant sense 
states are what they do. States, functioning as trustees, continue to 
legislate with respect to novel social and economic issues like the death 
penalty, involuntary institutionalization, assisted suicide, medical 
marijuana, stem cell research, environmental concerns, criminal 
sentencing, and a host of other matters. Their efforts can have several 
tangible effects. First, other states may follow a bolder state’s lead.434 
Second, Congress is often constrained from interfering with these state 
efforts, partly, to be sure, from its own crowded agenda, but also because 
the matter is simply perceived to be one for the states to address in the first 
instance. This may be a matter of congressional deference, or an artful 
dodge of an issue for which Congress lacks political appetite. In either 
case, the result is that state law is essentially preserved, or “final.” Finally, 
once the states address a novel concern, the courts pay particular attention 
to the innovations the states have attempted.435 These innovations are not 
always upheld, but they are generally treated by the courts with deference 
and respect. The shared understanding or agreement that states should be 
 431. See Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Conservatives Press Ahead on Anti-gay Issue, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2004, at A15 (quoting then-Democratic Senate Leader Tom Daschle: “The regulation of 
marriage has long been under the purview of the states . . . and I believe that is where it should 
remain.”). 
 432. See, e.g., David Ginn, editorial, NORTHEASTERN NEWS, Dec. 3, 2003, available at 
http://www.ny-news.com/main (last visited Apr. 5, 2005) (“I was recently reminded that one of the 
major advantages of our federalist system is the freedom it gives states to experiment with different 
policies. Seen in this way, states are laboratories where creative solutions to social problems can be 
tested out.”). 
 433. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, Anti-Federalist, 
and Anti-Democratic, available at www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/040923paper.html (Sept. 23, 2004) 
(“While respecting the power of the states to determine their own policies on matters as fundamental 
as property, criminal, and family law means there is a lack of uniformity in these areas, the 
corresponding benefits of state experimentation and local control have always been regarded as 
overwhelmingly compensating advantages of our federal system.”). 
 434. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Several States Likely to Follow California on Car Emissions, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2004, at C4; Adam Liptak, Justices’ Sentencing Ruling May Have Model in Kansas, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2004, at A12 (reporting that Kansas had overhauled its sentencing procedures in 
anticipation of Supreme Court ruling, and that other states would likely follow its lead). 
 435. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192–94 (2005) (citing state laws as basis for 
national consensus against execution of juvenile offenders). 
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allowed the breathing space to address novel issues substantially affects 
the legislative terrain.  
Events regarding gay marriage in Massachusetts, as well as in 
communities in California and New York, can hardly be characterized as 
“experimentation” in the controlled laboratory sense. There is little 
efficiency in proceeding in this haphazard fashion.436 But efficiency is 
only one goal. The value in experimentation, or innovation, or whatever 
one chooses to call what the states are doing, at least from the states’ point 
of view, is that it reinforces one of the states’ competences to such an 
extent that states gain citizen loyalty and a further measure of control over 
a critical local domain. The idea that marriage is a concern with regard to 
which the states should be allowed to innovate or “experiment” in the first 
instance remains politically, academically, judicially, and culturally 
popular. California’s recently enacted stem cell research initiative437 can 
also be viewed in this light. Despite federal misgivings, California asserted 
its sovereign prerogative to “experiment” in this morally charged but 
scientifically promising field. Aside from the substantial profits that stand 
to be made, California positioned itself, in the eyes of its citizens and those 
in other states, as a proactive sovereign. Insofar as the states are perceived 
as innovators in this fashion, they will continue to be regarded as at least 
partially “sovereign.” 
In sum, state sovereignty as an institutional fact arises from the various 
functions imposed upon the states. Social construction theory, and 
conceptions like the “new sovereignty,” posit that states are in substantial 
part what they do. Thus, sovereignty does not arise from the states’ 
exclusive authority, nor from some measure of their material resources or 
power. We ought not ask whether the states are “really” sovereign, for “the 
reality of sovereignty consists in its use and acceptance.”438 The state (X) 
counts as sovereign (Y) as, and to the extent that, it performs the various 
functions described above (C).  It counts as sovereign as, and to the extent 
that, shared understandings arise to the effect that states are entitled to 
deference with regard to local concerns and form legitimate sovereign 
polities entitled to recognition from other states and federal authorities. As 
in the international context, social construction theory can help to 
reconcile the continued recognition of state claims to “sovereignty” with 
 436. As Rubin & Feeley note, “true federalism allows governmental sub-units to choose different 
goals, not to experiment with different mechanisms for achieving a single one.” Rubin & Feeley, supra 
note 23, at 924. 
 437. See CAL. CONST., art. 35, § 1 (“California Stem Cell Research and Cures Act”). 
 438. Werner & de Wilde, supra note 30, at 304. 
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their substantially limited powers by focusing attention on the dynamic 
process of sovereignty’s construction. 
b. Status Symbols 
All of the aforementioned functional symbols transfer some power or 
other to the states—for example, to control local affairs, interpose, provide 
community benefits, or innovate. All of these powers are aspects of a 
state’s sovereignty. As Searle noted, institutional facts do not always 
involve imposition of power; some are based upon status. An imposed 
status can be either positive or negative.439 The use of status to construct 
state sovereignty has been less prevalent than the imposition of powers 
and functions. As we shall see, this has been almost exclusively a juridical 
process.440 “Sovereignty” in this context depends upon a purported shared 
understanding that a state “takes on” the status of some other object or 
institution that is itself thought to be sovereign. Thus, the state (X) counts 
as sovereign (Y), or does not, where it is judicially determined that the 
state resembles, or does not resemble, some other sovereignty-bearing 
object (C). The use of status as a constructive element has come to define 
a version of state sovereignty distinct from that associated with the 
functions discussed above.  
 (1) State as Corporation  
In terms of pure status, the states did not begin from an exalted 
position. The early colonies were merely a specie of the corporate form. 
Colonial constitutions, like the Massachusetts Bay Company Charter, were 
specifically “designed as corporate charters.”441 In early discourse, states 
 439. See SEARLE, supra note 32, at 96–97. For example, one can be voted either “most popular” 
or “least popular” person in one’s class. Id. 
 440. This is a situation unique to American state sovereignty. The European Court of Justice, for 
example, “has been remarkably frugal in its discussion of sovereignty.” SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, 
supra note 2, at 12. 
 441. Amar, supra note 59, at 1432–33. The corporate form was chosen largely for pragmatic 
reasons—it was most familiar to the colonists. See id. (examining corporate form). Organizationally, 
the colonial charters were the precursors of state governments. They instituted hierarchical leadership. 
Id. The corporate officers would later become state governors, deputy governors, and so on. Id. The 
charters set forth the boundaries of authority for these early officers. They laid the basic ground rules 
for a hybrid form, which was both a “profit-seeking entity” and an early form of governance. Id. The 
early adoption of the corporate form was mostly significant because it hinted at the framers’ 
experimental version of sovereignty, one which broke significantly with classical thought. Because 
they contained implicit boundaries for the exercise of sovereign power, corporate forms were an early 
break from English notions of absolute sovereignty. See id. at 1434–35 (“Within the limitations of 
their charters, governments could be sovereign, but that sovereignty could be bounded by the terms of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss1/3
p229 Zick book pages.doc 9/1/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] ARE THE STATES SOVEREIGN? 315 
 
 
 
 
 
 
were often treated as no more “sovereign” than ordinary corporations. 
James Madison, who sometimes vouched for the “sovereignty” of the 
states, once expressed the view that there existed a “gradation” of 
authority “from the smallest corporation, with the most limited powers, to 
the largest empire with the most perfect sovereignty.”442 “The states,” 
Madison insisted, “are not in that high degree Sovereign”; “they are 
Corporations with the power of Bye Laws.”443  
This line of thought greatly influenced the early Supreme Court’s 
treatment of claims to sovereign statehood. Recall that there was in the 
Court’s sovereignty discourse a period of “pre-sovereignty.”444 Early state 
claims to “sovereign immunity” fell victim to the imposition of the 
corporate status. If a state was only as “sovereign” as an ordinary 
corporation, then the state could be sued, just as any ordinary corporation 
might be.  
In Chisholm v. Georgia,445 the Court held that citizens from one state 
could indeed sue a foreign state in federal court. Despite their varying 
views on other matters (each justice wrote separately), the justices in 
Chisholm largely agreed that corporate status should be imposed upon the 
states.446 Georgia creatively justified its claim to sovereignty by seeking to 
“graft” arguments for nation-state sovereignty onto its immunity 
defense.447 The state insisted that to permit the suit to proceed would 
constitute an offense to the state’s “dignity.”448 The Court soundly rejected 
this justification, holding that it would constitute no offense to state 
“dignity” to subject the states to suit at the bidding of foreign citizens: 
[T]he obvious dictates of justice, and the purposes of society . . . 
[demand that] in certain cases one citizen may sue forty thousand; 
the delegation itself.”). Corporate officers who ventured beyond these boundaries were acting ultra 
vires. Thus, the concept of limited sovereignty found early expression in the symbol of the corporate 
body. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
(1967); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969). Indeed, 
“dual sovereignty” would later be defended on the ground that sovereignty could be incomplete, even 
divided, as it was in corporations.  
 442. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 463–64, 477, 479 (Max Farrand 
ed., 1966). 
 443. Id. at 477. 
 444. See supra notes 61–66 and accompanying text. 
 445. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 447 (1793). 
 446. See id. (Opinion of Iredell, J.) (“Any body politic (sole or aggregate) whether its power be 
restricted or transcendent, is in this sense ‘a corporation.’”); id. at 468 (Opinion of Cushing, J.) (“[A]ll 
states whatever are corporations or bodies politic. The only question is, what are their powers?”). 
 447. See Reus-Smit, supra note 312, at 357 (noting that “the best way to further a moral claim is 
to ‘graft’ it to prevailing views about what constitutes a fully realized human being”). 
 448. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 456 (Wilson, J.) (discussing state claim to “dignity”). 
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for where a corporation is sued, all the members of it are actually 
sued, though not personally, sued. . . Will it be said, that the fifty 
odd thousand citizens in Delaware being . . . associated under their 
charter, that although it may become the latter to meet an individual 
on an equal footing in a Court of Justice, yet that such a procedure 
would not comport with the dignity of the former?449
As a mere corporate form, in other words, the state was held to possess 
no more “dignity” than a bank, a railroad, or a stockyard. Like those 
entities, the state had to yield to individual justice, citizen dignity, and the 
larger “purposes of society.”450 The states, being mere corporations, were 
merely, as Justice Wilson stated in Chisholm, “the inferior contrivance of 
man.”451  
Chisholm would, of course, later be overturned by the Eleventh 
Amendment,452 and the Court has since piled on a number of state liberties 
from suit, including many which go well beyond the text of the 
amendment itself.453 The modern Court, as we shall see, has drastically 
reversed Chisholm’s early prioritization of “dignitary” interests; today it is 
largely the state’s dignity which prevails over that of its citizens. 
Corporate symbolism would today be considered an outright insult to the 
states, as the character of their sovereign status has undergone a 
remarkable juridical change.  
 (2) State as Market Participant  
The discussion thus far has emphasized that state sovereignty is not an 
inherent aspect of statehood, but a flexible construct. Perhaps no symbol 
 449. Id. at 472. 
 450. Id. The idea that states were merely corporate forms influenced congressional thinking as 
well during this early period of history. The concept was relied upon by Congress in enacting 
important civil rights legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1781. Some sponsors and 
supporters of the enactment expressed the view that states would be covered by its proscriptions, 
which extended to all “persons.” See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 78–84 (1989) 
(Brennan, J.) (describing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1781). According to the 
Dictionary Act of 1780, which purported to provide definitions in aid of statutory construction, 
“person” included corporations and bodies politic. See id. (describing the Dictionary Act). Based upon 
the Dictionary Act, there was at least some indication that states would be covered by the Civil Rights 
Act. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 661–62 (1871) (“What is a State? Is it not a body politic 
and corporate?”) (Statement of Sen. Vichers); id. at 696 (“A State is a corporation.”) (Statement of 
Sen. Edmunds).  
 451. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 455. 
 452. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
 453. See infra notes 494–98 and accompanying text. 
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or marker demonstrates this fact more clearly than that of state-as-“market 
participant.”  
Unlike the other status indicators, state-as-market participant does 
involve the transfer of some power to a state, although it is not sovereign 
power. Rather, this status provides states the power to act like any other 
corporation in the marketplace. The modern state enters markets of all 
kinds, purchasing goods and services just as any ordinary corporation 
does, and often on as large a scale. According to the “market participant” 
doctrine, where the state acts as a “market participant” rather than a 
“sovereign regulator,” it is permitted to restrict the flow of commerce in a 
manner that would otherwise be proscribed under the so-called “dormant 
commerce clause” doctrine.454 The “dormant commerce clause” essentially 
prohibits state economic protectionism and measures which effect an 
undue burden on interstate commerce.455 Where the state is labeled a 
“market participant,” the limits of the dormant commerce clause no longer 
apply and states can impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce.456 
The so-called “market participant exemption” is grounded in both the 
history of the Commerce Clause and principles of state sovereignty.457 As 
 454. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (holding that the distinction between 
“states as market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law”); 
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (distinguishing between state as regulator and 
state as participating in the market for Commerce Clause purposes); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-11, at 1088–95 (3d ed. 2000). A similar distinction is found in 
antitrust law under the state action doctrine. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (distinguishing 
between a state authorizing private parties to act anticompetitively and a state itself regulating 
commerce).  
 455. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (holding that economic 
protectionism is subject to a “per se rule” of invalidity); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 
432 U.S. 333, 350–54 (1977) (invalidating state law which had an undue burden on interstate 
commerce). 
 456. See Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395, 398 (1989) (arguing that the market-participant exemption 
reflects “a sound, if complex, accommodation of competing constitutional values”); Mark P. Gergen, 
The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097 (1988) (noting the “uneasy tension 
between the rule of interstate equality, which would brook no differential treatment, and the concept of 
state sovereignty, which would allow unrestricted preferences”). 
 457. As the Court has stated:  
There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to 
operate freely in the free market . . . .  
 Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of state sovereignty, the role of 
each State ‘as guardian and trustee for its people,’ and ‘the long recognized right of trader or 
manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent 
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’  
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 437–39 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)) 
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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the Supreme Court said in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,458 “the commerce clause 
was directed, as an historical matter, only at regulatory and taxing actions 
taken by states in their sovereign capacity.”459 Thus, rather than existing as 
an inherent aspect of statehood, “sovereignty” is treated, in this context at 
least, as something which the states are or are not in possession of at any 
given moment. There are, at least according to the Court, apparently 
situations in which a state acts in its sovereign capacity, and situations in 
which it takes on some other distinct character.  
In the end, however, what the states can or cannot do remains a 
question of their status. Whether a state will be permitted to disrupt the 
flow of commerce hinges entirely upon the formal category into which it 
is placed by the courts—“market regulator” or “market participant.” As 
the precedents indicate, this threshold inquiry does not involve any 
identifiable bright lines; it is hardly self-evident which role the state may 
be playing in any given situation and no set of factors seems to be 
determinative.460 In social context, at least, one can well imagine that out-
of-state firms which are disadvantaged by a state’s protectionism might 
draw the line between regulation and participation differently than the 
courts. Consistent with other status considerations, courts fix these sorts of 
lines without regard to impressions, appearances, or processes. The status 
is judicially determined, as the courts see it. 
Corporate status in this context is a positive symbol from the states’ 
perspective. Under the market participant exemption, the Court “has 
shielded from commerce clause attack blatant favoritism of local 
interests.”461 The state is “sovereign” to the same extent that a corporation 
is; thus insofar as a firm would enjoy the autonomy of the market so too 
will a state acting as a “market participant.” The exemption operates with 
something of a counter-intuitive backwardness insofar as sovereignty is 
concerned. It permits states to serve certain of their “sovereign” functions, 
such as structuring relations with their citizens and providing for the 
 458. 447 U.S. 429. 
 459. Id. at 436–37 (quoting TRIBE, supra note 454, at 336). 
 460. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 214–15 (1983) (upholding a 
City of Boston executive order requiring any construction projects funded in whole or in part by the 
city to employ a workforce composed of at least half Boston residents as not violating the Commerce 
Clause); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440 (holding that South Dakota’s policy of limiting sales of cement 
produced in a state-owned plant to state residents during times of shortage was permissible 
participation in the market, rather than regulation); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 
810 (1976) (holding that Maryland was acting as a market participant when it provided bounties for 
the destruction of inoperable automobile hulks, which effectively encouraged the processing of these 
hulks by in-state processors).  
 461. Coenen, supra note 456, at 397. 
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general welfare, so long as the Court concludes that a state is not acting in 
its usual “sovereign” capacity.  
 (3) State as Nation 
In recent years, states have aggressively invoked their “sovereignty” in 
a variety of contexts. These claims have met with substantial success; so 
much so that some scholars have talked in terms of a federalism 
“revolution.”462 The manner in which states have justified, and the Court 
has increasingly validated, state claims to “sovereignty” has been a 
significant element of the recent federalism revival. Status has been a 
critical aspect of this revival.  
In holding, for example, that Congress cannot “commandeer” state 
officials to enforce federal regulatory policies, the Court has emphasized 
that states are not “mere political subdivisions of the United States,” or 
“regional offices,” or “administrative agencies of the Federal 
Government.”463 As the Court stated in Printz v. United States,464 which 
held that Congress could not “commandeer” state executive officials to 
enforce federal policies: “It is an essential attribute of the States’ retained 
sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous . . .”465 The 
Court has also increasingly upheld claims that the “dignity,” “respect,” 
and “esteem” of the states must be protected, even at the expense of 
citizens’ claims to injury at the hands of state officials.466 The language of 
justification the states and the Court have used has puzzled scholars, who 
have offered several theories regarding the Court’s aggressive support of 
state autonomy, and its reliance on language of “dignity” and “esteem” in 
particular.467 If the putatively “dignified” states are not political 
subdivisions or regional offices, then what status do they possess, what 
may they be likened to?  
 462. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1601 (“It is now apparent that the United States is in the midst of a 
constitutional revolution.”). 
 463. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (opinion of White, J.). 
 464. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 465. Id. at 928. 
 466. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) (“[T]he 
primary function of sovereign immunity is . . . to afford the States the dignity and respect due 
sovereign entities.”).  
 467. See, e.g., Judith Resnick and Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role 
of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003) (identifying “role dignity” in 
discussions of sate sovereign immunity); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1121, 1127 (2000) (“Not since extending the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
corporations has the Court so anthropomorphized an abstract entity.”). 
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Some scholars have suggested that the Court has begun to impose a 
status akin to that of nations upon the states in order to explain or define 
their “sovereignty.”468 There is some historical support for such an 
imposition. What we now know and refer to as “the states” might have 
been called something else entirely when the Constitution was framed: 
subdivisions, protectorates, provinces, or districts, for instance. The 
framers in all likelihood used “state” purposefully. The Constitution’s 
drafters were well versed in the law of nations.469 It is, thus, no mere 
coincidence that “state” also happens to be the term used to describe and 
analyze the Westphalian system of sovereign states and nation-states 
which developed in the seventeenth century.470 There is, in fact, substantial 
evidence that the Framers were aware of, indeed many had read, 
Emmerich de Vattel’s treatise, The Law of Nations, which itself did not 
distinguish between “nation” and “state.”471 It is at least plausible, then, 
that the Framers to some extent relied upon the conception of “state” as it 
had been developed at the time within the law of nations.  
Physically, as well, the American states possess the elementary aspects 
long thought to confer the status of nationhood; namely territory, 
population, and government.472 “In the Constitution,” the Court has 
observed, “the term state most frequently expresses the combined idea . . . 
of people, territory, and government.”473 Vattel described nations as 
“bodies politic, societies of men united together for the purpose of 
promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint efforts of their 
combined strength.”474 States meet this definition as well. 
The imposition of “nation” status upon the states is significant in two 
contexts. First, in their relations with one another, states have been 
 468. See Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State 
Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1027 (2001–2002) (comparing state sovereign immunity with 
principle of international law at time of framing); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and 
Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment 
Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999) (comparing references to “States” in Constitution to 
international nation-states); Peter Smith, States As Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1 (2003) (locating dignity language in the law of nations, specifically the law of foreign 
sovereign immunity).  
 469. See Rappaport, supra note 468, at 830–38 (noting the framers’ familiarity with international 
legal texts and principles). 
 470. See id. (arguing that “state” was used by the founders more or less synonymously with 
“nation”). 
 471. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (1863). 
 472. See JAMES, supra note 3, at 13; see also Keating, supra note 13, at 204. 
 473. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720–21 (1869) (emphasis added). 
 474. DE VATTEL, supra note 471, §§ 1, 4 (“Nations, or sovereign states, are to be considered as so 
many free persons living together in the state of nature.”).  
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assigned an “external” sovereignty similar in some respects to that 
possessed by nation-states. The “several states are of equal dignity and 
authority, and [because] the independence of one implies the exclusion of 
power from all others[,] . . . the laws of one State have no operation 
outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity.”475 This 
sovereign equality is “a principle inferred from the constitutional structure 
and borrowed from background assumptions of the law of nations.”476 The 
Court has borrowed principles of international law, including territorial 
limits and sovereign equality, in resolving disputes (i.e., border claims) 
between states, determining the contours of the doctrine of inter-state 
immunity from suit and, prior to the mid-twentieth century, in fashioning a 
doctrine of personal jurisdiction.477  
The second context, at least according to one theory of the “dignified” 
state, is the presently in-vogue doctrine of “sovereign immunity.” Peter 
Smith has recently suggested that the Court’s repeated references to state 
“dignity” are drawn from the law of nations, specifically the doctrine of 
foreign sovereign immunity.478 This doctrine shields sovereign nations 
from lawsuits in foreign courts, at least under most circumstances.479 The 
relationship is, as Professor Smith acknowledges, only implicit; the Court 
has not explicitly invoked nation status on behalf of the states. He argues, 
however, that sovereign “dignity” is a basic principle of the doctrine of 
foreign state sovereign immunity.480 Although it is “impossible to know 
precisely what the Court intends when it relies on the concept of state 
dignity in the state sovereignty immunity cases,” Professor Smith argues 
that the Court’s “rhetorical clues suggest that it is drawing support from 
 475. Brown v. Fletcher, 210 U.S. 82, 89 (1908) (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 
(1877)); see also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) (“Neither state can legislate for, or 
impose its own policy on the other.”); Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845) (“When 
Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she succeeded to all 
the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the 
cession . . . .”). 
 476. Bradford Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1245, 1323 (1996); see Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (“[T]he constitutional equality of the 
states is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was 
organized.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing for equal representation for states in the 
senate); U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring state participation in constitutional amendment process); U.S. 
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (preserving the territorial integrity of the states).  
 477. See Smith, supra note 468, at 81–87 (discussing cases and doctrine). 
 478. See id. at 7 (arguing that recent sovereign immunity precedents treat states as nations). 
 479. See id. at 36–47 (discussing foreign state immunity and law of nations). 
 480. See id. at 7 (arguing that dignity “has an established meaning, with established implications, 
in the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity”). 
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the doctrine of foreign state sovereign immunity and the law of 
nations.”481
Whether or not the Court is imposing the status of nation, however, 
Professor Smith ultimately concludes that this status would not support the 
Court’s state sovereignty immunity holdings. The concept of the state as 
figurative nation-state can work, he argues, only if the Court is willing to 
insist that states are fully sovereign nations within the meaning of 
international law.482 This argument, as Professor Smith notes, would run 
counter to the significant constitutional divestiture of state sovereignty in 
matters of foreign affairs, as well as the post-ratification understanding of 
state sovereign authority.483 More importantly, as Professor Smith also 
observes, the metaphor would run counter to the law of nations itself. 
Under that body of law, Congress is entitled to subject foreign nations to 
suit in domestic courts. Thus, the state-as-nation metaphor “clearly should 
lead to the conclusion that Congress can subject the states to suit in federal 
court.”484 This, of course, is precisely the opposite conclusion the Court 
has reached over and over again in recent sovereign immunity cases. 
Nationhood status has plainly been imposed upon states when they 
interact with one another. As they interact, states are equal, independent, 
territorially-bound, sovereign units. It is also possible that nation status 
is—to a limited degree—being imposed upon the states to support such 
things as state “sovereign immunity” from lawsuits.  
 (4) State as Person 
Given the apparent inability of state-as-nation to explain the results in 
some recent cases, we should perhaps seek other explanations for the 
markedly improved status of the states. I have argued elsewhere that the 
whole of the federalism “revival” can plausibly be attributed to an effort to 
impose the status of personhood on the states.485 That theory will be only 
briefly sketched here. 
The Anti-Federalists argued forcefully in favor of respect not only for 
state dignity, but also for state “morality” and “rights.”486 Given their 
 481. Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
 482. See id. at 88 (“[T]he Court’s implicit suggestion in relying on the states’ dignity is that the 
states are analogous to independent sovereigns within the meaning of customary international law”). 
 483. See id. at 92 (noting that Constitution “specifically divested the states” of powers of foreign 
diplomacy and commerce). 
 484. Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
 485. See Zick, supra note 25. 
 486. See id. at 229. 
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familiarity with the law of nations, which as Professor Smith observes 
includes such concepts as state “dignity,” it is a plausible interpretation of 
their writings that the Anti-Federalists were among the first to compare the 
states to nations. This comparison, in turn, would have formed the basis 
for the idea that states were akin to persons. Early international relations 
theorists, who wrote during the period of the monarchy, often likened 
sovereign nations to persons.487 Thus, it is equally plausible that these 
early constitutional theorists were advocating a respect for state liberty that 
mirrored the rights possessed by persons.488 Indeed, at the earliest 
moments, state sovereignty was justified with reference to such individual 
characteristics as personality, dignity, morality, and rights.489  
Echoes of these sorts of justifications have surfaced in recent years as 
the states have aggressively advanced constitutional claims usually 
associated with persons. For example, the states have asserted 
constitutional rights to autonomy, equality, and due process.490 Recall the 
specific insight of social constructionists regarding this sort of tactic: 
“Within domestic society, the best way to further a moral claim is to 
‘graft’ it to prevailing views about what constitutes a fully realized human 
being, or to beliefs about the ideal community of such beings.”491 Or, as 
another scholar put it: “New ideas are more likely to be influential if they 
‘fit’ well within existing ideas and ideologies in a particular social 
setting.”492 A significant part of the “new federalism” agenda has been to 
graft individual notions of self-determination, autonomy, and equality onto 
state arguments for constitutional rights.  
 487. See CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that early theorists conceived of a state 
as “‘a living, articulate force, a historic individual with a personality and will of its own’”) (quoting 
KENNETH DYSON, THE STATE TRADITION IN WESTERN EUROPE: A STUDY OF AN IDEA AND AN 
INSTITUTION 103 (1980)). Indeed, the nation-as-person metaphor can be traced back to de Vattel, who 
invoked it to argue on behalf of the “equality” of nations. See Bardo Fassbender, Sovereignty and 
Constitutionalism in International Law, in SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 121 
(discussing origins of the nation-as-person analogy); see also Douglas G. Smith, Interstate Commerce 
and the Principles of the Law of Nations, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 111, 126–29 (discussing de Vattel’s 
conception of states as persons). 
 488. Nationhood and personhood are closely linked symbols. International relations theory, for 
example, has long analogized nations and persons. See, e.g., CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 29 
(noting that early international theorists contended that the state was a person with “personality” and 
“interests”).  
 489. See Zick, supra note 25, at 233–34. 
 490. See id. at 220–21 (describing newly discovered “fundamental rights” of states). 
 491. Reus-Smit, supra note 312, at 527.  
 492. KATHRYN SIKKIRK, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS 26 (1991); see also Reus-Smit, supra note 312, 
at 527 (“Historically, the identity values defining ideal individuals and states have been closely linked 
. . .”). 
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The result, in terms of constitutional doctrine, has been the generation 
of a series of state constitutional “rights” which resemble in many 
important respects the “fundamental” rights of persons to things like 
autonomy, equality, and process. In other words, as I have argued 
elsewhere, statehood has essentially become the “new personhood.”493 The 
Court has increasingly expended its considerable capital not on expanding 
fundamental individual rights but on recognizing state claims to 
fundamental constitutional rights. As it has evolved recently, state 
sovereignty has come to closely resemble personal sovereignty. 
Thus, the states currently enjoy a person-like right to order the intimate 
affairs of their sovereignty: Congress must at least be perfectly clear in its 
intention to invade such sacred state enclaves as deciding who may serve 
in positions of state authority and on what terms.494 Through the vast 
expansion of “sovereign immunity,” states have gained what looks more 
and more like a right to respect and consideration equal to that of the 
federal government. States cannot be treated by Congress as “second 
class” sovereigns.495 The anti-“commandeering” cases have produced a 
state right to something like the physical autonomy persons enjoy under 
various provisions of the Constitution.496 The Court has also held that the 
states may not be “mentally” coerced into waiving their constitutional 
rights.497 Finally, procedural protections have been erected to protect the 
states from “charges” that they have engaged in unconstitutional 
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and other 
Reconstruction Amendments.498  
 493. Zick, supra note 25, at 223. 
 494. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (asserting that the setting of qualifications 
for state judges “goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of the most 
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity”). 
 495. See Zick, supra note 25, at 259–67 (discussing state right to “equality”); see also Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 749–50 (1999) (noting that the federal government enjoys immunity from suit 
and stating: “In light of our constitutional system recognizing the essential sovereignty of the States, 
we are reluctant to conclude that the States are not entitled to a reciprocal privilege.”); id. at 748 
(stating that immunity’s central purpose is to “accord [] the States the respect owed them as members 
of the federation.”) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 
139, 146 (1993)).  
 496. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 152 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot 
compel state legislature to enforce federal regulatory programs); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
905 (1997) (holding that state executive officials cannot be “pressed into federal service”). 
 497. See College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 
687 (1999) (concluding that “the point of coercion is automatically passed—and the voluntariness of 
waiver destroyed—when what is attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from 
otherwise lawful activity”). 
 498. See, e.g., Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (invalidating 
provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act which subjected states to lawsuits); City of Boerne 
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The language of justification, values, and the substance of protections 
which together comprise the recent renaissance of “states’ rights”—
dignity, esteem, equality, autonomy, internal ordering, and procedural due 
process—can thus plausibly be read as an attempt to impose the status of 
person upon the states. Grafting these and other personal characteristics 
upon statehood has led to a substantial revival of state sovereignty in a 
number of constitutional contexts. 
In sum, state sovereignty has been given meaning and substantive 
effect not only through the imposition of various functions but also 
through the imposition of formal statuses. If a state is a “market 
participant,” for example, then it may impede commerce; if it is a “market 
regulator,” then it generally may not do so. More substantively, states, 
once treated as possessing no more “sovereignty” than an ordinary 
corporation, have recently become nation- or person-like institutions with 
“rights” and claims to personal values like “dignity,” “esteem,” and 
“respect.” State sovereignty is manifested in this regard in the rights to 
autonomy, immunity, equality, and process states have been held to 
possess. This is another way in which the states, which do not possess 
classical sovereignty or substantial power relative to federal authorities, 
are nevertheless still considered to be and ultimately are treated as 
“sovereign.” 
C. The “Two Sovereignties” 
The upshot of the evolution of the concept of domestic state 
sovereignty is that there are currently two rather distinct versions of state 
sovereignty circulating in constitutional discourses. These “two 
sovereignties” are based upon the shared understandings that have arisen, 
or are presently in process, from the imposition upon statehood of, on the 
one hand, various competences, and on the other hand, a variety of court-
imposed statuses. State competences include such things as police powers, 
agency and community functions, and legislative and judicial innovations. 
The institution of state sovereignty is generated, and sustained, as a result 
of the continuous and vigorous exercise of these competences. 
Sovereignty based upon status, by contrast, is essentially an equation of 
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that legislation enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers 
under the Reconstruction Amendments must exhibit “congruence and proportionality between the 
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end”). In deciding whether a 
legislative enactment of this sort is “congruent and proportional,” the Court does not defer to 
Congress; it conducts a “close review” of the legislative record. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 
645. 
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the sovereignty of the states with the sovereignty enjoyed by other 
purportedly similar objects, such as corporations, nations, or persons. The 
first of these sovereignties we will call competence sovereignty and the 
latter status sovereignty.  
Competence sovereignty substantially resembles the “new sovereignty” 
described in Part IV. It arises from the proactive exercise of the functions 
associated with the symbols of trustee, agent, community, and laboratory. 
Through these functions, or “bundle of competences,”499 states actively 
prop up and preserve their sovereignty. They become, and are regarded as, 
legitimate authorities for, and recognized representatives of, distinct 
political communities. States earn deference from courts, politicians, and 
sub- as well as supra-state institutions by bargaining, negotiating, 
providing remedies and outlets for political participation, and so forth.  
Competence sovereignty is deeply ingrained in our constitutional and 
political systems. It arises, ultimately, from shared understandings that a 
state, to borrow from some of the many available definitions of 
sovereignty, is “in charge of a domain,”500 has the “capacity to make and 
give effect to public decisions,”501 has the ability to regulate movements 
across borders, and is “an independent entity entitled to freedom from 
external intervention.”502 Even though the Constitution formally places 
states in a subordinated position relative to federal authorities, state 
sovereignty continues to prosper as a result of the social and political 
dynamic described above. State sovereignty constructs reality for federal 
and state authorities, as well as for citizens. That is why the concept 
persists and prospers despite the relative disadvantages of states. 
Notice that competence sovereignty is not narrowly defined or 
confined to issues of wealth or exclusive power. It is in the nature of a 
bundle or basket of competences or functions states perform to greater or 
lesser degrees, rather than a “chunk” of stone that may be won or lost.503 
This version of state sovereignty comports with what we actually see in 
terms of state and federal practices; it jibes with the messy constitutional 
system we actually have rather than an unattainable and unrealistic 
sovereign monolith. On this view, the sovereignty of the state depends 
 499. BLIX, supra note 26, at 12. 
 500. JAMES, supra note 3, at 19 (quoting CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL, THE EXERCISE OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 3 (1965)).  
 501. JAMES, supra note 3, at 19. 
 502. John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 782, 786 (2003). 
 503. See FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at 64 (distinguishing the “basket” and “chunk” 
approaches to state sovereignty).  
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upon its competence in carrying out the functions of statehood. We can 
monitor and analyze state sovereignty by studying institutional behavior 
and state performance. States can prop up their own sovereignty by 
attending to sovereign functions, even those that may seem trivial or, in 
the short term, ineffectual.  
Status sovereignty, by contrast, has nothing at all to do with the actions 
of states, or the dynamic between the states and federal authorities. Status 
sovereignty resembles the more traditional idea of inherent respect and 
recognition for states as states. It is, in this respect, precisely the negative 
proscription on federal authority the Skeptics have denounced, rather than 
a positive resource for states to utilize. It is propped up and maintained 
primarily as a result of states defending lawsuits in which courts decree 
that the states are immune from things like judicial processes and 
“commandeering.” Status sovereignty often means that states cannot be 
held accountable for, among other things, their alleged civil rights 
violations. 
There is nothing inherently dysfunctional or disturbing about the 
existence of two different iterations or conceptions of domestic state 
sovereignty. After all, state sovereignty is a polysemous construct. But in 
fashioning a reconceptualization of state sovereignty, we should take 
advantage of the full range of insights that concepts like the “new 
sovereignty” and social construction theory offer for scholars, states, and 
courts. This should include insights regarding the circumstances in which 
state sovereignty is generated and, more importantly, how it is sustained 
over time. Based upon these insights, there are several reasons why, in 
terms of proposing a reconceptualization of state sovereignty, competence 
sovereignty is to be preferred over status sovereignty.  
First, if one accepts that state sovereignty is an “institutional fact” that 
depends upon the generation of shared understandings, the primary 
problem with status sovereignty is readily apparent. Status sovereignty is 
imposed upon states almost exclusively by judicial fiat. It has been the 
product, so far, of the mostly implicit treatment of states as being “like” 
nations or persons or market participants. If there is a shared 
understanding on these terms, it is most likely not one shared by many 
outside a majority of the Court and, of course, the states whose immunity, 
or autonomy, or other right or power, happens to be vindicated. 
Competence sovereignty, by contrast, is the product of a much broader 
dynamic process of generation which includes social, academic, judicial, 
and political discourses as well as ongoing state performance and 
practices. The core “bundle of competences” that states are understood to 
possess have a long and distinguished history; they have, as the discussion 
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above showed, been associated with statehood at least since the framing of 
the Constitution. These functions or competences, in contrast to judicial 
comparisons of states to nations or persons, are thus deeply ingrained, 
mostly agreed-upon aspects of state sovereignty. They rest, therefore, on a 
much more solid foundation than does pure juridical status.  
Second, status sovereignty, unlike competence sovereignty, has not 
been justified by reasoned judgments. Indeed, the Court never explains the 
basis for its invocation of state sovereignty in the immunity and autonomy 
cases. It is difficult to reach a shared understanding of what the states’ 
sovereignty entails absent at least some principled discussion of its 
normative justification. Repeating over and over that the states are 
“sovereign, ” that they possess “dignity” and “esteem,” and that they are 
entitled to “respect,” falls far short of a reasoned justification. Indeed, it is 
precisely this sort of claim to state sovereignty that lends credence to the 
Skeptic’s complaint that sovereignty is nothing but empty rhetoric or a 
disguise for power politics. The principal infirmity of the Court’s status 
sovereignty is not, as some Classicists claim, that it is only a partial 
defense for states; sovereignty can be partial and yet still quite effective.504 
It is, rather, that the status imposed upon the states lacks sufficient 
justification or reason. It never becomes a part of any dynamic 
constructive process. It is not vetted, justified, or filtered. What makes a 
state “like” a nation? Or a person? The Court never says. The justifications 
for state competences and functions, by contrast, have been articulated 
over an expanse of time in a variety of social, political, and judicial 
discourses. They have survived the test of time.  
Third, as noted, status sovereignty is entirely passive in character. It 
exists not to provide the states with power or authority, but rather, as 
Professor Rakove posits, “to deny some other locus of authority . . . that 
power.”505 Status sovereignty does not require that the states do anything 
at all, other than simply exist, to prop up or sustain their sovereignty. 
Institutional facts like state sovereignty thrive on performance, interaction, 
and repetition. The international concept of the “new sovereignty” 
demonstrates that most states, even powerful nation-states, cannot sit back 
and rest upon some sort of negative sovereignty status shield. The new 
sovereignty, unlike the old, is not absolute or defensive. It is proactive, 
and maintained largely by the states themselves. If it were not sustained in 
 504. See Gey, supra note 21, at 1641 (“In the end, a coherent theory of state sovereignty must 
mean that states possess the authority to make final policy decisions with regard to some functions, 
and the federal government can do nothing about it.”). 
 505. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 54.  
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this manner, nation-state sovereignty would likely atrophy, or worse. 
Status sovereignty carries “defensive emotive associations” which not 
only encourage the passivity mentioned above, but also stifle creative 
thinking about “a ground for a forward policy of one’s own.”506 These are 
particular perils for the American states’ sovereignty, which is only 
guaranteed, in constitutive terms, in the most rudimentary and thin sense 
and otherwise requires constant state attention, maintenance, and repair.  
Fourth, status sovereignty gives rise to a substantial moral objection. 
The objection, highlighted by the Court’s recent immunity, anti-
commandeering, and “due process” precedents, is that status sovereignty 
encourages bad behavior by states. It is something of a license to behave 
in a manner that is disrespectful, even dismissive, of the rights of 
individuals. In domestic terms, it conjures the “states’ rights” of old, with 
its racist agenda and disregard for human rights. Sovereignty of this 
character thus “has a baleful influence on men’s minds”;507 it encourages 
the attitude that citizens are subservient to state interests rather than the 
other way around.  
This relates to a fifth, and for present purposes final, problem with 
status sovereignty, which is that a judicially maintained negative “rights 
talk” for states will, in all likelihood, not be sustainable over the long term. 
Nation-states have come to tolerate substantial interventions into their 
“internal” sovereignty in terms of enforcement of human rights.508 There is 
no reason to expect that the states will continue to be shielded from 
liability for alleged violations of their citizens’ rights. Indeed, there are 
already signs that the Supreme Court is wary of taking status sovereignty 
to its logical extreme, which would prohibit Congress from authorizing 
any private lawsuits to remedy or prevent state civil rights violations. The 
Court has recently balked at the opportunity to take status sovereignty this 
far.509 History suggests that the formalism of status sovereignty will, in the 
end, suffer the same fate as prior formalistic iterations of sovereignty.  
 506. JAMES, supra note 3, at 260. 
 507. Id. at 257. 
 508. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Sovereignty: The State, the Individual, and the International 
Legal System in the Twenty First Century, 25 HASTINGS INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 279 (2002). 
 509. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (permitting private suits against states pursuant 
to Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act); Nev. Dept. Of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 734 (2003) (permitting private suits against states pursuant to Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993); see also Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 1941, 1946 (2004) (upholding federal statute 
authorizing federal prosecution of bribery even absent connection between forbidden conduct and 
federal funds). 
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Even if its energies inclined in this direction, the Court should cease 
this project. A negative, discussion-ending status sovereignty plays right 
into the hands of Skeptics. As the Skeptics point out, “reasoning from a 
simplistic principle like sovereignty [is] much easier than doing the heavy 
if prosaic lifting of making federalism work by avoiding the allure of 
extreme formulations.”510 Status sovereignty is precisely the sort of 
concept that “begs to be borrowed and assigned new and surprising uses, 
beckoning would-be consumers to take it down from the shelf and put it to 
work.”511 It would be far preferable, not only from the standpoint of 
acknowledging the constructed nature of state sovereignty, but also for the 
overall health of our constitutional system, that states should be 
encouraged to assert their sovereignty in a much more proactive and 
dynamic fashion.512
Of course, as some Classicists posit, states will continue to function 
whether or not they are labeled “sovereign.” But this misses a critical 
point, namely that the states’ functions are an integral part of their claims 
to sovereign respect, recognition, and control. Yes, states will always 
perform some of these functions because this is, in some measure, why 
states exist in the first place. Better, however, they do so knowing that 
their own sovereignty is what is “at stake” and with some appreciation 
with regard to how they can contribute to its construction and prosperity. 
The more states rely on status sovereignty to bail them out, the more 
complacent they will become, and the weaker their claims to sovereignty 
will ultimately be. Moreover, a state that is aware of the need for 
proactivity will exercise its sovereignty in novel ways. The coming 
together of the “Big Four” states, discussed above, is a good example of 
this.513 Professor Amar has suggested that states “can gain political 
goodwill by arming their citizens with remedies for constitutional wrongs 
threatened or perpetrated by federal officials.”514 He contends that state 
sovereignty, applied in this positive fashion, can become what it once 
 510. Rakove, Hash II, supra note 23, at 57. 
 511. Id. 
 512. This is not the same as suggesting, as others have, that the Court justify its “federalism” 
decisions with respect to the normative values associated with federalism or “dual sovereignty.” See, 
e.g., Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U. CINN. L. 
REV. 245, 246 (2000) (noting “how the theme of deference to the states has drifted from normative, 
structural analysis to a states’ rights approach”). It certainly should do so, and this would, of course, 
contribute to the construction of competence sovereignty, not least by adding an important judicial 
discourse to that dynamic. This would help, but it would not suffice to establish state sovereignty. 
Sovereignty is not a matter of judicial fiat; it is ultimately a state-administered, state-driven institution.  
 513. See supra notes 330–31 and accompanying text. 
 514. Amar, supra note 59, at 1428. 
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was—a “tool[] to right government wrongs.”515 Whatever means they 
choose, with whatever specific policy goals, states must endeavor to turn 
sovereignty from a negative proscription on federal power into a positive, 
functional resource.  
As the ongoing experiment of the European Union suggests, a state can 
be successful and vigorous without traditional “sovereign” prerogatives 
like legal supremacy, coinage of money, and genuinely independent 
military forces. Social construction theory suggests, however, that in order 
to be meaningfully “sovereign,” the post-modern state must ultimately 
appear to be able to respond adequately to the expectations—economic, 
political, and social—of the community. For the American states, this 
means that they must continue to maintain a meaningful independence 
relative to other states and sub-state actors. They must be able to influence, 
but not necessarily dictate, policies with regard to fundamental matters 
like birth, marriage, and death. They must continue to resist and alter 
supra-state (federal) mandates affecting fundamental goods like education 
and welfare. They must be able to engender citizen loyalty. Finally, they 
must overcome their natural inertia and risk-aversion to serve as a 
potential source of solutions to the social and economic problems of the 
present and future. The “new sovereignty” of the states requires that states 
consistently, and preferably aggressively, act as sovereigns in order to be 
recognized as such. 
D. Implications 
This section summarizes the implications, for states, scholars, and 
courts, of the reconceptualization of sovereignty proposed in this article. 
As has been the case in international fields, the new domestic state 
sovereignty has substantial implications for statecraft, scholarship, and 
jurisprudence.  
With regard first to states, the new sovereignty requires a level of 
proactivity and creativity that a status-based sovereignty does not. States 
have to be aware that their sovereignty is a resource, that it can be shared 
with other states and pooled in unique arrangements. States must realize 
that their sovereignty is always at stake. The positive news is that a state’s 
“sovereignty profile” is to a large degree something that it can actively 
influence and maintain. This does not require that a state always “win” in 
disputes with federal institutions, only that it assert its interests, and those 
 515. Id. at 1429. 
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of its citizens, forcefully and publicly. The new sovereignty requires that 
states act with the knowledge that actions and appearances count. They are 
part of the constructive process that produces state sovereignty. 
As for scholars, those who accept that states can in fact be “sovereign” 
can gain some insights from the new sovereignty into where, in fact, the 
states’ sovereignty resides. Scholars should not be counting brute facts like 
dollars, goods, troops, legislative enactments, and personnel in 
determining whether the states remain sovereign. Nor should 
constitutional scholars be concerned solely with formal indicia of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty occurs on the ground, in functions, relationships, 
and dynamics, rather than in brute materials. Scholars should be looking 
for instances in which states share or pool their sovereignty and exercise 
their sovereign functions. They should be thinking about, and perhaps 
proposing, novel methods for states to share their sovereignty, as 
European states have done and continue to do.  
Finally, courts should recognize that status sovereignty is inherently 
flawed. The specific reasons were provided above. Above all, status 
sovereignty misconceives what sovereignty is. It is a construct that can 
only come about through the development of shared understandings over 
time. Sovereignty cannot simply be imposed or declared. And it should not 
be used as a defense, a mechanism for preserving formal state prerogatives 
that have little or nothing to do with either federalism or sovereignty, at 
least as properly conceived. If they wish to sustain the states, courts need 
to develop a more positive, normative vision of state sovereignty and 
federalism.  
VI. WHY STATE SOVEREIGNTY STILL MATTERS 
It remains to be considered whether, if state sovereignty is not or at 
least should not be conceptualized as a sledgehammer as it was in the 
Classical model, it plays any useful role in constitutional discourse or 
practice. This Part argues that it does, for reasons similar to those 
advanced by international relations scholars who continue to defend the 
concept of state sovereignty.  
If, as this Article has asserted, state sovereignty cannot be measured 
and is not independently verifiable, then sovereignty’s relevance 
ultimately depends upon its status as an institutional fact. Simply put, then, 
the question, whether the context is domestic or international, is whether 
state sovereignty helps to explain the ordering of the world. 
Sovereignty does indeed serve this purpose for the relevant social and 
political actors. Indeed, state sovereignty persists, domestically and 
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abroad, precisely because it matters to states, diplomats, citizens, and 
institutions. Sovereignty is part of the discourse of statecraft. It is “a claim 
to ordering power.”516 It is “a way of speaking about the world, a way of 
acting in the world.”517 This is so whether we are talking about states or 
nation-states. Sovereignty effectively channels arguments and claims 
about power. In terms of domestic state sovereignty, it forces 
consideration of and attention to subsidiarity—the idea that there is a 
“second sovereign.” The concept has come to serve a similar function 
internationally, as supra-national structures like the EU have arisen.  
Indeed, the primary benefit of retaining some concept of state 
sovereignty is that it contributes to order. As one international relations 
scholar said: “Sovereignty in both theory and practice is aimed at 
establishing order and clarity in an otherwise turbulent and incoherent 
world.”518 The concept of sovereignty contributes to order by creating a 
class of political entities that are expected to be permanent fixtures in a 
governance system. Under the Constitution, for example, constitutive 
rules—preservation, separateness, participation, and interpretive 
independence—imply the permanency of states. But what actually makes 
“dual sovereignty” a reality is the constitutive process, the manner in 
which states move beyond these rules to stake claims to legitimacy, 
deference, and recognition. The constitutive process makes the concept of 
state sovereignty more than a merely symbolic check on federal authority. 
It gives substance to sovereignty in such a manner that the label 
“sovereign” does more than describe political and economic arrangements; 
it explains and justifies them “as if they belonged to the natural order of 
things.”519  
Sovereignty does more than merely help to protect the states against 
elimination or annihilation. It provides a recognized legal and political 
hierarchy. As the constructive dynamic demonstrated, the idea that the 
states retain a “sovereign” status operates to, among other things, level the 
playing field in interactions between state and federal authorities. 
Sovereignty is in this respect a very powerful concept. It results in 
deference to and respect for states even though the Constitution does not 
mandate this in express terms; even though, in fact, Congress, for 
example, is not required to defer or desist. Sovereignty allows the states to 
bargain and negotiate as if they occupied a position of more or less equal 
 516. SOVEREIGNTY IN TRANSITION, supra note 2, at 6. 
 517. CAMILLERI & FALK, supra note 3, at 11. 
 518. Id.  
 519. Id. 
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bargaining power. This does not mean that states always succeed in 
negotiations with federal authorities—far from it, of course. However, in a 
variety of circumstances that touch on local concerns, states are often 
given the “final say” whether or not the Constitution or empirical 
circumstances formally entitle them to it. The institutional fact of state 
sovereignty makes this possible.  
Sovereignty contributes to order and stability in other ways as well. It 
creates expectations of how political entities are to behave. States, for 
example, recognize that they possess an “external” sovereignty in terms of 
their interstate relations. As a result, states are aware not only of their own 
latitude and power, but also of their obligation to respect the prerogatives 
of their “peers.” The doctrine of “separate sovereigns” codifies this 
particular shared understanding.520  
Finally, by maintaining state permanence and order, the concept of 
sovereignty promotes the self-determination of local political 
communities. Advocates of “decentralization,” as opposed to a system of 
at least partially sovereign states, tend to downplay this critical conceptual 
function.521 But a state that is aware of its sovereign status is likely to be 
bolder in terms of governance than some fungible unit in a decentralized 
system of authority; it will be more confident of its legitimacy. This 
confidence at least raises the potential for state innovation, the sort of 
proactive competence sovereignty this Article has defended. It buoys 
states to understand that an effective claim to control or deference might 
be made to blunt central interventions. There is, moreover, a distinct honor 
in maintaining a separateness and uniqueness. This is so not only for the 
states, as states, but far more importantly for their citizens, who surely 
have a greater stake in a sovereign community than one which is always 
compelled to follow central commands and to conform.  
Of course, for sovereignty to serve any of these purposes, it must reside 
in the states, which of course act ultimately as representatives of the 
people. As a theoretical matter, the locus of sovereignty is likely never to 
be definitively fixed. However, as internationalists recognized long ago, 
sovereignty has been “co-opted” and utilized by democratic and 
republican states the world over. The Republican sentiment that the people 
who consented to the social contract are the only “true” sovereign is an 
 520. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (“When a defendant in a single act violates the 
‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed two distinct 
‘offences.’”). 
 521. See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 23 (arguing that decentralization of authority 
would be more beneficial than maintaining the system of sovereign states). 
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accurate statement of political theory so far as it goes; but it offers little 
succor to states routinely faced with challenges and encroachments from 
sub- and supra-state institutions and private actors. “The people” have no 
means of expressing their “sovereignty” in response to these challenges, at 
least not on a day-to-day basis or in any manner that allows for 
contemporaneous expression of their will. The states do. In pragmatic 
terms, the concept of sovereignty can only serve its purposes if we accept 
that the states are the institutions that exercise “sovereign” powers.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
The concept of state sovereignty is controversial, both in terms of 
international politics and, especially recently, in terms of domestic claims 
that the states are “sovereign.” Nations have relied on claims to 
“sovereignty” for centuries to maintain internal control and external 
respect and recognition. States have done much the same thing 
domestically. State “sovereignty” has risen to prominence mostly as a 
result of the Supreme Court’s recent invocation of the concept to vindicate 
state claims to independence, autonomy, immunity, and other “rights.” As 
a result, the timeless notion that the Constitution establishes a “dual 
sovereignty” has received renewed attention.  
The general concerns raised by state claims to “sovereignty” are 
remarkably similar in both the international and domestic contexts. As one 
international relations scholar explained:  
For many of us, the term seems unfortunate because it suggests 
separateness and independence in an era increasingly marked by 
togetherness and interdependence; it stands for freedom of action by 
states when the need is for central coordination and control; and it 
evokes the fear of unpredictable and irresponsible state behavior . . . .522
The defenses of state sovereignty are also similar regardless of context. 
For instance, the same scholar suggests that “we value sovereignty as a 
protective mantle and deplore such disrespect for it as is entailed by acts of 
aggression against states and arbitrary interventions into their affairs.”523 
 522. Inis Claude, Jr., Foreword to FOWLER & BUNCK, supra note 3, at ix. 
 523. Id. 
The notion of sovereignty identifies the units that give the system its multistate character and 
is the essential indicator of the currently asserted and currently accepted implications of the 
status enjoyed by those units: the rights, immunities, responsibilities, and limitations 
attributed to states. Sovereignty, in short, has much to tell us about statehood and stateliness. 
 Id. 
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The enigma of sovereignty is that it is at the same time both troubling in 
terms of its broad implications, and critical in terms of such things as 
maintaining order and creating expectations of how political entities are to 
behave. 
State sovereignty has long been a topic of serious and sustained interest 
in the field of international relations. Domestic considerations of state 
sovereignty, on the other hand, are sporadic and relatively thin; they seem 
to crop up only when, as has recently been the case, the Supreme Court 
focuses attention on the concept. Unfortunately, domestic constitutional 
scholarship has wholly failed to take advantage of the energy and 
sophistication scholars of international relations and politics have brought 
to their consideration of state sovereignty.  
This Article has sought to bridge the scholarly divide. Specifically, it 
has done two things. First, it has emphasized sovereignty’s flexibility and 
perpetual conceptual evolution. We cannot determine whether the states 
are “truly” sovereign with regard to a classical model of sovereignty that 
has been superseded the world over. Internationalists have acknowledged 
the ongoing evolution of state sovereignty. Lawyers, legal scholars, and 
judges should do the same. State sovereignty today can be partial, 
relational, divided, even “pooled” as it is in the European Union. Yet 
states can still exhibit the indicia of sovereignty, such as effective control 
over territory or domain, performance of traditional sovereign functions or 
competences, rights, and recognition. Thus, the mere fact that the states 
enjoy only a residual and partial sovereignty ought not stifle further 
consideration of the concept of state sovereignty.  
Second, in addition to this conceptual updating, the Article has sought 
to explain how states continue to successfully assert claims to sovereignty 
despite their limited powers and material resources. The answer to this 
question lies in understanding how “sovereignty” is generated and 
maintained. This Article has suggested that social construction theory, 
which some internationalists have applied specifically to the concepts of 
statehood and sovereignty, provides one plausible answer. The theory 
reconceptualizes state sovereignty as an institutional fact dependent, in the 
end, upon the formation of shared understandings with regard to whether 
states are “sovereign” and under what circumstances. Social construction 
theory helpfully changes the focus from relative material authority (in 
terms of, for example, personnel, power, and wealth) to the dynamics of 
what states do, how they are represented, and how their claims to 
sovereignty are justified.  
With some adjustments necessary to account for the different contexts, 
social construction theory can explain how the states continue to be 
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perceived as “sovereign” despite their relative disadvantages in terms of 
wealth and power. This Article demonstrated, in Part V, that state 
sovereignty has been, and continues to be, socially, politically, and legally 
constructed. It showed that states continue to be treated as sovereign—as 
being essentially “in charge of a domain,” or having the “final say” with 
respect to substantial matters, or possessing certain rights—despite lacking 
absolute and exclusive authority. Sometimes this is a matter of 
competence; just as the international “new sovereignty” depends upon 
bargaining, negotiation, and proactivity, so too does the states’ sovereignty 
depend on the perception of performance and exercise of typical 
“sovereign” functions like exercise of police powers and the provision of 
community benefits. At other times, state sovereignty is a juridical status 
imposed upon states by the Court to defend them from lawsuits, or federal 
“commandeering.” Thus, states enjoy some of the same sorts of 
“sovereign rights” as nations, or people. Both on the ground, in day-to-day 
administration, and in the courts, shared understandings have taken shape 
that the states are “sovereign” authorities.  
This Article suggests that we stand at a crossroads with regard to what 
state sovereignty is to be in the post-classical, post-modern era. It 
identifies, as products of the constructive process, two distinct 
sovereignties which it labels “competence sovereignty” and “status 
sovereignty.” The Article argues that the juridical concept of status 
sovereignty is not sustainable, and should not be encouraged. A state 
sovereignty based upon defenses to lawsuits and judicially imposed 
recognition will not ultimately sustain the states, or satisfy skeptical critics 
who maintain that sovereignty is a mere cover for power politics. In the 
end, the states must generally administer and prop up their own 
sovereignty. Insofar as they do so, and do so effectively, state sovereignty 
will continue to be an important concept in terms of preserving the states 
and ordering federalism.  
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